


THE IMPERIAL BRITISH NAVY

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THE IMPERIAL BRITISH NAVY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE GRAND FLEET
ILLUSTRATED





AN IMPERIAL SHIP IN WAR TIME.

Cribb.

Frontispiece.

THE IMPERIAL BRITISH NAVY

HOW THE COLONIES BEGAN
TO THINK IMPERIALLY UPON
THE FUTURE OF THE NAVY

BY
H. C. FERRABY

WITH TWO MAPS AND
THIRTY-TWO ILLUSTRATIONS

HERBERT JENKINS LIMITED
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TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE

TO
R. D. B.
WHO GAVE ME
MY CHANCE

44C990



AUTHOR'S NOTE

PROBLEMS envisaged are well on the way to resolution.

It has been given to the peoples of Britain to evolve out of chaos a unified system of defensive force which shall serve as a shield to cover widely separated parts of the Empire. It is a task that, like all our tasks, we have been dilatory in beginning. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there was desultory discussion of the subject. At intervals for the next three decades Colonial Conferences talked around the subject in an academic way and passed resolutions. It was not all talk, however. Things were done: but the doing was spasmodic, the efforts were not co-ordinated. Local considerations dictated policies and not the best needs of the whole Imperial system.

In 1892 Admiral Penrose Fitzgerald wrote in this connection:

“War would doubtless bring about federation immediately.”

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It is in the hope that such naval federation is at hand, and that it will be achieved with the consent of the several States forming the Empire, that this book has been written. It is a bringing together of the facts connected with the Colonial attempts to found new Navies or to graft their help on to the British Navy. It is a survey of the past, but it is also intended to be a signpost for the future. My hope in writing it has been that I might make clear to the man in Birmingham and in Brisbane, in Pretoria and in Regina, that old but often forgotten truth that the sea is all one. Therefrom depends the great fact in the future defence of the Imperial Commonwealth—that our sea forces must be all one in spirit and in direction if not in actual details.

“Let us be backed with God and with the seas
Which He hath given us for fence impregnable,
And with their helps only defend ourselves:
In them and in ourselves our safety lies.”

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THE ARTERIES OF EMPIRE

THE British Empire is the child of the sea and only by the sea can it live.

There is a danger that this simple truth may become obscured in the clouds of soldiery called forth by the necessities of a great Continental campaign. Every Dominion, every Crown Colony, every dependency has been drained of men to supply the great armies fighting in the four corners of the world. The attention of the citizens of the overseas Empire has been focussed on the military doings. In a word, the visible military superstructure has caught men's eyes, and they have forgotten the solid unnoticed founda-

tion of sea power on which alone the Army could be built. Even the soldiers have forgotten the path by which they reached the continental battle grounds.

This is no new thing. Five years before the Great War broke out it was necessary for a leading English statesman to ask his countrymen :

“ If every young man of twenty was trained to arms, what would it avail you if the sea was not free and open ? ” And he referred further to “ the great trade routes which are the very arteries and rivers through which our life-blood flows.”* One’s only quarrel with the phrase is the use of the words “ trade routes.” For the sea is something more than a trade route. To confine our appreciation of its benefits to the use made of it for trading purposes is to infer in us a commercialism of mind that would go far to justify the historic gibe of Napoleon.

The sea is much more than a trade route. It is the heart of the Empire. The ebb and flow of its tides are the pulsating of the blood through the whole body. Without

* Mr. Balfour, January, 1909.

the strength which it gives every limb would atrophy and die.

It is a fact seldom noticed even by careful thinkers that all the constituent parts of the Empire save one are to be found in islands or lands peculiarly liable to attack from the sea. Canada is the only continental Dominion with a nervous centre far removed from the menace of direct naval attack. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa are as dependent on the sea as Great Britain for defence against aggression. India was won by sea power and is held by the same force. The West Indies and the East Indies, Honduras and St. Helena, the Guinea Coast and the Pacific Islands—all these are in the same position. From the sea comes their menace. On the sea is their defence.

Anyone who studies the growth of the Empire from the days when the Cabots discovered Newfoundland is speedily impressed by the fact that it was the maritime nations that widened the borders of the known world—Spain, the Netherlands, France, Portugal and England. Spain and Portugal were the first to lose the power of free movement across the seas. Holland sank from

the front rank after the Dutch wars. And France only ceased to be co-equal with England when the military megalomania first of Louis XIV and then of Napoleon had exhausted her. More by good luck than by any settled policy of their forbears the rulers of Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century found themselves in a position of unchallenged supremacy, and there was no serious attempt to challenge that position throughout the long reign of Queen Victoria. Shielded by the sea the scattered units of the Empire grew up. Canada was united into a Dominion. The Australian States coalesced into a Commonwealth at the dawn of the new century, which also saw the making of United South Africa. New Zealand had responsible Government for half the nineteenth century, and throughout the world British protectorates extended.

All this went on unimpeded by any menace from a single European Power, despite the fact that throughout the century the military strength of all the great Continental nations was doubled and re-doubled.

That is a fact that may well give pause to the most haphazard student of Imperial defence.

All through that period of growth the life of the whole fabric depended on one thing: the safety of the little island in the north-west corner of Europe round which the Atlantic surges. The late Admiral P. H. Colomb, than whom there was no more acute student of the influence of sea-power, described the position accurately when he wrote :—

“It (the Empire) is a living organism whose parts are all interdependent and highly sensitive in their relations. A stab at the heart may put it to death more suddenly, but perhaps not more surely, than the severing of a remote artery or the wound of a nerve centre.”

That was profoundly true when it was written. Defeat of Great Britain by the military hordes of the European Continent would have shattered at one blow the whole fabric of the Empire. It was her inviolability that kept the overseas fledglings inviolate.

That position no longer obtains. The Empire to-day is a coalition of grown nations, each competent to provide for its own defence within certain limits but not yet competent single-handed to defy aggression by one of

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the older Powers. Upon the form of defence that each chooses and provides for the common weal—and each is free to choose for itself—depends the ultimate fate of the coalition of all. The British Isles are not now the heart. That, as I have said, is the sea. It is the inviolability of the sea that must be defended.

A phrase that came into general use some ten years ago described the North Sea as “the centre of naval gravity.” And though there were pedantic opponents of the policy of that time who affected to be unable to understand the phrase, its meaning is perfectly clear. Newton’s *Principia* holds good as well subjectively as objectively. The West Atlantic was the centre of naval gravity when the struggle was between Spain and Elizabethan England. The North Sea was the centre when Holland and the Restoration England were antagonists. The opponents gravitated towards the Mediterranean when the control of the route to the East and the safeguarding of the anti-Napoleonic alliance became essential.

It is noteworthy that hitherto the centre of naval gravity has always lain in

European waters. It will not do so for ever. Among the factors that will swing it elsewhere must be the growth of air-power. European nations are near enough to one another to make aerial attack on a small scale a thing of the immediate future. The outlying parts of the Empire are safeguarded by distance at present from that menace. The threat to them will be, as it has always been, sea-borne.

Hubert de Burgh's appeal to the Cinque Ports seamen in 1217, "If these people land England is lost: let us therefore boldly meet them," was the rallying cry of the initial master-stroke in the use of sea-power. Its fundamental verity is unchallengeable. It applies to-day to every Dominion that looks to support the commonwealth of English-speaking nations.

CHAPTER II

EARLY EFFORTS

THE growth and development of the individual colonial naval efforts during the latter part of the nineteenth century will be dealt with in separate chapters, but there are certain general lines of policy, tendencies that may be called the origins of the Colonial Navies which can be most suitably considered as a whole.

The neglect of naval matters in Britain between the years 1830 and 1885 is one of the blots on the Victorian era. It arose from a variety of causes, acting and reacting on each other as these things always do in the body politic. For one thing, there was only one First Lord of the Admiralty during that time who took any vital interest in the Navy. Anyone who looks through the list of men who occupied the post during those fifty-five years will be struck at once by the fact that either they were aristocratic nonenti-

ties or political figure-heads. The Sea Lords were, with rare exceptions, undistinguished ; most of them served on the Board too long. For example, the Hon. Sir Richard Dundas became a junior Sea Lord on January 5, 1853, as a captain, and continued to serve without intermission through various grades until he died First Sea Lord and Vice-Admiral in 1862. There were few naval men at that time who had the personality that impresses the public, and the present-day tradition that the Navy is a silent service dates from the era when it said nothing because it had no spokesman.


It was a misfortune that the period of growth of the oversea States should have coincided with this era of naval neglect. The lack of interest in the Mother Country could not fail to be reflected in the young nations.

When Britain was roused to adequate consideration of the naval problems of the future by the dramatic ebullitions of Lord Charles Beresford, the sterling value of the lectures and books of Admiral Colomb, and the quiet but persistent campaign in society that Sir George Tryon carried on at the

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innumerable dinner parties which it was his lot to attend as Secretary of the Admiralty in the early eighties, the oversea people, knowing the record of the previous three decades, wanted to know what the panic was all about. It took many years of ardent preaching to clear away the misconceptions of the period of neglect.

At the same time it would not be just to overlook such efforts as were made by far-sighted men to rouse the country. Nearly thirty years before the agitation that culminated in the Naval Defence Act of 1889, one member of the House of Commons had endeavoured to get consideration of the question of Colonial co-operation brought before the public. Mr. Austin Mills, M.P., suggested in 1861 a Committee "to enquire and report whether any and what alterations may be advantageously adopted in regard to the defence of British Dependencies; and the proportion of cost of such defences as now defrayed from Imperial and Colonial Funds respectively." The Committee was appointed and heard witnesses, among them Mr. Gladstone, who was responsible for the affirmation that "so long as England has



Cribb.

THE KING INSPECTING AN IMPERIAL SHIP.

Facing page 22.

TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE

supremacy at sea, her Colonial Empire is virtually safe." The Committee's report endorsed this sound opinion, but went further into the strategical aspects of the whole question and advised definitely against the project for the multiplication of shore defences—or fortified places as they were described—in the oversea possessions.

This was a decided rebuff to the fortifications school which was strongly entrenched in Canada among other places. The Canadian authorities of the time encouraged the development of local militia and the land forces generally to the detriment of naval preparations.

The war scares of the seventies turned the thoughts of public men in the Dominions and colonies to the practical side of Imperial defence. The "Common Force" school began to win over the adherents of "local defence," and in 1879 the Government appointed a Royal Commission.

This Commission was presided over by the Earl of Carnarvon, and the terms of reference empowered it "to enquire into the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad." The Commissioners presented three

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reports between 1879 and 1882, and the principal points covered by the reports were :

The advantages to the Empire arising from the convenience of a multiplicity of well-found ports.

The potential strength of the Dominions at sea.

Fortification of coaling stations.

The importance of the Cape of Good Hope.

There were errors in the recommendations. Many heretical opinions on the questions of offence and defence held sway in the latter nineteenth century, errors that were swept away as the teaching of Colomb and Mahan became better known. But on the two points that mainly interest us in the present considerations, the second and fourth, the Commissioners' report was eminently sound. And Lord Carnarvon was fully justified in expressing, as he did, his surprise at what he designated the "strange procrastination" of the Government in carrying into effect the resolutions of the Commission.

Public opinion meantime was being instructed by lectures, by articles and by private conversations. The Australasian newspapers devoted considerable attention to the ques-

tions and "scare" methods of a type that the present generation associates with the anti-German campaign between 1908 and 1914 were very effectively used. On the more serious side were addresses such as that delivered by Lord Brassey at the Royal Colonial Institute in June, 1878. He advocated then a system very similar to that which was actually adopted for the control of the various naval units of the Empire at the outbreak of the Great War. He proposed that the Imperial and Colonial (Australian) Governments should combine to create a fleet of sea-going ships which should be kept in reserve in the harbours of the Australasian Stations and manned by a Colonial Naval Volunteer Force in time of war. Co-operation of the Colonies and the United Kingdom on measures of naval defence was, in fact, advocated by all the prominent thinkers of the time, including Colomb and Sir Julius Vogel, the former Prime Minister of New Zealand.

The early eighties were a period of mental preparation in most of the colonial States. The work of Sir George Tryon in Australia is discussed in its proper place in connection

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with the Royal Australian Navy.* And it is not until the first Colonial Conference was held in London in 1887 that we find any common ground on which all the States of the Empire met.

The Government of the day was held by naval students to be ill-advised strategically in the position it adopted, but in the light of later years' experience it was clear that their plan was politically the sound one. The project for a local Australasian Squadron was endorsed, and the Home Government in its message to the oversea delegates said :

“We do not regard this question in the light of a mere bargain between the Mother Country and the Colonies, but as the starting point of a new policy—the first step towards a federation for defence.”

The Conference of 1897 brought a further development ; Cape Colony agreed to a yearly subsidy, and Natal and Newfoundland made voluntary contributions.

The idea spread gradually, as knowledge of the meaning of sea-power spread. The Colonial Conference of 1902 found all the representatives more and more convinced of

* See *post*, pp. 40-43.

the necessity for combined effort. Canada began to show signs of coming into line, and the subsidies paid by the others were materially increased.

Five years later, however, the agreement had broken down in part. Australian opinion keenly desired the creation of an Australian Navy, and at the Conference of 1907 it was agreed that this desire should be met, that New Zealand should go on paying a subsidy, while the Cape and Natal should have a branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. Canada's position was that the obligations she had already taken over were as much as she could shoulder.

It was the Conference of 1909 which put the seal on the two decades of preparation for Imperial Naval Defence. As Lord Esher put it in an address to the Imperial Press Conference in the same year, the younger nations sought how they might help "by developing individuality as centres of naval strength and developing in such a way as makes for the closest possible co-ordination between their Navies and the Old Country."

The Board of Admiralty prepared a special memorandum on the subject for the con-

sideration of the Dominion Delegates. This document is of considerable historical importance, and is so germane to the whole subject matter of this book that I have obtained permission to print it in full.*

The upshot of the Conference was summarized by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in a statement made to the House of Commons on August of that year, and cannot be more succinctly given than in his own words :

“ Naval defence was discussed at meetings of the Conference held at the Foreign Office on the 3rd, 5th and 6th August. The Admiralty Memorandum, which had been circulated to the Dominion representatives, formed the basis of the preliminary conferences.

“ The alternative methods which might be adopted by the Dominion Governments in co-operating in Imperial Naval Defence were discussed. New Zealand preferred to adhere to her present policy of contribution ; Canada and Australia preferred to lay the foundations of fleets of their own. It was recognized that in building up a fleet a number of conditions must be conformed to. The fleet must be of a certain size, in order to offer

* Appendix I.

a permanent career to the officers and men engaged in the Service ; the personnel should be trained and disciplined under regulations similar to those established in the Royal Navy, in order to allow of both interchange and union between the British and the Dominion Services ; and with the same object, the standard of vessels and armaments should be uniform.

“ A re-modelling of the squadrons maintained in Far Eastern waters was considered on the basis of establishing a Pacific Fleet, to consist of three units in the East Indies, Australia and China Seas, each comprising, with some variations, a large armoured cruiser of the new *Indomitable* type, three second-class cruisers of the *Bristol* type, six destroyers of the “ River ” class, and three submarines of C class.

“ The generous offer, first of New Zealand and then of the Commonwealth Government, to contribute to Imperial naval defence by the gift each of a battleship was accepted with the substitution of cruisers of the new *Indomitable* type for battleships—these two ships to be maintained one on the China and one on the Australian Station.

“Separate meetings took place at the Admiralty with the representatives of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and general statements were agreed to in each case for further consideration by their respective Governments.

“As regards Australia, the suggested arrangement is that with some temporary assistance from Imperial funds the Commonwealth Government should provide and maintain the Australian and Pacific Fleet.

“The contribution of the New Zealand Government would be applied towards the maintenance of the China unit, of which some of the smaller vessels would have New Zealand waters as their headquarters.

“As regards Canada, it was considered that her double seaboard rendered the provision of a Fleet unit of the same kind unsuitable for the present. It was proposed, according to the amount of money that might be available, that Canada should make a start with cruisers of the *Bristol* class and destroyers of an improved ‘River’ class—a part to be stationed on the Atlantic seaboard and a part on the Pacific.

“In accordance with an arrangement

already made, the Canadian Government would undertake the maintenance of the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, and it was part of the arrangement proposed with the Australian representatives that the Commonwealth Government should eventually undertake the maintenance of the dockyard at Sydney."

That was the starting-point of the Imperial British Navy. The problem was still complex. The difficulties to be surmounted were still great. How many years it would have taken to bring about a consensus of opinion throughout the Empire favourable to federated naval forces, locally maintained but Imperially controlled at need, must always remain a matter of conjecture. The sternly practical lesson of war came at a time when opinion was not wholly formed. Of the effect of the lesson there can be no doubt. War which enshrouds so much in fog was a clarifying influence on the subject of sea-power. Every far-flung islet of the Empire realized within a few weeks the truth that had been emphasized by speakers and writers for a generation, a truth that was uttered first by Raleigh when he wrote :

“To entertain those that shall assail us with their own beef in their bellies and before they eat of our Kentish capons I take it to be the wisest way ; to do which his Majesty, after God, will employ his good ships on the sea and not trust in any entrenchment upon the shore.”

CHAPTER III


AUSTRALIAN PLANS

HISTORICAL research has all the fascination of criminal investigation. You have to follow so many clues to pin down one fact. It would appear to be the easiest thing in the world to discover at what date the Admiralty first maintained a squadron in Australasian waters, or first created what came to be known as the Australasian Station. In point of fact, many hours of painstaking research have only enabled me to come to this conclusion—that the command did not exist in 1836, and that it did exist in 1840. An unofficial Navy List for the latter year records the *Alligator*, *Beagle* and *Britomart* as stationed in Australia.*

* *The Naval and Military Almanack for the year 1840*, edited by W. H. Maxwell. London, A. H. Bailey and Co. Sir W. Laird Clowes (*History of the Royal Navy*, Vol. VII, p. 89) states that Australia was established as a separate station on March 26, 1859, when Commodore W. Loring was appointed to the command. This is obviously only correct in so far as it refers to the actual appointment of a senior officer to command on the station. It existed as a station before 1859.

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The *Alligator* was a 26-gun ship commanded by Captain Sir J. J. G. Bremer, K.C.B., which in the following year took part in the blockade at Amoy and the operations at Amunghoy, when Captain Bremer took the Bogue forts from the Chinese. So her stay on the Australian Station was not a long one. The only other vessels that appear to have been allotted to Australasian waters were the surveying ships *Beagle* and *Britomart*. The former, however, was destined to win fame in history, for it was in her that Darwin had made his discoveries that are enshrined in *A Naturalist's Voyage Round the World*. While she was in Australia she was under Commander John Clements Whickham, and in her he surveyed Swan River and part of the north coast of the island continent. The *Britomart*, curiously enough, was also the floating home of a light of literature, though a lesser light. She was at one time commanded by Captain Frederick Chamier, who wrote *A Sailor's Life*, *Ben Brace* and other nautical tales that form a most interesting storehouse of information on the social life of the Navy in the last era of masts and yards.



Critt

AUSTRALIANS VISITING H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA."

The several States that are now welded into the Commonwealth of Australia endeavoured at various times during the century to provide themselves with some sort of naval defence. Their object was mainly to have craft that would harry and threaten raiding enemy cruisers and more particularly armed merchantmen that might be expected to appear off the Australian littoral and demand indemnities from the ports and coast towns under threat of bombardment.

Victoria began to acquire a force as far back as 1866. Melbourne did not often see the ships of the Royal Navy that were stationed in Australasian waters, and the Victorian Government ordered the ironclad *Cerberus*, a turret-ship carrying four big guns, to be built at Jarrow-on-Tyne for coast defence, and the old wooden frigate *Nelson* was bought to act as a training ship. These two ships were still in service twenty years later, but the *Cerberus* was at anchor at Williamstown in Melbourne Harbour, forgotten and obsolete, and the *Nelson* seldom had any volunteers on board to train. The Victorian Government had progressed, however, with the times, and had acquired quite

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a considerable flotilla of small craft in 1885. It included two gunboats, the *Victoria* and the *Albert*, three torpedo-boats, the *Childers*, *Nepean* and *Lonsdale*, and five armed steamers.* In 1892 a further first-class torpedo-boat, the *Countess of Hopetoun*, was acquired, but retrenchment and reform set in twelve months later, and by the end of 1893 the Victorian naval squadron had been considerably reduced. What remained continued to be kept up at an annual cost of £27,000 until federation was accomplished.

New South Wales, as the base of the Australasian Squadron of the Royal Navy was at Sydney, felt less need of ships, but realized very keenly the need of men. Consequently the naval effort there was more vigorously directed towards the maintenance of a Volunteer Naval Brigade. It was composed in part of time-expired petty officers and men of the Royal Navy and in part of Australian volunteers. It was intended to serve as a source of reinforcement for the Australasian Squadron, to replace casualties,

* The *Victoria*, *Albert* and *Childers* were detached to Suakin in 1884 while on their way out to Victoria and placed under the orders of Admiral Hewitt.

to man auxiliary ships in time of need, and to take part in any expedition where naval men were wanted. The corvette *Wolverine*, at one time the flagship on the station, was made over to the New South Wales Government to serve as a training ship, but was never fully equipped or commissioned for that service. She was sold in 1889. In 1885 two torpedo-boats were built at Sydney and manned by the naval forces, permanent naval officers being appointed for instruction and command and for the care of the vessels and their machinery. The Naval Brigade and the later development in the shape of the Naval Artillery Volunteers became in the course of time more and more a land force, and some sections were gradually merged in the land defence forces. The Imperial Defence Act of 1888 made a naval station at Sydney necessary, and Garden Island in the harbour of Port Jackson became the base of the Australasian Squadron in 1893, when the New South Wales Government handed over the island for Imperial purposes, and undertook to spend £300,000 on the erection of buildings and in supplying the necessary plant to start an efficient naval yard. Farm

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Cove to the west of the island was equipped with moorings for the Australasian Squadron on active service.

Queensland commissioned two 360-ton gunboats, the *Gayundah* and *Paluma*, in 1884. They were heavily armed for their size, each carrying one 8-inch and one 6-inch gun, and it may be noted here that the Australian ships were fitted with modern breech-loading guns at a time when the ships of the Royal Navy on the station were still armed with muzzle-loaders. The *Gayundah* was provided with a full complement by the Government of Queensland; the *Paluma* was commissioned by the Admiralty for surveying work. There were also at that time one first-class torpedo-boat and one picket-boat in the Queensland Navy, and a Naval Brigade similar to that of New South Wales was maintained. In 1893, however, this effort at a local Navy died out, and the two gunboats were put out of commission.

South Australia, in 1884, put into commission a small, heavily-armed cruiser, the *Protector*, which was specially designed for work in the territorial waters of the State. She was kept in commission with a three-fifths

complement until 1893, when she was passed into the reserve. She remained in this condition on and off until the South Australian Government offered the Imperial authorities the services of its gunboat in China during the disturbances of 1900. The offer was accepted for four months, and the *Protector* served in China from September till the end of November. The Commander-in-Chief reported that the *Protector* was most useful, being an efficient and well-kept man-of-war reflecting credit on captain, officers and men.*

Tasmania, in the late eighties, possessed one second-class torpedo-boat, but this was laid up in harbour for many years and was finally transferred to South Australia.

Western Australia never had a local naval force.

It will be noticed in this résumé of the unco-ordinated and individual efforts of the different States that the period 1884-5 was one of considerable activity in all of them. The reason for this is to be found in what is generally spoken of as the "Russian War

* The Governments of New South Wales and Victoria similarly offered Colonial Naval Brigades for service against the Boxers. The former sent 300 and the latter 200 officers and men.

scare " of 1878. It will be noticed also that most of the local navies were put out of commission in 1893. The reason for that is to be found in the fact that in that year the special Royal Naval Australasian Squadron, which was brought into existence in consequence of the deliberations of the Colonial Conference in 1887, was then ready to take up its duties on the station. The history of that fifteen years with all its negotiations and propaganda and argumentation is really the history of the birth of the Royal Australian Navy. And with it must ever be linked the name of Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, whose constructive work in the early half of that period was of far greater importance to the world than was the destructive moment of the crash between the *Victoria* and the *Camperdown* in the Mediterranean, which is the more generally remembered event connected with his name.

He went out to Australia as Commander-in-Chief of the squadron at the end of 1884. He was the first flag-officer ever appointed to the command: hitherto it had not been considered important enough by the Admiralty to merit an officer of higher

rank than a commodore. He went out, too, at a time when the thoughts of all the statesmen of the southern hemisphere were turned to naval defence, and he was directly charged by the Admiralty with the task of guiding their efforts in the best direction. A conference of Premiers had previously met at Sydney and expressed a wish that the British Squadron should be permanently increased. One of them, Sir W. Morgan, the Premier of South Australia, suggested that Australia ought to contribute half the expense of the additional naval forces, but his was the only voice raised in support of the proposition. The plan that was most favoured was local squadrons, and the various States proceeded, as we have seen, to acquire ships for themselves.

The Admiralty could not look upon this plan with any particular favour. It was too inchoate. Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key, who was then First Sea Lord, drew up a memorandum for the guidance of Tryon, in which he emphasized the fact that the Australian Premiers "naturally consider the most effective way of supplementing the support which will be afforded by the ships

of the Royal Navy cruising and stationed in colonial waters will be the organization of small squadrons at each port for local harbour defence." He then pointed out the disadvantages of the scheme apart from its inherent strategic viciousness. The officers and men would not be under the British Naval Discipline Act, but under rules and conditions that would vary between the different States. Lack of training establishments and colleges would mean that the officers could not keep up to date in the then rapidly changing arts of gunnery and torpedo work. Confusion in signalling would almost inevitably arise if the local ships, less continuously trained, had to work with the ships of the Royal Navy in time of emergency.

He concluded by suggesting that all Tryon's efforts should be directed to obtain the concurrence of the various Colonial Governments to the system of a special Australasian Squadron of the Royal Navy, "bearing in mind that the object of Her Majesty's Government was to encourage an extension of the Imperial Navy rather than separate Colonial Navies."

Tryon hoisted his flag on board the *Nelson*

at Sydney on January 22, 1885. And in the spring of that year there was another "Russian War scare." There can be little doubt that this was of assistance to the work he had to do, in that it turned the thoughts of the public to the very question he wanted considered, but the "local navy" idea was very firmly rooted. Tryon combated it very diplomatically in a memorandum which he drew up on the question of naval defence for the consideration of the Premiers prior to the assembling of an inter-colonial conference. The pith of his argument is in this sentence :

"While it is not very costly to protect our homes with the aid of local forces, they do not, and they could not, help to drive off cruisers such as could prey on us. We must, therefore, provide the means whereby they may be captured if possible : if not, at all events driven off our coasts."

As Admiral Penrose Fitzgerald justly remarked : "He thoroughly identified himself with all their interests, making those interests his own and always speaking of 'our' coasts, 'our' harbours, 'our' towns."*

* *Life of Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, K.C.B.*, by Rear-Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald. London, Blackwood. 1897.

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The work that Tryon did was supplemented by the deliberations of the Colonial Conference in London in 1887. The Admiralty proposal was that it should provide extra ships for Australasian waters ; that the Colonial Governments should pay for the building and maintenance of the ships, and that the ships should belong to the British Navy for ten years, and at the end of that time become the property of the Colonies.

It was not a good scheme. It was virtually an inducement to the overseas statesmen to acquire local defence ships on the hire-purchase system. And the question of "instalments" occasioned a species of haggling at the Conference which neither Australians nor Britons care particularly to remember at the present time.

The upshot of the deliberations was a compromise. The regular Australian Squadron was to be continued at the charge of the Admiralty (and the British taxpayer) as before, but a special auxiliary squadron was to be built, towards the cost of which Australia and New Zealand would pay £126,000 a year. The new squadron was to comprise five light cruisers (I use the

modern classification for simplicity) and two gunboats. The five cruisers were built: the *Katoomba*, *Mildura*, *Ringarooma*, *Tauranga* and *Wallaroo*, and all launched in or about 1890. They were vessels of 2575 tons displacement with nineteen knots speed, carrying 4·7-inch quick-firing guns, and manned by a complement of 215 officers and men. They were built to the same design as four ships then under construction for the Royal Navy.*

The agreement was made for ten years, and was then, or at the end of any subsequent year, to be terminable only upon two years' notice being given. At the termination of the agreement the ships were to remain the property of the Imperial Government. Three cruisers and one gunboat were to be kept continuously in commission, with the remainder in reserve in Australasian ports, maintained in such a condition as to be ready for commissioning with full complements whenever occasion should arise. All the ships were to be kept within the limits of the Australasian Station for employment within

* For New Zealand's share in the agreement, see *post* p. 53, *et seq.*

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those limits in peace or war, and could only be sent beyond those limits with the consent of the Colonial Governments. The Colonial Governments undertook to pay interest up to a maximum of £35,000 a year on the prime cost of the building of the vessels, such prime cost being paid by the Imperial Government, and to find a further £91,000 a year for the annual maintenance. It was agreed, however, that in times of emergency and war the cost of commissioning and maintaining the three reserve ships was to be borne by the Imperial Government.

So far as discipline and status went, the ships were classed as British men-of-war, and the officers and men of the ships in full commission were to be subject to triennial change or recommissioning exactly as the rest of the British Navy then was.

An arrangement was also come to for a limited number of cadetships to be reserved annually in the British naval training establishment, the *Britannia* at Dartmouth, for sons of Australians who wished to become officers of the Navy, but the scheme did not produce many applicants.

The agreement was continued by the

Colonial Conference of 1897. The amounts paid by the different Colonial Governments in 1899 were :

New South Wales	£47,207
Victoria...	57,883
South Australia	16,642
West Australia	4,626
Queensland	28,200
Tasmania	5,065

And after the federation of the separate Australian States into the Commonwealth in 1900 it was still adhered to. The Conference of 1902, however, produced modifications. Sir Edward Barton, the Premier of Australia, and Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, took advantage of the change that had come over public opinion in regard to the "coast defence" problem. They were able to sweep away the special Australian auxiliary squadron—the ships of which had, indeed, by that time become obsolescent—and to substitute an admittedly Imperial Navy Squadron. Australia and New Zealand paid a higher contribution: the Admiralty provided better ships. Moreover, it was agreed that one or two vessels should be specially devoted to the work of training Australian seamen. A

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good class of lads came forward subsequently to join the service, and they formed the nucleus a few years later of the personnel of the Royal Australian Navy.

The amount paid by Australia and New Zealand under the new agreement was £240,000 a year, of which Australia paid £200,000. In return for this the Australasian Squadron of the British Navy was to consist of at least one armoured cruiser, three second-class cruisers, and five third-class cruisers, or, as we should now classify them, one armoured cruiser and eight light cruisers. The agreement was to run for a period of ten years again.

It did not.


Australians had never felt much enthusiasm for the "subsidized squadron," however willingly they had paid their share of the burden. There was a latent feeling that Australia wanted a squadron of its own, and although there were not wanting those who described this aspiration as a dream of "tinpot navies" it persisted.

Australia had taken control of her own defences at the time of the Federation in 1901. Until 1905 a naval officer administered



Cribb.

ON BOARD THE AUSTRALIAN DESTROYER "YARRA."



the naval forces, such as they were, under the Minister for Defence, but in that year a Council of Defence was formed with a Naval Board as a branch of it, to control the Commonwealth naval forces, and with the formation of the Dominion Admiralty the day of separate Dominion Navies really dawned.

Mr. Deakin, who represented Australia at the Colonial Conference of 1907, with Mr. W. M. Hughes and Mr. G. F. Pearce, took back with him concrete proposals, assented to by the Admiralty, for the formation of an Australian flotilla quite apart from the Imperial squadron, of nine submarines, six destroyers, and two depot ships. His proposal to the Australian Parliament was 'to raise the money for the construction of these craft by loan. Parliament refused to do the work by loan : a Labour Government came into power and ordered the construction of two destroyers, and decided that a third was to be built, if possible, in Australia.

Across this plan was suddenly thrown the shadow of the great naval crisis of 1909 in Britain. The story of that incident need hardly be recounted at length here. The

Mother Country found that it was necessary for the safety of all the Empire to make a supreme effort in naval construction in order that our battle strength should not be brought below the lowest margin of safety. The crisis crystallized opinion in the Commonwealth, and at the Colonial Conference of that year the Australian representatives agreed that their Government would provide a fleet unit.

The cost would be about £3,700,000,* and the Home Government offered to contribute £250,000 a year towards the cost, but the Labour Government of the Commonwealth decided to shoulder the whole burden from the start.

Such is the history of Australia's tentative naval plans. Thenceforward we have to deal with the Royal Australian Navy.

* See Appendix I, p. 252.

CHAPTER IV

NEW ZEALAND'S PLANS

THE fortunes of New Zealand's naval efforts have been in great part bound up with Australian history, as we have seen. The sea is all one, and the Pacific seas are especially the unifying link of the Australasian lands. It is even the dream of New Zealand statesmen that the whole Pacific shall ultimately come under the sway of the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and Indian Fleets.

New Zealand had self-government in 1852. Ten years later it began to experiment with sea-power. The point is worth emphasis, because it is, I believe, the first instance of an Oversea Government possessing any ship of war. Four small cargo boats, called the *Flirt*, *Midge*, *Chub* and *Ant*, were purchased in 1863, and thinly armoured by the New Zealand Government. They played a part in the second Maori War when they assisted

in the attack on and capture of Merimeri and Rangariri by the troops under General Cameron.

Sir George Tryon's work on the Australasian Station left its mark also on New Zealand. He visited Wellington in January, 1886, after the receipt of a memorandum from the New Zealand Ministers in reply to his outline of the projected Australasian naval defences. They contended that a portion of the squadron ought to be based on Auckland, and added :

“ Ministers think that if the Admiral will honour this Colony with a visit he will entertain a higher opinion of its resources and be more alive to its real necessities in the matter of naval defence.”

He arranged a meeting at Government House, Wellington, at which he met the Governor and responsible Ministers, including the Premier, Sir Robert Stout. They were willing to pay their share towards the maintenance of an Australasian Squadron, but the many years during which no ship of the squadron had visited New Zealand had rather embittered them. They admitted that “ the defences of New Zealand and Australia may



Topical.

HARBOUR FRONTAGE AT AUCKLAND, N.Z.

Facing page 52.

be considered as bound up together," but insisted on the importance of basing a section in New Zealand waters.

At the Colonial Conference of 1887, however, New Zealand's representatives agreed with the Australian statesmen that the cost of maintenance of the special Australasian Squadron should be borne in part by the two colonies, and of the £126,000 which was fixed as annual subsidy, New Zealand undertook to pay £20,000. The agreement was continued by the Conference of ten years later, and in 1899 New Zealand's share of the subsidy was £20,830.

Towards the end of 1899 an Act was passed by the New Zealand Parliament to empower the Auckland Harbour Board to create a coaling station for the use of the Royal Navy. The Calliope Dock was to be fitted with modern machinery for repairing warships, a new pier to be erected, and £165,000 expended for berthage, dock works and dredging.

The 1902 Conference, as we have seen, altered the amount of the subsidy, and the New Zealand Parliament passed the new Naval Agreement Act raising the Colony's *

* New Zealand became a Dominion in 1907.

share to £40,000 a year through all its stages at one sitting in November, 1903.

The "naval crisis" of 1909 occasioned a great change in the whole situation. New Zealand was the first of the Dominions to offer to bear the cost of building a Dreadnought to help the Home Government to make up leeway, and at the Conference of that year Australia's determination to start on the construction of her own fleet unit necessitated a complete reorganization of the question of subsidies. The upshot of the deliberations seemed to bring the New Zealand dream of a Pacific Fleet a step nearer to realization. It was agreed that an Eastern Fleet should be formed, to be composed of three units—one in the East Indies, one in China, and one in Australian waters. Each was to consist of one battle-cruiser, three light cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines. The Home authorities were to maintain the East Indies Squadron, Australia was to be responsible for the Australian Squadron, and New Zealand was to support the China Squadron with the proviso that certain of the smaller vessels were to be stationed in New Zealand waters, the battle-

cruiser *New Zealand* being sent to the main station.* New Zealand's money contribution by that time had been raised to £100,000 a year by an Act passed in 1908.

The agreement did not mature. The situation in the North Sea required the presence of every possible ship there, and Sir Thomas Mackenzie's Government consented to the stationing of the *New Zealand* with the British Battle-cruiser Force. The official announcement of the change was made on May. 20, 1912, in the following terms :

"The Admiralty have recently been in communication with the Government of the Dominion of New Zealand upon the employment of the battle-cruiser which is now building at the charge of the Dominion for presentation to the Royal Navy. It had been intended that this vessel should be stationed in the Far East, but the Government of New Zealand have, in response to Admiralty enquiries and suggestions, expressed their wish that the Admiralty should

* A previous *New Zealand*, a battleship built at Portsmouth in 1904, was renamed *Zealandia* in order that the name *New Zealand* might be borne by the Dominion ship.

employ this vessel wherever her services can be most useful. His Majesty's Government have gratefully accepted this intimation. As the British Squadron on the China Station has recently been reinforced by the *Defence*,* the Admiralty have decided that the battle-cruiser *New Zealand* can best at present be employed in home waters. She will accordingly, as soon as she is completed, visit the Dominion of New Zealand, probably in the early part of next year, after which she will join the First Cruiser Squadron in the First Fleet, which her arrival will complete to its full strength of five ships."

New Zealand, however, despite this patriotic self-denial, was not satisfied with the position at sea. Association with the China unit did not satisfy the aspirations of the Dominion, though at the same time an offer by the Australian Government to train New Zealand officers for naval service at the Australian

* An armoured cruiser of 14,600 tons built at Pembroke in 1907. She was destroyed at the Battle of Jutland when she and the *Warrior* were caught by the fire of German battleships at the beginning of the engagement between Jellicoe's Battle Squadrons and the main German Fleet. Her loss was recorded in Sir John Jellicoe's despatch in the laconic phrase, "*Defence* disappeared."

Naval College was refused. At the beginning of 1913, Mr. James Allen, the Minister of Defence, visited London to discuss the questions involved in the virtual abandonment of the Pacific Fleet scheme, so far as New Zealand was concerned. The result of his labours was seen in the autumn of that year when Mr. Massey, the Premier, made a naval statement to Parliament.*

He announced that the Admiralty had agreed that New Zealand should train her own personnel and that the Home authorities would lend a sea-going training ship for the purpose with the necessary complement of officers and men, the whole to be under the administration of the New Zealand Government. Two naval cadetships at Osborne and Dartmouth were to remain at the disposal of New Zealand each year also, for the education of officers. The Dominion Government had asked that two light cruisers of the *Bristol* class† should be stationed in New Zealand waters, but the Admiralty was unable to spare vessels of that type, and could only offer two of the old Australian

* House of Representatives, October 28, 1913.

† Built 1910, 4800 tons, 25 knots speed.

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
Squadron cruisers, the *Pyramus* and *Psyche*.^{*} These the Dominion Government considered insufficient, and proposed to Parliament the building of at least one modern fast light cruiser, similar to those built for Australia.

Finally, a first-class naval depot was to be established at Auckland, remaining for a time at any rate under the maintenance and control of the Admiralty. And by the terms of the Naval Bill embodying these proposals, which was presented to Parliament by the Minister of Defence on November 29, 1913, the annual payment of £100,000 to the Imperial Exchequer as a contribution towards naval defence was abolished.

The Admiralty meantime, however, had proceeded to redistribute the ships in the Pacific on the assumption that their plan had been accepted. The official Navy List for November, 1913, described Commander H. C. Carr, R.N., as the senior naval officer of the New Zealand Division of the Australasian Squadron, with the light cruisers *Psyche* and *Pyramus* and the sloop *Torch* under his command. The *Philomel*[†] was lent to the

^{*} Built in 1897, 2200 tons, 20 knots speed.

[†] An old light cruiser built on 1890.



Topical.

THE KING AND OFFICERS OF THE "NEW ZEALAND."

Dominion Government to serve as a training ship.

That was the position when the war started. New Zealand had not begun the construction of the projected cruiser, and all thought of proceeding with the work was put on one side so long as the war lasted.

The visit of the battle-cruiser *New Zealand*, under the command of Captain Lionel Halsey, R.N., in the course of 1913, was made the occasion of an Empire tour of this Imperial ship. She steamed 45,319½ miles in the course of the ten months' trip, and visited, in addition to various New Zealand ports, the more important sea-coast towns of South Africa, Australia, Canada (both west and east), Fiji, Barbadoes, Trinidad, and Jamaica. Altogether she dropped anchor in fifty ports during the tour.

The King inspected her at Portsmouth on February 5, the day before she started, and she arrived at Wellington, New Zealand, on April 12. The officers and men were feasted and fêted day and night: the ship was thrown open to visitors, and in the course of her tour 578,937 people were welcomed on board her. Two of her lieutenants and

three midshipmen were New Zealanders, Lieutenant R. C. Garsia, Lieutenant R. D. Boyle, and Messrs. O. J. L. Symon, P. B. V. Heard, and H. B. Anderson. One of the most picturesque incidents of the visit to Wellington was a greeting to the "war canoe" by a deputation from the Ngatiapa tribe of Maoris, who presented the Captain with a valuable Kiwi mat and an illuminated address, in the English version of which the following picturesque passage occurred :

"Welcome, welcome, welcome. Brave ones, sons of the great God of War Tuten-gauaghan. . . . Welcome with power, welcome with thy exaltation, welcome with thy awe-inspiring presence, welcome thou canoe of war, the sentry that is for ever wakeful upon the mighty deep and upholder of the British Mana. Let us view the offspring or fruit of the seed cast upon the waters by our Mantua (father), Sir Joseph Ward. The act of such a statesman proved to be the moving spirit of closer relations between the Dominions and the Motherland, who holds the power of protection and peace over her Dominions which make her stand to-day pre-eminent among nations. Welcome, ye

defenders of the fort. It is expressed by a proverb in Maori: 'The house that stands without the fort is food for fire.' "

The New Zealand Government struck a silver medal for presentation to the Captain, officers and men in commemoration of the visit.

When she returned to England she was attached to the battle-cruiser force in home waters.

CHAPTER V

SOUTH AFRICAN PLANS

“**B**EYOND the very limited extent of territory required for the security of the Cape of Good Hope as a naval station, the British Crown and nation has no interest whatever in maintaining any territorial dominion in Africa.”

If I resuscitate this half-forgotten phrase from an unfortunate statesman's papers, it is from no wish to belabour the Imperial unwisdom of Victorian politicians, but to point out that even amid that unwisdom there was appreciation of the importance of sea control. Lord Grey, the Colonial Secretary at the time of the Convention of Bloemfontein (1854), was no Chamberlain. The so-called “policy of scuttle” of the Government in which he served found a whole-hearted supporter in him, but at least it may be remembered to his credit that the importance of the Cape of Good Hope as a controlling

point in the world's ocean-borne traffic was clear to him.


The Cape of Good Hope Station was a Rear-Admiral's command as early as 1836, and ranked among the five foreign service stations that were separately recorded in the Navy Lists of that time. It has remained a flag command down to the present day. And yet South Africa has never had a naval squadron of its own. The reason is not far to seek. The Union of South Africa only came into existence on May 31, 1910, and prior to that Union the two principal British colonies, Natal and Cape Colony, were not wealthy enough to maintain squadrons of their own, though sea spirit and appreciation of the importance of naval protection were not lacking in either.

The home authorities encouraged the development of the harbour at Cape Town at considerable expense in the middle of the nineteenth century, and importance was lent to the completion of the enterprise by the inauguration of the breakwater and docks by the Duke of Edinburgh in 1870. At the beginning of the present century the Simon's Town Naval Yard was considerably enlarged

and improved at the cost of the Imperial Government, but certain sums were voted by the Union Government as special contributions towards the cost.

It was in 1897 that South Africa first came forward to help the British Navy. Sir Gordon Sprigg offered, on behalf of Cape Colony, to present the cost of a first-class battleship, an offer equivalent in those days to a sum of about £900,000. The proposal did not meet with unanimous approval in the Colony and it was withdrawn. In the following year, however, the Cape Parliament passed the Cape Navy Contribution Act, under which the Colony contributed £30,000 a year towards expenditure in connection with the Royal Navy. The contribution was unhampered by conditions of any sort. At the same time Natal offered to provide (and did for some years provide) 12,000 tons of coal annually, free of charge, for the use of ships of the Royal Navy.

These contributions continued until after the Colonial Conference of 1902. Then the Cape Government passed the Navy Contribution Increase Act by which the annual sum to be contributed to the cost of the British



MR. AND MRS. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN ON BOARD THE
"GOOD HOPE."

Cribb.



Navy was raised to £50,000, and at the same time Natal undertook to provide £35,000 a year in place of the gift of coal. The annual cost of maintaining the Cape Squadron was then about £278,000.

The Admiralty marked their appreciation of Cape Colony's gift by naming a new armoured cruiser the *Good Hope*. She was originally called *Africa*.

The name *Natal* was given to an armoured cruiser built in 1904. The *Good Hope*'s maiden voyage was to South Africa, carrying Mr. Chamberlain for his series of conferences on the settlement of the country after the war. The *Natal* never visited any South African port. The *Good Hope* was lost in the battle of Coronel, November 1, 1914, when she was flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock. The *Natal* was destroyed by an accidental internal explosion in harbour on December 30, 1915.

At the Imperial Conference of 1907, Dr. Smartt stated that it was the intention of the Cape Government to introduce a Bill whereby their naval volunteers would be at the disposal of the British Admiralty "should a period of danger arise." And he asked that

a small training ship might be placed at their disposal. Mr. Moore, the representative of Natal, made a similar request, pointing out that the Natal Naval Brigade was in danger of dying of inanition. Mr. Moore also threw out a suggestion, the first, I believe, of its kind, that "when the time came to increase their contribution he hoped the Admiralty would allow them to make it in the form of men and material rather than in a cold lump sum."

The idea of a South African Navy was born.

The important Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 found the delegates from South Africa in a position of some difficulty. The Union was preparing but was not in existence, and the future Government could not be committed to a course of action. The delegates were obliged to ask, therefore, to be allowed to come to no decision. Even when the Union had come into being and was represented by its own delegates at the Conference of 1911, its Government was too hampered with internal questions to undertake any naval action. Nevertheless, public opinion in the various States of the Union was forming on the subject. General Botha

made a speech at Frederikstad in August, 1912, which contained a very plain hint. He declared that the Union must be prepared to take an adequate share in the defence of the £90,000,000 which represented South African sea-borne trade. Mr. Hull, the ex-Minister of Finance, made several speeches during the autumn in the same vein, and the *Volkstem*, which represents inland Dutch opinion, came out bluntly with the advocacy of "the principal of the South African Navy." And Mr. Smuts indicated his personal preference for a contribution of ships rather than money.

These speeches were believed to herald an announcement of a South African ship-building programme. None was ever actually made public, but it was unofficially intimated* that Ministers favoured a proposal for six light cruisers to be built at the expense of the Union Government in British yards to Admiralty designs, the manning of these ships to be entrusted to the Royal Navy entirely, with the proviso that the ships should be stationed permanently in South African waters except in time of war, when they

* *Times*, November 18, 1912.

would pass under the general strategic disposition of the Imperial forces for use wherever they could be of most service.

This policy of the "Kleine Vlootje," or little fleet, failed to mature mainly owing to the partial paralysis of Government business by internal political trouble. It was not abandoned by General Botha and most of his colleagues, however, as was clear in the debate on the Naval contribution in March, 1913, when the House of Assembly unanimously passed the following resolution :

"That the House recognizes the importance of full and careful consideration being given to the question of naval defence in South Africa, and it accordingly requests the Government, in consultation with the Imperial Government, to ascertain what provision should be made for such defence and thereafter submit proposals to the House."

At that time South Africa had contributed a total of £939,567 to the Imperial Navy in the course of the years that the Cape Colony and Natal Contributions had been in force. General Botha, dealing with this point, said :

“ I do not see what advantage there is for this country in making an annual contribution. I think that if we follow in the footsteps of other Dominions with long experience we shall do much better. These other Dominions have decided not to make contributions to the Navy.”

“ I want our people to realize the importance of our sea-borne traffic,” was part of the argument. “ The value of our sea-borne trade is something like £100,000,000, and is increasing day by day. It requires the attention of every man in South Africa. I want the people of this country to realize that if they are to be responsible for the protection of this country, they must expect to be made equally responsible for the protection of their sea-borne trade. . . . It is not only our trade that passes along that route, but the trade of other Dominions as well. In these circumstances the British Empire cannot, and does not, expect us to do everything in these waters.”

Finally he came to this concrete suggestion :


“ Possibly we might wish to have a small navy in our own waters, and if we could go

on those lines I think we should see good effects. The Government would like to have this question carefully gone into, so that we might see what would be the expenses connected with this scheme. . . . Then we should be able to act in agreement with the Imperial Government as to the form of our contribution.”*

The action of the other Dominions to which General Botha referred was strikingly demonstrated to South Africans in September of that year, when two ships of the Australian Unit, the *Australia* and *Sydney*, called at Cape Town on their way from the Home yards, where they were built, to their service station. Rear-Admiral Patey and officers of the two ships were entertained at a banquet at the Cape Parliament House, and several very significant speeches were made by men whose views could not by any stretch of language be called imperialistic. Sir Frederic de Waal, the Administrator of the Cape Province, said :

“ If to-morrow there were no British Navy the liberty of Canada and Australia would be in danger, and the liberty of South Africa

* *Times*, April 12, 1913



Cribb.
KING EDWARD AND PRINCE LOUIS OF BATTENBERG INSPECTING THE "GOOD HOPE."

Facing page 70.

would be even more so, because of the important strategic position they occupied on the great trade route to the East. South Africa would be unable to hold its own if an enemy had possession of its ports. It was therefore right that the great question of the British Navy should affect us living in South Africa."

Mr. Justice Kotze, on the same occasion, said :

" Although we in South Africa have not advanced to the stage that Australia has—for we depend for the protection of our sea coast on the Imperial Government—still I may venture to express the hope that the Parliament and the people of this country may always see their way to make a substantial and adequate contribution to the British Navy such as our resources shall from time to time allow."*

There was, however, no development prior to the beginning of the Great War. Public opinion was ripening. Obstacles were being removed. The very fact that the Governor-General's speech at the opening of the Union Parliament in the spring of 1914 contained

* *Times*, September 15, 1913.

no reference to co-operation by South Africa with the Imperial Government in respect to naval defence was inferential evidence that the matter was in train. The War came, however, and found the four-year-old Dominion without any formulated naval plan.

CHAPTER VI

CANADIAN PLANS

THE cynic, confronted with the necessity for writing something under the heading, "Canadian Naval Plans," would probably put the one word "None." And like most cynicisms it would be both untrue and unkind. Canada has never paid a naval contribution to the Imperial Exchequer, but Canada has always had a naval policy. Now that the dust and roar of propaganda and Parliamentary strife have died down, now that the passage of time enables us to winnow the frothy mouthings of the hack from the serious suggestions of the statesman, it is possible for us to see that from the very beginning of the Colonial naval agitation in the eighties of the last century the majority of the citizens of Canada were solidly and immovably opposed to anything but a Canadian Navy.

It is not for the historian to take sides, and

it must be my endeavour throughout my comments on the naval development of Canada to avoid bias. But the effect of my researches into the records of naval controversy in Canada has been strong, and I cannot help expressing the conviction that in his great effort to assist Britain by the gift of three Dreadnoughts in 1912, Sir Robert Borden misinterpreted entirely the feeling of his countrymen. It was not the assistance to the British Navy that they grudged. It was the form that assistance was to take under the Borden proposal that failed to meet with the people's approval. Had it been proposed to expend the seven millions sterling on a Fleet Unit for Canada, the history of Canadian naval development would have been very different.

The beginnings of a naval movement in the Dominion are to be found in the speech from the Throne at the opening of the Canadian Parliament in 1880. There occurs the following passage :

“ I have the gratification of informing you that Her Majesty's Government has generously presented to Canada for training school purposes the steam corvette *Charybdis*,



THE NUCLEUS OF A FLEET: CANADIAN FISHERY PROTECTION SQUADRON.

lately returned from service in the China Seas."

The *Charybdis* was then twenty-one years old. She was not in good condition, and the "generosity" of the home authorities was not as heartily appreciated as it might have been when the Canadian Government found itself involved in an expenditure of £20,000 to put her boilers into something like repair, and maintain her. She was moored in St. John's harbour and broke loose from her moorings, causing some loss of life and damage to shipping, and the Canadian authorities then packed her off to Halifax and restored her to the Imperial authorities. She was sold at Halifax for firewood and scrap iron in 1884.

Thereafter a campaign of speech-making was waged by various leagues and organizations in the hope of converting public opinion to the idea of a naval subsidy. Canada, however, was engaged on internal development. Immense expenditure and heavy borrowing was necessary for the great railways that had to be constructed if the country was to be opened up and its fertility made of use to the world. Sir John Mac-

donald and Sir Charles Tupper both took the view that Canada's duty to the Empire at that time was to develop commercially, and if she had to do it under the shelter of a Navy towards which she paid nothing directly, that was an unavoidable incident in the course of Imperial expansion. Sir Charles Tupper, indeed, was at some pains to make it clear in 1894, in an address to the Royal Colonial Institute, that he did not count the various services, commercial and social, which Canada was then rendering to the common weal as a full discharge of Canada's obligations. They were an earnest of what she could do in the day of her maturity.

The first direct steps towards the formation of a Canadian Navy were taken in 1900, when Sir Louis Davies was Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries. He undertook to establish a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. He withdrew from the Government before the scheme developed at all, and then Mr. Raymond Prefontaine took it up. The proposal had the approval of the Government, for Sir Wilfrid Laurier said at the Colonial Conference of 1902 that it was in contemplation to establish a local naval reserve

force. In 1901 Rear-Admiral Bickford, in a speech at Vancouver, threw out the suggestion that the British Columbia sealers should form themselves into a naval reserve force. Mr. Prefontaine, who was then the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, visited England in 1905 to lay before the Admiralty a concrete proposal that one or more modern cruisers should be stationed at Halifax and on the Pacific coast, with skeleton crews and instructors in gunnery and torpedo work, Canada undertaking to pay a certain amount annually for the maintenance of the ships.

The proposed Naval Militia Bill had then been three times mentioned in the speech from the Throne. It was destined to remain a project only. It is possible that one obstacle to its progress was a difficulty in obtaining recruits at that time. In the autumn of 1904 it was proposed that the fishery protection cruiser, *Canada*, should take on board detachments of men from the other fishery cruisers during the winter, and proceed South to the Caribbean with the British North America and West Indies Squadron, as the Newfoundland Reservists

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did each winter.* Then followed a series of postponements for one reason and another, and finally the Admiral, Sir D. H. Bosanquet, was compelled to put off the *Canada's* cruise until the following winter. And in the winter of 1902-3, Captain Spain, R.N., of the Canadian Fishery Squadron, visited St. John's, Newfoundland, to study the Naval Reserve movement there and to examine the *Calypso*, which was stationed in the harbour as a drill ship. But nothing ever came of his visit beyond an official report.

A further significant step was taken, however, in 1905. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's Government offered to take over the cost of maintaining the dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt. The British Admiralty at that time had just announced that "it has become possible to effect considerable economies in some of the dockyards outside the United Kingdom. Accordingly those at Halifax, Esquimalt, Jamaica and Trincomalee will be reduced to *cadres*, on which the expenditure in time of peace will be small, but which can in time of war be at once developed according


* See *post*, p. 86.

to necessity." Canada's offer to take over the two Canadian *cadres* was an acknowledgment that some day she hoped to be able to develop them into full dockyards again for her own ships. The offer was accepted by the Imperial Government, and at the Naval Conference of 1907, Canada frankly said that having shouldered that responsibility, together with expenditure on fishery protection and local surveying work, she had at the moment no further proposal to make.

Nevertheless public opinion in Canada was crystallizing. And in 1909, after a full debate, the Canadian House of Commons resolved that "the House fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada as they increase in number and wealth to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of national defence: that the House is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Dominions the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence; that the House

will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last Imperial Conference," with the usual addenda about the naval supremacy of Britain and the safety of the Empire, etc.

Now that resolution was something more than a pious expression of opinion. It was a declaration of policy. It was a firm and explicit dissent from the then generally held opinion that in the "naval crisis" to which reference had only just been made in the British House of Commons, it was the duty of the daughter nations to put their hands in their pockets for donations towards strengthening the British Navy. Canada took up a definite stand for her own Navy, let the scoffers call it "tin-pot" if they would. And from that position she has only receded during that fierce and stormy interlude of the three Dreadnoughts to which I have referred. The Royal Canadian Navy dates in reality from the day of that resolution, and the steps which Sir Wilfrid Laurier



QUEBEC HARBOUR, WITH THE "INDOMITABLE" AT ANCHOR.

took in 1910 to give effect to the resolution I shall deal with in the chapter on the R.C.N.*

But the notes on Canada's plans would be incomplete without a brief summary of the Borden proposals. Mr. Borden, as he then was, introduced into the Canadian Parliament, in December, 1912, "An Act to authorize measures for increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire." The text of the Bill is quite short and is worth giving in full, as it is very little known :

"His Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada enacts as follows :—

"From and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there may be paid and applied a sum not exceeding \$35,000,000, for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire.

"The said sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the Governor in Council in the construction and equipment of battle-ships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type.

"The said ships, when constructed and equipped shall be placed by the Governor

* See *post*, p. 161 *et seq.*

in Council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire. The said sum shall be paid, used and applied, and the said ships be constructed and placed at the disposal of His Majesty, subject to terms, conditions, and arrangements to be agreed upon between the Governor in Council and His Majesty's Government."

The Bill was hotly debated for days and weeks on end. I shall not attempt to deal with the speeches. Most of them are better forgotten. But I would draw attention to two remarks made respectively by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the then Leader of the Opposition, and by Mr. Borden, the Prime Minister, in the course of a debate on May 16, 1913.

Sir Wilfrid said :

"A Canadian service, built, manned and equipped in Canada—this is the goal to which we are looking."

Mr. Borden, in his reply said :

"If hereafter the people of Canada should decide on a policy of establishing a Fleet Unit in the Atlantic and another in the Pacific, the ships we propose to construct could be utilized for that purpose."

There is, I believe, a world of failure to

appreciate conditions as they are in his use of that word "could." Canada preferred the word "would," but her Prime Minister did not say it. The Bill was rejected by the Senate a few days later by a vote of 52 to 27. Occasionally in the months that intervened before the war began it was rumoured that the scheme would be revived in Parliament. It never was.

CHAPTER VII

OTHER COLONIAL HELP

CROWN Colonies, dependencies and protectorates have all at different times and according to their differing means helped or offered to help the Mother Country in the maintenance of the Fleet. There is also one other self-governing Colony, the smallest, which has for nearly thirty years loyally done what it could, in face at times of official discouragement from London, to supply the Navy with that most precious of "munitions"—man-power. This is

NEWFOUNDLAND

The discoverers of Newfoundland, the Cabots, were of the hardy race of Tudor seamen from whom the Elizabethan rovers and fighters descended, and Newfoundland has always lived by the sea, for fishery is its prime source of wealth. The Colony was

given responsible Government in 1832, and when the Dominion of Canada was formed it held aloof and has retained its independence to this day.

During the early years of the "Colonial help" agitation Newfoundland persistently begged to be allowed to establish a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve. The Admiralty at that time was as persistently deaf to the offer, until the patient urging of the Governor, Sir H. H. Murray,* obtained the "concession" of a training ship, the *Calypso*,† and permission to start a nucleus of a naval reserve. It was stipulated that the number of men enlisted should not exceed 700.

The men were to enrol for a period of five years.

The scheme was a success from the first. There is a population of 250,000 in the island, of whom at least 65,000 gain a living directly from the sea, and 40,000 of them are men of exactly the right age and fitness. The popularity of the Reserve was such, in fact, that at the third Colonial Conference in 1902

* Born 1829. Governor 1895-1898.

† Corvette of 2770 tons, built at Chatham in 1883, for the training service.

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the Newfoundland Government was able to offer a yearly contribution of £3000 towards the maintenance of its own branch and £1800 for the refitting of the drill ship. This offer was accepted.

The financial attraction held out to men to join is small, amounting only to an annual retaining fee of £6, with an annuity of £12 6s. 6d. after the age of sixty if they have served in the Reserve for twenty years. They are provided with uniform, and every winter parties of fifty were sent away in ships of the North America and West Indies Squadron of the Royal Navy for a six months' training cruise. This was a great inducement to join, for the winter is a dull time for the fisherman, with most of the boats laid up and little occupation to be found ashore. Membership of the Reserve, however, was restricted to about 1000 in the days before the war. In April, 1906, a contingent of 115 officers and men of the Newfoundland R.N.R. visited England and were inspected by Lord Tweedmouth, First Lord of the Admiralty.

In 1913 the Government made an offer to increase its help in the naval defence of the

Empire, and the Imperial Cabinet transmitted its thanks for the offer, but beyond that nothing was done. When the war came, however, the fishermen of the Colony came forward in their hundreds. If you look through those first pages of the official Navy List, where the names of all the officers and men who died for the Empire are given, you will find freely sprinkled the description, "Seaman, R.N.R. (Newfoundland)" after their names.

The Newfoundland Naval Reserve was mobilized at the outbreak of war, and although it was in the middle of the fishing season and the flotillas were scattered over all the North Atlantic from the southern edge of the Grand Banks to the shores of Labrador, 400 of the 600 men on the strength were soon gathered together at St. John's. On August 8 the Governor telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary: "Ministers undertake to raise force of naval reserve by October 31 to thousand efficient, available naval service abroad for one year, and are willing to meet all local expenses." On August 14 a reply was sent that "Lords Commissioners of Admiralty accept with gratitude offer of

your Government to raise force of naval reserve to 1000. It has been already arranged to utilize part of reserve to complete H.M.S. *Niobe*, and additional numbers will be valuable for later requirements."

The Admiralty orders for the demobilization of the surplus men of the R.N.R. in England at the end of August were unfortunately transmitted to Newfoundland, but the mistake was corrected at the beginning of October, when the Newfoundlanders were all called to the colours again, and the Colony again undertook to increase the total to a thousand. By the end of November 809 had been enrolled. The first 110 were sent to the Canadian cruiser *Niobe*, and others were sent to England to man auxiliary cruisers. A report by Sir W. E. Davidson, the Governor of Newfoundland, issued in June, 1917, stated that 1713 Newfoundland R.N.R. men had joined the Navy. There had been 124 men drowned, killed in action or died, and 92 had been invalided home and discharged. A detachment of 25 Newfoundland reservists perished with the *Viknor*, sunk off the coast of Ireland ; 22 more went down with the *Clan McNaughton*, and 11 were

drowned when the *Bayano* was lost. All these ships were employed on patrol, maintaining the blockade of Germany, and Sir W. E. Davidson, in his report, said :

“ Newfoundlanders are found in most boarding parties, and wherever handy men are required to man ship’s boats on stormy seas. The Newfoundland R.N.R. serve in drifters and mine-sweepers, in cruisers and torpedo-boats, in battleships and armed auxiliary cruisers. Many know the North Sea well and the Channel and the narrow seas. Many have cruised as far as Jan Mayen Land and are familiar with the coast of Iceland and the shores of the northern isles. Others are serving in the Persian Gulf and all over the Atlantic. When the *Greif* was sunk, Newfoundlanders were in the *Alcantara* and won prize money in that famous fight. Others were in Beatty’s squadron when the *Blücher* was sunk. Some helped to hunt the German High Seas Fleet back behind its mine-fields when they ventured out just for once as far as the Jutland coast. Many were in action at the Dardanelles, and several received special distinction in that service.”

FEDERATED MALAY STATES

One of the most startling incidents in the series of "naval crises" through which the British Empire passed in the five years before the war was undoubtedly the offer of a battleship by the Federated Malay States. These States are a protectorate of Great Britain. They are independent: they owe no tribute of any sort to the Imperial Exchequer. They comprise the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang, and are in a prosperous condition. Britain is represented at Kuala Lumpur by a High Commissioner, and Government is by a Federal Council on which the rulers from the four States have seats, as well as the British Residents and certain prominent native dignitaries.

After the offer of Dreadnoughts by New Zealand and Australia, and before the Canadian offer had been presented to the Dominion Parliament, the Federal Council of the Malay States passed a resolution to make the offer of a battleship to Great Britain.

The resolution was moved by the Sultan

of Perak in Malay, and the following are the exact words of it as he spoke them :

“Telak suka ahli mashuarat ini membenarkan diatas kerajaan negri negri Melain yang persakatu sembahkan sa buah kapal prang yang layak dipakai uleh kerajaan Ingriis.

“Maka bila kala kapal itu akan di bunt hal ini akan dipulangkan pada timbangan menteri menteri kerajaan Ingriis.

“Dan lagi waktu baiaran wang blanja membuat kapal prang itu dan bebrapa baniak angsuran wang itu akan ditetapkan membaiar jelas dalam tempo'lima tahun lamania.”

The resolution in English reads thus :

“It is resolved that this Council approves of the Federated Malay States offering to the United Kingdom a first-class armoured ship, the vessel to be constructed as soon as his Majesty's Advisers consider it desirable : details as to payment to be decided hereafter, but payment to be made within five years if possible.”

The Sultan of Perak said he was deeply sensible of the benefits of British protection. The reason for making the offer was not so much that the United Kingdom—the strength

of which they appreciated—was really in need of a battleship from Malaya, as that they desired to express their loyalty in some tangible form. He hoped that such a vessel would meet the requirements of the British Navy, and that it would be fully armoured and of the latest type. These questions, however, could be left to the Home Government, but he trusted that the cost of the vessel would not be less than \$20,000,000 (£2,250,000), and that it would be ready within five years. The resolution was seconded by the Sultan of Selangor and supported by the Yang-di-Pertuan Besar of Negri Sembilan and the Dato Imang Prang, representing the Sultan of Pahang. Other members of the Council supported it with an amendment in phrasing, and it was finally passed unanimously in this form :

“ With a view to the strengthening of the British Empire and maintaining her naval supremacy, the Rulers and people of the Federated Malay States desire to offer to his Majesty’s Governments a first-class armoured ship, and it is resolved by the Council that this offer should be made, the vessel to be constructed as soon as his

Majesty's Advisers consider it desirable. Details as to payment to be decided hereafter, but payment to be made within five years if possible."*

The offer was accepted the next day, Mr. Lewis Harcourt, the then Colonial Secretary, cabling that the Government would accept with deep gratitude the Federal Council's generous offer.

The vessel, which naturally received the name *Malaya*, was laid down at the yard of Messrs. Armstrong Whitworth and Co., in July, 1913. She was of the same design as the *Queen Elizabeth*, carrying eight 15-inch guns. She was launched after the war began in 1914, and completed during 1915. She joined the Grand Fleet and took part in the battle of Jutland with the Fifth Battle Squadron.

ST. VINCENT

In 1909 the Legislative Council of St. Vincent unanimously passed a resolution introduced by the unofficial members, offering to vote annually and pay unconditionally into the Imperial Treasury an amount approxi-

* *Times of Malaya*, November 14, 1912.

mating to one per cent of the revenue of the Colony as a contribution towards the Navy.

After referring to the comparative smallness of the amount, the resolution stated that the principle involved was the practical acknowledgment of a debt of gratitude for assistance and protection afforded in the past and of loyalty to the King. The Colonial Secretary telegraphed the Imperial Government's high appreciation of the patriotic desire of the Council to assume a share of the Imperial burden and cordially welcoming the assistance offered. At the same time, as the whole question of Imperial defence was under consideration, the Government asked to be allowed to postpone for the time being actual offers of support of this nature.*

So far as I have been able to discover, his Majesty's Government forgot the offer and it has never been heard of since.

Fiji

The same fate seems to have befallen an offer by Fiji. In July, 1913, the elected members of the Legislative Council adopted a motion in favour of continuing a contribu-

* Hansard, August 6, 1909.

tion of one per cent of the Colony's revenue to the Imperial Navy.* No such payment is recorded in the Navy Estimates for 1914-15. It can hardly have been too small to be recorded, for the Admiralty accountants can juggle with amounts like £29 5s. 6½d. paid to Marine bandsmen through ten or twelve pages when they like. It would seem that the whole matter was quietly overlooked by some clerk in the Colonial Office.

WEST INDIES

A large detachment of coloured petty officers and seamen from Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados arrived in London in August, 1917, to join various ships of the Fleet. They had been enlisted for the duration of the war and trained before coming to the Mother Country.

BASUTOLAND

The native chiefs expressed a desire during the war to present to the Empire a swift gunboat for submarine chasing.

* *Times*, July 12, 1913.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

AUSTRALIA'S Fleet unit of 1909 was the foundation of the Royal Australian Navy. Thenceforward naval men were to be seen wearing the traditional uniform of the British Service, but with this difference, that their cap-ribbons bore the letters H.M.A.S. (His Majesty's Australian Ship) in place of time-honoured H.M.S. There was a world of significance in that letter "A."

The Commonwealth Government was not content merely to sit down and wait while its Fleet unit was built. It looked ahead. Under the guidance of Rear-Admiral Cresswell, who was associated with the South Australian Naval Defence Force and subsequently became Director of Naval Forces and a member of the Naval Board, Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson was invited by the Commonwealth Government in June, 1910,



Cribb.

SIR GEORGE PATEY, AUSTRALIA'S FIRST ADMIRAL.

Facing page 96.

to visit Australia and advise regarding the future of the country's naval defence. His report was issued in March, 1911, and he presented a suggestion for a shipbuilding programme to cover the ensuing twenty-two years. This plan was for the building before the end of 1933 of eight battle-cruisers, ten protected cruisers, eighteen destroyers, twelve submarines, three depot ships and one fleet repair ship at a cost of £23,290,000. There were to be, ultimately, two squadrons, one in the East based on Sydney and one in the West based on Fremantle, with subsidiary bases at Thursday Island and Port Darwin. Destroyer and submarine bases were also recommended at Brisbane, Port Western, Port Stephens, Port Lincoln, Townsville, Hobart and other places, and the capital expenditure on these bases was estimated at £15,000,000. The report foreshadowed a Fleet numbering twenty-three ships of all classes in 1918, forty-two ships in 1923, forty-eight ships in 1928 and fifty-two ships in 1933.

The war naturally interfered with progress on this plan, which was approved by the Government with minor modifications. But

the original Fleet unit agreed on in 1909 was put through. The work of constructing the ships and instructing the men for the crews was put in hand at once. Moreover, with an eye to the future, artisan ratings of all kinds were sent to the shipyards in England where the new Australian ships were to be built, in order that they might gain practical experience in shipbuilding, for Australia meant to build her own fleet in course of time.

The first ships to be completed were the two torpedo-boat destroyers, *Yarra* and *Parramatta*, which were commissioned in September, 1910. A third destroyer, the *Warrego*, was shipped to Sydney in parts and was put together in the Commonwealth Dockyard at Cockatoo Island, Sydney. She was commissioned on June 1, 1912.

The battle-cruiser *Australia* was built at Clydebank, commissioned in June, 1913, and reached Australian waters in September of that year.* Two of the light cruisers,

* The first *Australia* was an armoured cruiser of the *Orlando* class, launched in 1886. She was of 5600 tons displacement.

the *Melbourne* and the *Sydney*, also reached Australia during 1913. A training ship was obtained by the gift from the Admiralty of the small cruiser *Pioneer*, which enabled the old *Protector* to be used for service as a tender to the Gunnery School, and the *Encounter* was lent to the Commonwealth until the third new cruiser, the *Brisbane*, was built. Work on her began at the Commonwealth Dockyard, Sydney, in January, 1913, but she was not launched until September 30, 1915. On March 14, 1917, Mr. Cook, Minister of the Navy, announced in the House of Representatives that she was satisfactorily serving with the Fleet. Three more destroyers, the *Derwent*, *Swan*, and *Torrens*, were built at Sydney, and an oil supply ship, the *Karumba*, and a submarine depot ship, the *Platypus*, were built in British yards. Two submarines, AEx and AE2 were built in England, and made the voyage to Australia under their own power in May, 1914.

It is worth putting on record the list of ships of the Royal Australian Navy as existing at the beginning of the war :

100 THE IMPERIAL BRITISH NAVY

IN SERVICE

		Tons displacement.	Built in
<i>Australia</i>	Battle-cruiser	19,200	1913
<i>Melbourne</i>	Light Cruiser	5,600	1913
<i>Sydney</i>	„ „	5,600	1913
<i>Encounter</i>	„ „	5,880	1903
<i>Pioneer</i>	„ „	2,200	1900
<i>Parramatta</i>	Destroyer	700	1910
<i>Warrego</i>	„	700	1912
<i>Yarra</i>	„	700	1910
<i>Gayundah</i>	Gunboat	360	1884
<i>Protector</i>	„	920	1884
<i>Countess of Hopetoun</i>	Torpedo Boat	—	1892
<i>Childers</i>	„ „	—	1885
<i>Tingira*</i>	Boys' Training Ship	1,800	—
<i>AE1</i>	Submarine	800	1914
<i>AE2</i>	„	800	1914

BUILDING

<i>Brisbane</i>	Light Cruiser	5,600†	
<i>Derwent</i>	Destroyer	700	—
<i>Swan</i>	„	700	—
<i>Torrens</i>	„	700	—
<i>Platypus</i>	Submarine Depot Ship	3,100	—
<i>Karumba</i>	Oiler	3,000	—

* *Ex Sobraon*. Bought from the New South Wales Government by the Commonwealth.

† It was announced in January, 1916, that another cruiser, the *Adelaide*, was to be laid down.



AUSTRALIA'S FLAG AFLOAT.

Cribb.



THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY 101

The cost of naval defence naturally rose rapidly in the days that saw the change from the Imperial Squadron to the Royal Australian Navy. It is graphically shown by the following table :

ANNUAL NAVAL EXPENDITURE

1901-2	..	£178,819
1906-7	..	255,772
1909-10	..	329,739
1910-11	..	1,464,091
1911-12	..	1,633,441
1912-13	..	1,659,554
1913-14	..	1,999,765

The total estimated cost of the Fleet unit was £4,792,266.

The Naval Board of Administration was formed in March, 1911. It was composed of the Minister of Defence, three naval members, the Finance and Civil Member and the Permanent Secretary. The first members of the Board were the Hon. G. F. Pearce, Rear-Admiral Cresswell, Captain Bertram Chambers, R.N., and Engineer-Commander Clarkson, R.N. Later, Fleet Paymaster H. W. Eldon Manisty joined the Board as Finance and Civil Member.

The organization of the Board followed

very much the lines of the British Admiralty. The senior naval member corresponds to the First Sea Lord. The duties of the second naval member are analogous to those of the Second Sea Lord, but Captain Chambers was further charged with the command of the Commonwealth Naval College. The third naval member is responsible for construction, dockyards and naval bases.

The first orders issued by the Board were dated April 11, 1911 (C 5123). They dealt with the appointment of the Board ; powers and functions of the Board ; registration of Naval Volunteer Cadets ; monthly returns of expenditure by naval commandants ; salutes on British anniversaries ; appointments of officers to ships building and for inspection and repair of Commonwealth vessels ; and provisional regulations for extra pay to officers and men in destroyers.*

The Board appointed as its representative in London Captain Haworth Booth, who had accompanied Admiral Henderson on his tour of examination for the preparation of the report on the future development of the Commonwealth fleet.


* Known in the British Navy as "hard-lying" money.

But although considerable progress had been made in the organization of a separate navy there was still an interregnum during which the squadron in Australian waters was practically under the dual control of the Admiralty and the Navy Board. The separation was not complete and formal until April, 1913. Rear-Admiral George Patey was lent by the Admiralty to the Commonwealth Government, and in March, 1913, was appointed to the command of the Australian naval forces with his flag in the new *Australia*, and in the Navy List for April, 1913, we find officially recorded for the first time, "The Royal Australian Navy," with a list of its Navy Board, of its officers and its ships.

Two flags are flown by the Commonwealth warships, the White Ensign and the starred Blue Ensign. There was an important point in international law raised just before the separation. What would be the status of ships and officers of the Royal Australian Navy in foreign ports, since Australia, though a self-governing country, was not a sovereign power? The question was solved by the circulation of the following Commonwealth Navy Order on February 28, 1913:

“After July 1, 1913, all British naval officers, whether belonging to the Royal Navy or the Permanent Naval Forces of the self-governing Dominions, shall receive Imperial Commissions. These commissions, whether issued by the British Admiralty or the Dominion Governments, will be of one form, extending to service in all the naval forces of the Crown, including the Royal Navy and any Dominion Fleet.”

The effect of this was to place the Dominion Naval Forces on the same footing as the Royal Navy in regard to recognition of their rights and privileges as men-of-war by foreign Governments. They were, in fact, “King’s Ships” as the *Harry Grace à Dieu* of the old Tudor Navy had been. The administration was separate : the spirit was the same.



Cribb

THE CREW OF H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA."

CHAPTER IX

THE R.A.N. : ITS PERSONNEL

PROVISION of officers and crews was a problem obviously full of difficulty for the new Navy of the Commonwealth. Training for the work of running a ship of war is a matter of years, not months. As was pointed out in the Admiralty memorandum on fleet units the proposed squadron would require at least 2300 officers and men. And in 1910 Australia's naval forces totalled 240. The Admiralty agreed to help to bridge the interval that must elapse before Australians could man and manage their own ships by lending officers and men and by allowing Australia to enlist Royal Fleet Reserve men. Admiral Henderson, in his report, said that 1623 officers and men must be found in two years, and that they could not be provided by Australia, whose utmost limit he predicted would supply 878 by the time the vessels of the Fleet unit reached

Australia. He also suggested that of the 1623 to be found by the Mother Country, 816 could be raised by enlisting pensioners and reservists. By March 31, 1913, however, only 353 of these men had been enlisted, and the Admiralty had again to fill up the gap and supplied 115 active service men more than the original estimate. Australia, on the other hand, had done better than was expected. Instead of enlisting 15 officers and 863 men in readiness for the coming of the new ships, she had raised a force at the end of March, 1913, that totalled 32 officers and 1004 men. Moreover, enlistment was so brisk that the training establishments were all full, and the age for seamen and stokers was raised for a while to restrict entries. Such was the effect of the provision of a "local" Navy.

Large numbers of trained ratings were sent from Australia to commission the new ships. The following table shows the proportion of native seamen to total complement in three of the ships when they were commissioned :

Names.		Total complement.		Australian Seamen.
<i>Australia</i>	..	790	..	372
<i>Melbourne</i>	..	400	..	190
<i>Sydney</i>	..	400	..	146



Cribb.

THE FIRST SEAMEN R.A.N. TRAINED IN ENGLAND.

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THE R.A.N. : ITS PERSONNEL 107

At the same time there were 124 Australian seamen in the three destroyers, and 155 in the light cruiser *Encounter*.

The personnel of the Australian Navy in April, 1915, totalled 9423 active and reserve, divided as follows :

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Sea-going forces . . .	440	3290	3730
Administrative and Instruc- tional Staff . . .	35	113	148
R.A.N.R. . . .	18	157	175
Reserves (under universal service obligations) .	61	5309	5370
Total . . .	554	8869	9423

Australian officers and men are more highly paid than those in the Mother Navy. Regulations were issued in June, 1911, fixing the rates of pay from which one or two examples may be cited for the purposes of comparison.

The pay of the lieutenant in the R.A.N. begins at £250 a year. The pay of a lieutenant in the British Navy begins at £201 5s. a year. The lieutenant in the Australian Navy rises to £500 a year. In the British Navy even a commander only gets £401 10s., unless he is actually in command of a sea-going ship. There is no pension attached to

the R.A.N., but each officer and man has what is termed "deferred pay," which he can draw or receive as an annuity when he leaves the service. The "deferred pay" of the lieutenant begins at 4s. 3d. a day.

Another thing that the Commonwealth Government managed more generously than the Admiralty is the training of boys for officers. Whereas the cadet at Osborne and Dartmouth for the Royal Navy has to be kept by his parents and heavy fees and expenses totalling at least £100 a year have to be paid, the whole cost of the clothing, keep, training and education of cadets for the Royal Australian Navy is borne by the State.

The Naval College when first established was housed in a large building just outside Geelong, Victoria, which, by a curious coincidence, was called Osborne House, the same name as the cadet college for the British Navy in the Isle of Wight. It was later transferred to permanent quarters at Captain's Point, Jervis Bay, which were opened by Lord Denman, the Governor-General, on March 1, 1913. There is one difference between the British and Australian young



AUSTRALIA'S FIRST NAVAL COLLEGE AT GEELONG.

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officers that is important to note. The word "cadet" had for many years been applied in Australia to all young men undergoing training in the naval branch, whether for commissions or the lower deck. The Navy Board therefore announced :

"As the term Naval Cadet has throughout the Commonwealth another meaning to that in use in the Imperial Navy the rank hitherto known in the British Navy by the term "naval cadet" will be designated instead "cadet midshipman," the young officer attaining the rank of midshipman on passing out of the college."

The course of training lasts for four years, and is based exactly on the model of the Osborne-Dartmouth, or Selborne, system of common entry for all officers, executive or engineer, introduced into the British Navy at Christmas, 1902. At the end of the four years there is a six months' training cruise.


In order that boys who have received the benefits of the free education at the College shall not be withdrawn by their parents from the service when the time comes for them to be graduated as midshipmen, it is provided that no boy shall leave the service except at

the desire of the Navy Board without his parent or guardian (who must reside in Australia) becoming liable to a penalty of £75 for each year's training that the boy has received.

As will be seen by the terms of the agreement between the Imperial Government and the Dominion Governments on the subject of interchange of officers,* promotion and seniority of officers in the Australian or Canadian Navies is kept on a level with that in the Royal Navy. Lieutenants are compulsorily retired at the age of 45 and captains at 55. All subordinate ratings retire at the age of 45.

Lower deck training is similar to that given to boys at Shotley or any of the other British naval training establishments. The boy enters the training ship *Tingira* at the age of 14½ and agrees to serve till he is 25. Training lasts one year and the boy goes then to sea. He should be an ordinary seaman (2nd class) at the age of 17, ordinary seaman at 18, able seaman at 19, leading seaman at 21, petty officer at 23 or 24 and warrant officer any time between 30 and 35. Pro-

* Appendix II, Clause XIII and XIV.



INSPECTION OF AUSTRALIAN NAVAL CADETS.

motion to commissioned rank is open to young warrant officers passing certain examinations and to certain senior warrant officers of meritorious service. The younger men may hope to rise to the rank of commander.


The rates of pay for the lower deck are considerably higher than in the British Navy, and the system of deferred pay takes the place of the pension system in the parent navy. Ordinary seamen receive 21s. a week and 5s. 3d. deferred pay. This latter item is credited to each man's account, and on his yearly balance he is paid interest. At the end of his term of service he can draw half this deferred pay in a lump sum, or an annuity will be purchased for him.

An A.B. receives 4s. a day and 1s. a day deferred pay, as compared with the 1s. 8d. a day of the British A.B., and a pension varying from £18 to £60 according to the rank he has attained after '22 years' service.

The Australian chief petty officer of 12 years' service draws £2 9s. a week active pay and 12s. 10d. deferred pay. The British C.P.O. of the same seniority draws 30s. 4d. a week.

The Australian warrant officer, like the gunner or the boatswain, can rise to £200 15s. a year active pay and £50 3s. 9d. deferred. The same ranks in the British Navy only draw £164 5s. after 15 years' service in the rank. The chief gunner or chief boatswain, R.A.N. (commissioned warrant officers), receive £243 6s. 8d. active and £60 16s. deferred pay a year. The same officers in the Royal Navy can only attain to £219 a year after eight years' service in the rank.

There has never been much difficulty in obtaining officers and men for the Australian Navy. The Navy Board frankly said in one of its early recruiting appeals that the belief had been "not infrequently held that Australians had not inherited the maritime traditions of their race." This was in the days when men were asked to enlist in the ships of the Royal Navy on the Australasian Station. Service under these conditions, said the Navy Board, "could not offer the same prospect as that held out by the Royal Australian Navy, as the paucity of facilities for early training inevitably resulted in Australians having to enter the Royal Navy at a higher average age, as a rule, than the



BOYS OF THE R.A.N.



men from the Mother Country, and in consequence the native-born found themselves at the end of their period of engagement with but small prospects of promotion to even the grade of leading seaman."

That the removal of these disabilities stimulating recruiting is evident from one important set of figures. At the time the Fleet unit was ready there were in addition to officers and men actually serving—

28 cadet midshipmen training at Osborne House.

250 boys in the training ship *Tingira*.

400 young seamen and stokers, short-service men, undergoing special training at the Naval Depot, Williamstown, Melbourne.

In April, 1915, there were 87 cadet midshipmen under training, and in the *Tingira* there were 260 boys.

CHAPTER X

THE R.A.N. : ITS DOCKYARDS AND BASES

IN the Commonwealth statistician's abstract of shipping tonnage entering and leaving the more important ports of Australia during each year there are seventeen names. Ten of those seventeen ports figured in the report of Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson on the naval defence of Australia in 1911.

Looking well ahead he planned bases for a fleet strong enough to form two squadrons. The First Squadron was to be based on Sydney with Brisbane and Port Western as its main destroyer bases and Port Stephens as its principal submarine base. The secondary bases for this squadron were to be at Thursday Island, Townsville, the River Tamar, Hobart and Port Lincoln.

The Second Squadron was to be based on Fremantle, the same port being the main destroyer base, Port Western acting as one



LEARNING TO BOX THE COMPASS.

main submarine base (thus overlapping with the destroyers of the First Squadron) and Port Lincoln as another, a fourth submarine flotilla being based on Fremantle. The secondary bases for this squadron were to be Port Darwin, Cone Bay and Albany, and (again overlapping the First Squadron) Port Lincoln, Port Western, the River Tamar and Hobart for destroyers and submarines.

Those who do not carry the geography of Australia in their minds will do well to study the outline map of the Commonwealth.* They will see that the two squadrons are respectively allotted to the western and eastern halves of the country, and that the point where they overlap is in the Bass Strait between Tasmania and the important, thickly populated coastline of Victoria and South Australia. The reason for the overlapping is thus seen to be strategic and deliberate, not imposed by paucity of suitable bases.

With regard to the primary bases, Admiral Henderson recommended that their main requirements would be :

Docks capable of receiving the largest vessels when in an injured condition.

* p. 120.

Workshops capable of effecting any repairs to, or replacements required in, hull, machinery, fittings or armament of all types of vessel ; to include facilities for lifting out and replacing the heaviest weights such as guns, gun mountings and machinery.

Provision of the necessary equipment and supplies for the replenishment of all naval ordnance, naval stores (including oil and coal) and provisions.

Easy and safe communication with the manufactories of shipbuilding material, ordnance and ammunition.

Facilities for the rapid coaling of ships.

Necessary equipment for the testing of chain cables.

Safe storage for reserves of ammunition and explosives.

Moorings and wharfage for ships under repair or in reserve.

Satisfactory arrangements for reception and treatment of sick and wounded.

In regard to the strategical disposition of the squadrons, Admiral Henderson made the following important observations :

“ Thursday Island has a very important strategical position at the entrance to the Torres Straits and at the head of the Barrier Passage, in which passage torpedo-boat destroyers could act with great advantage.

“ Bertie Bay (Goode Island) appears to be the harbour best suited for use as the base, and it should be surveyed thoroughly and examined with a view to enlarging the anchorage and space available for large ships and also to giving a safe and secure anchorage for torpedo-boat destroyers.

“ This will also be the base for torpedo-boat destroyers, and should have all the requirements, including a floating dock and a workshop adequate to carry out destroyer repairs.

“ Port Darwin is a good harbour and occupies a very important strategical position. It should develop gradually into as important a base as, say, Hong-Kong, possessing docks (either floating or graving) capable of receiving the largest ships, and machine shops, etc., adequate for carrying out any repairs to warships. Later, at Port Darwin, there should also be maintained reserves of coal, oil and naval stores and provisions.

“Owing to the lack of proper land communications and of population no steps can be recommended to be taken at Port Darwin at present : but when the north to south trans-continental line is completed Port Darwin's position will be valuable and measures should then be put in hand to make it a useful naval base.”

The line is completed from Port Darwin southwards to Pine Creek (146 miles). The section from Pine Creek to Katherine River ($54\frac{1}{2}$ miles) is under construction, and the sections from Katherine River to Bitter Springs (65 miles) and Bitter Springs to the Oodanatta terminus of the South Australian lines (965 miles) have been or are being surveyed. It will be obvious, therefore, that the Henderson report took a very far-sighted survey of the development of the Australian naval position.

On the south coast in connection with Port Western the recommendation was that the dock accommodation at or near Melbourne should be utilized for destroyers, and so render provision of a dock at Port Western unnecessary. In addition to its use as a destroyer and submarine base, Port Western



Topical.

SYDNEY HARBOUR.

Facing page 118.

should be the training centre for the Western Fleet, for which purposes the following would be required :

Naval barracks, including torpedo school, to be erected on the foreshore between Sandy Point and Stony Point.

A land-locked range for the adjustment of repaired or new torpedoes.

The general requirements of the submarine bases (Port Stephens, Port Western, Port Lincoln and Fremantle) were set out thus :

A graving dock, floating dock or slip, capable of receiving one submarine at a time, possessing facilities for rapid docking, cleaning and undocking.

Small workshops.

Enclosed wharfage accommodation for four boats, with facilities for adjusting gyroscopes : if desirable a suitable hulk might be used, but the structure must not be coppered : good sleeping accommodation is required for all officers and men either on shore or in the hulk.

Storage for adequate reserves of oil fuel.

It was also recommended that Port Western


should be utilized by the Western Fleet as one of its principal anchorages until Fremantle (Cockburn Sound), which is far more important as a strategical point, is ready. The importance of this latter place was fully appreciated by the Commonwealth Government, and by May, 1913, the base there was in a state to be officially declared open. It will ultimately be provided with accommodation for docking Dreadnoughts and with shipbuilding facilities.

On the subject of the disposition of the Fleet when finally built to full strength, the Henderson report said :

“ Though the fleet is divided into two divisions (each of which should be under the command of an admiral or commodore), it is not intended that their sphere of employment should be restricted to the vicinity of the ports so named. Ships of the two divisions should be interchanged from time to time, and at least once a year the two divisions should meet for fleet tactics and exercises under the senior admiral and for manœuvres in which one division would be opposed to the other. Excellent centres for such purpose in the summer-time are



STRATEGICAL MAP OF AUSTRALIA.



Hobart and its vicinity, Jervis Bay and Port Lincoln: in the winter-time ships should work on the northern coast."

The control of the Australian naval bases was handed over by the Imperial Government to the Commonwealth authorities on July 1, 1913. The transfer mainly affected Sydney, destined under the Henderson scheme to be the main base of the Eastern Fleet of the Royal Australian Navy, and already a well-equipped naval dockyard and anchorage. Sydney Harbour is one of the world's famous natural shelters. Farm Cove has been the regular man-of-war anchorage for many years, and is also the historic spot where the Union Jack was first hoisted on January 26, 1788. The naval depot was established at Garden Island, and there were two dry docks for the use of the old Australian Squadron at Cockatoo Island. Spectacle Island was the site of the explosives depot.

CHAPTER XI

THE R.A.N. : ITS SHARE IN THE WAR

FULL particulars of the part played by the ships of the Royal Australian Navy in the course of the war can only be published in later years. Certain official reports by the Naval Board have been issued from time to time, however, from which it is possible to present a survey of the main features of the campaign as it affected the force.

On August 3 the Governor-General telegraphed among other things : " In the event of war Commonwealth of Australia prepared to place vessels of Australian Navy under control of British Admiralty when desired." He further telegraphed on August 11 : " Order issued August 10, transferring all vessels of Commonwealth naval forces and all officers and men in King's naval forces. Such transfer to continue in force until Proclamation is issued, declaring that war no longer exists."

The following is summarized from a report officially published at the end of the first twelve months of war :

On July 30, 1914, a warning telegram having been received from the senior naval officer in New Zealand, steam was ordered to be raised in the Australian ships at one hour's notice.

The *Australia*, *Melbourne*, *Encounter*, *Warrego* and *Yarra* were at Hervey Bay, Queensland, the *Sydney* was at Townsville, the *Parramatta* was at Sydney, and the submarines AE1 and AE2 were refitting in Sydney. Shortly afterwards a warning telegram was received from China. The *Australia* was ordered to Sydney at twenty knots, and the other vessels were variously ordered.


On August 3 the *Psyche* was at Auckland, the French warship *Montcalm* was *en route* for Noumea, the French ship *Kersaint* was at Noumea, and the French ship *Zelée* was at Tahiti. The German ship *Gneisenau* had left Nagasaki on June 23, probably in company with the *Scharnhorst*. The *Nürnberg* was either still in Mexico or on her way back to Tsing Tau, whilst the *Leipzig* was off Vancouver. It was subsequently ascertained

that the *Emden* left Tsing Tau with four colliers on August 3. Rear-Admiral Patey* then divided the operations into periods, the first period concluding with the operations at Rabaul.

On August 13 the Admiralty war orders were made out on the supposition that the enemy's ships would be in their usual peace stations, viz. two light cruisers in the neighbourhood of New Guinea. On this occasion, however, it appeared from wireless calls that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were also in that neighbourhood and were concentrating. The Vice-Admiral, therefore, suggested that the *Australia*, flying his flag, should endeavour to get in touch with them instead of shifting his flag to the *Encounter* and sending the *Australia* to her preliminary station at Albany, which course was approved by the Admiralty.

On August 6 he received news that the *Scharnhorst*, the *Gneisenau* and the *Nürnberg* were in a certain position, steering in a south-easterly direction. Consequently, and pending more reliable information of the German ships being at latitude 8 degrees, S., and longitude 160 degrees, E., he directed

* Promoted to Vice-Admiral on Sept. 14, 1914.



Topical.

THE KING BOARDING H.M.A.S. "AUSTRALIA."

the *Sydney*, *Warrego*, *Parramatta* and *Yarra* to meet him on August 9, at a rendezvous that had been fixed. When juncture was effected, all the captains repaired to the *Australia*, and the plan of attack on Simpsonshaven was explained to them. The attack was carried out as arranged, but to his disappointment the *Sydney* reported that both Simpsonshaven and Matupi harbour were empty, as the wireless station at Rabaul was found to be reporting the fleet's movements. Vice-Admiral Patey sent a message to the Governor that if this continued, fire would be opened.

On the night of August 12, the first was heard from the Government of New Zealand of the proposed expedition to Samoa, and Admiral Patey received information from the Admiralty through the Naval Board that the New Zealand expedition for Samoa had already started, also that the *Kanowna* was leaving Thursday Island for Port Moresby with 500 men on board, and that a further expedition would leave Sydney in the *Berrima*. He therefore found himself with two expeditions to convoy, and had to relinquish all other operations. If the New Zealand

expedition had delayed its start for three days, the necessity of it steaming considerably out of its way would have been avoided.

For the convoy of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force by the *Australia* and the *Melbourne* to Samoa, detailed orders were issued after a conference at Noumea with the French commander (Rear-Admiral Huhuet). On arrival at Suva, it was learned that Japan had declared war against Germany, and the Commander-in-Chief on the China station placed himself in communication with Vice-Admiral Patey regarding the movements of the ships arriving off Apia.

On August 30 the Vice-Admiral wrote to the Governor of Samoa, summoning him to surrender forthwith the town of Apia and the Imperial possessions under his control. An answer was demanded within half an hour, and, failing a reply or a negative reply, the cruisers had orders to cover the landing party with their guns. A reply was received that "according to the principles of the rights of nations, and especially the agreements of the second Hague Peace Conference, the bombardment of our harbours and protectorate is forbidden, and also the threat

to do so to avoid military measures." The Governor added he had given orders for the wireless telegraph station to be packed up, and he left it with the Vice-Admiral to take possession of the Protectorate of Samoa, respectfully remarking that the responsibility for the life and property of the European population would rest with him. The estimates of German residents and armed police varied from 400 to 1000. No enemy ships were at Apia, nor had there been any there recently. The expedition having been established and all stores landed, the Vice-Admiral left Apia on August 31.

On September 9 Admiralty instructions were received to occupy Angaur Gap and Nauru, but learning that the German Pacific Isles were, as a result of the stoppage of their trade, badly off as regards food supplies, and as the occupation of these islands would involve the responsibility of feeding the inhabitants, the Admiral sent a telegram to the Admiralty submitting that the first-named two islands should not be occupied. Reference was made to a telegram relating to the escort of Australian troops to Aden, which was six days late in reaching the

Admiral. On the day on which he received the message, September 9, he telegraphed that he would detach the *Sydney*, that the *Melbourne* must come to Simpsonshaven to coal, and would then be sent to Sydney, and should arrive in time to escort the troops.

No opposition was offered at Herbertshohe, and the Union Jack was hoisted there on September 11. The Vice-Admiral proceeded to sea that night in the *Australia*, and on the next day he received reliable information that about five days previously the *Geier* was at Kaweing with a big steamer, which appeared to be a prize, in the course of being armed, and he therefore decided to send the *Melbourne*, accompanied by the *Warrego*, by way of Kaweing to Sydney. They arrived there the next day, but no enemy cruiser was found.

At three o'clock on September 15, the British flag was hoisted at Rabaul, and on September 15 the Governor came in and a conference was held.*

As the time at the Vice-Admiral's disposal

* A full account of the Australasian expeditions to German New Guinea will be found in *Australia versus Germany*, by F. S. Burrell. London, George Allen & Unwin. 1915.

was limited—owing to information being furnished by the Admiralty that the *Australia* was also to form part of the escort for the Australian troops to Aden in addition to the *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, and as, further, he had been informed that the Australian Expeditionary Force was to assemble in transports by October 5 at King George's Sound, where it was to be joined by further transports from New Zealand—he decided to leave Simpsonshaven as soon as a settlement was in view.

The *Australia*, the *Melbourne* and the *Sydney* left New Britain for Sydney, and on the night of September 17 a telegram was received from the Admiralty to the effect that the situation was changed by the appearance of the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau* at Samoa on September 14, and of the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal. The *Australia* and *Montcalm* were to cover the *Encounter* and the Expeditionary Force to New Guinea from attack, and then search for the two cruisers. The *Melbourne* was to be used at the Admiral's discretion; the *Sydney* was to return for the convoy of Australian troops to Aden; the *Hampshire* and the *Yarmouth*


were to seek the *Emden*; the *Minotaur* was to arrive at Fremantle on October 4 for the Australian convoy, and one Japanese cruiser was to accompany the *Minotaur*. Owing to certain circumstances the Vice-Admiral decided to substitute the *Sydney* for the *Melbourne*.

The fight between the *Sydney* and the *Emden* off the Cocos-Keeling Islands on November 9, 1914, is dealt with in a separate chapter. The despatch of Captain Glossop describing the action, the first despatch of the Royal Australian Navy to be published, is given in full.*

The submarine AE1 was lost on September 14, 1914, off Cape Gazelle, while engaged on patrol work during the New Britain expedition. The cause of the disaster is unknown, but it is believed that the submarine struck a submerged rock. AE2 was sent to co-operate with the British submarine flotillas operating at the Dardanelles in 1915. On May 11 the following report was issued by the Admiralty:

“ A Turkish official communique, via Berlin and Amsterdam, states that the Australian

* Appendix III, p. 261.



Cribb.

OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE AUSTRALIAN SUBMARINE AE2.

submarine AE2 (Lt.-Com. Henry H. G. D. Stoker) was sunk by Turkish warships while trying to enter into the Sea of Marmora, and that the crew, consisting of three officers and 29 men, were taken prisoners."

The news was subsequently confirmed by the receipt of letters from Lt.-Com. Stoker and other members of the crew.

An official review of the second year of the war contained the following information about the Australian ships :

The battle-cruiser *Australia* reached England on January 28, 1915, to join the Battle-Cruiser Force under Beatty, and was four days too late to take part in the battle of the Dogger Bank. She became flagship of Vice-Admiral Pakenham in the Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron, but was, by ill-luck, away at the time of the battle of Jutland.*

The two light cruisers, *Sydney* and *Melbourne*, also came to European waters, and

* The *Australia's* work before she came to European waters consisted mainly in taking part in the "drive" of von Spee's squadron to the Falklands. She co-operated with several Japanese cruisers in the slow sweeping of the Central and South American coasts. After the battle of the Falkland Islands she passed into the Atlantic on her way to England and during the voyage caught and sank the German supply ship *Eleonore Woermann*.

were attached to a squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Patey employed on patrol. Their duties took them as far south as Monte Video and as far north as Halifax in Nova Scotia.

"This has meant," said the report, "not only an unusual amount of sea time—by the end of last year (1915), for instance, the *Sydney* had steamed well over 100,000 miles during her commission, nearly three-quarters since the outbreak of the war—but life in climates varying often sharply, from the cold of a Canadian winter to the perpetual moist heat of the Gulf of Mexico. More than half the *Sydney's* sea time has been spent in the tropics.

"In Canada the Press laid some stress on the fact that warships belonging to one of the great Dominions of the Empire were allotted to patrol off the shores of a sister Dominion on the other side of the world. An interesting episode in this section of the Australian Navy's work was provided by the threat of certain German sympathisers in the United States to revenge themselves on the *Sydney* by blowing her up on the anniversary of the day when she fought the *Emden*. A careful

watch was kept but the threat was not carried out, though something happened that, futile as it was, might have been meant for an attempt."

The report also recorded the work of H.M.A.S. *Pioneer* in the Indian Ocean.

She was attached to the squadron that blockaded German East Africa, and from the time of her arrival on the African coast was employed in company with other ships in watching the mouth of the Rufigi River, where the *Königsberg* had sheltered. When the British monitors went up the river to shell the German cruiser, the *Pioneer* was employed in bombarding German land defences at the Ssimba Urunga mouth of the river.*

The remaining Australian ships, the *Encounter*, *Warrego*, *Parramatta*, *Yarra* and *Una*,† with the *Psyche* of the New Zealand Division, and *Fantome*, temporarily attached by the Admiralty to the Australian Navy and manned by Australian crews, were en-

* Vice-Admiral King Hall's despatch of July 15, 1915, records that her captain was Commander (acting) Thomas W. Biddlecombe, R.A.N.

† Ex-*Komet*, a German armed vessel captured on October 12, 1914.

gaged in patrolling the Australian trade routes and escorting convoys. The report said :

“ In the course of this work they have covered huge mileages, mainly in tropical waters, under conditions of much discomfort. They have entered many harbours previously little known and rarely visited, and thus have added to the world's permanent stock of maritime knowledge. And the quality of their work has been praised by Imperial officers, to whose commands some of them have on occasion been attached. The tasks set them have been on the whole more monotonous and less diversified with incident than those allotted to ships serving in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. But they have been factors in the solution of an important problem and Australia has every reason to be satisfied with the way in which they have done their share.”

Three hospital ships were equipped for service during the war, the *Grantala*, *Karoola* and *Kanowna*. The fleet auxiliaries employed were the *Aorangi*, fleet supply ship, and *Berrima*, armed transport.

Not a single British merchant vessel was

captured by enemy corsairs in Australian waters : no Australian port was attacked, nor were the coasts threatened at any point. Mr. Massey, the Premier of New Zealand, pointed out in a speech that "if it had not been for the Australian Navy a New Zealand fortified town might have been smashed and destroyed, for two of the most powerful of the German ships on one occasion were within three days' steam of New Zealand."

The effect of the war on naval expenditure by Australia is shown by the Commonwealth Government's own figures.* The total naval expenditure for 1913-14 was £1,999,765. The estimate of the Navy Department for 1915-16 was £10,035,415.


In the early part of 1917 a batch of midshipmen, R.A.N., the first to complete their four years' training in Australia, left Sydney for England to join the British Fleet in the North Sea.

* *Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia*, No. 9.

CHAPTER XII

THE "SYDNEY" AND THE "EMDEN"

THE first action between a Dominion ship and an enemy is historic, and would in any case deserve to be recorded at some length. In point of fact, however, the events which led up to the *Sydney's* baptism of fire are so extraordinarily romantic, so reminiscent of the old days of the corsairs, that the story of the Hundred Days of the *Emden* must always be fascinating reading for a seafaring race. Almost alone among the German naval officers the captain of the *Emden* proved himself both a seaman and a chivalrous antagonist. Almost alone among the German naval officers he showed a sense of humour. And for two months he outwitted the efforts of four enemy navies to trap him. The record of those two months, seen after a lapse of time when the natural annoyance roused by his successes has cooled, is the measure of the diffi-



MAP OF THE "EMDEN'S" CRUISE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

culties of a campaign at sea. It demonstrates more clearly than any other episode of modern times the vastness and the loneliness of the oceans. For the *Emden* passed once within a hundred miles of a convoy of British troops, but made no contact. And she called at a British Island in the Indian Ocean and was received as a friend, for the inhabitants had not heard of the war that had begun ten weeks previously.

When Germany declared war on Russia the *Emden* was at Tsing Tau, and on either the 3rd or 4th of August she began her career of commerce-destroying by capturing the Russian steamer *Rezan*. At that time she was near her own base and was consequently able to take the prize into port, a thing she was never able to do in the Indian Ocean. The *Rezan* was quickly transformed into an auxiliary cruiser and accompanied the *Emden* when she left the German base in China hurriedly on or about August 8. The two ships made for the South Pacific to rejoin the flag of von Spee, slipping past the vigilant watch of a Japanese cruiser by a stratagem which Captain von Müller was to use with good effect more than once. The *Emden*

was a three-funnelled cruiser similar in silhouette to British cruisers of the "Town" class, like the *Yarmouth*, which was on the China Station, except for the fact that the British ships had four funnels. The engineer-commander of the *Emden*, Ellerbrock, rigged up a dummy funnel, and with this in position the ship passed for the *Yarmouth*. Captain von Müller, with a delightful sense of irony, ordered the band to play "Heil dir im Siegeskranz," which has the same tune as "God Save the King," while the *Emden* was passing the Japanese cruiser, and it is reported* that the Japanese seamen cheered the ship as she steamed away under the impression that they were cheering their allies.

The *Emden* and the *Rezan* appear to have joined up with von Spee at the Marschall Islands, and the Admiral then attached the new auxiliary cruiser to his own force and despatched the *Emden* to the Indian Ocean. She left the Marschall Islands on August 22, and thenceforward we have no record of her movements until she appeared in the Bay of Bengal on September 10. It seems reasonable to assume that she cruised at economic

* *Völkerkrieg*, part 19, Hoffmann, Stuttgart.

speed through the Caroline Archipelago, through the Banda Sea to the Strait between Java and Sumatra, and thence northward. In the Indian Ocean she re-coaled from the Hamburg-America liner, *Markomannia*. The distance from the Marschall Islands to Calcutta is about 6500 miles, so that even at economic speed she must have been pretty nearly swept clean of coal at the rendezvous.

The wireless stations at Calcutta, ignorant of the presence of an enemy ship within their range, were busy sending out shipping intelligence as usual.

The *Emden*'s captain had full knowledge of every ship's course in the Bay. And at nine o'clock on the morning of September 10 he stopped the steamer *Indus*. The next day the *Lovat* was captured and sunk. On September 12 the *Kabinga* fell into the hands of von Müller, who placed a prize crew on board, and two hours later he took the *Killin*, which was sunk the next day. At midday on September 13 the *Diplomat* was taken, and the haul was completed by the capture of the *Trabbock*. In every case those on board the merchant ships were allowed time to get away from their ships. They were all

gradually drafted to the *Kabínga*, which was sent off to harbour on September 14 with the good wishes of their captor, who warned them that they must be cautious in approaching the Hooghly as pilotage marks had been removed and lights extinguished since the *Emden's* presence in the Bay had been reported. The *Emden* then made off south-eastward towards Rangoon, where the *Clan Matheson*, *Dover* and *Pontoporros* were captured. The first was sunk, the second sent to Rangoon with captured crews, and the third attached to the *Emden* as an additional collier. Then Captain von Müller made for Madras.* The Indian Government announced on September 23 that "a hostile cruiser appeared off Madras Harbour at half-past nine last night and started firing on the oil tanks, setting two alight. On our guns replying the cruiser ceased firing, put out her lights and steamed away."

A German version of the affair† says that one of the crew who had worked in Madras told the captain about the oil tanks and their

* The Italian steamer *Laroumno* was captured but released, as Italy was not then at war with Germany.


† Quoted in *La Guerre Navale*, by Hubert F. . . . Payot, Paris, as from *The Journal of a Petty Officer of the Emden*.

position. The account adds that 125 shells were fired and then the *Emden* made off to the north-east. A few hours later, however, she turned south-west and made for Pondicherry, where she lay off the harbour at anchor during September 24. She made no attack and by the next day was on her way to Ceylon, and between September 25 and 28 captured the *Tymeric*, *King Lud*, *Ribera* and *Foyle*, which were sunk, the *Gryfedale*, which was sent to Colombo with the captured crews, and the *Buresk*, which was kept as a collier.

By that time the *Emden*'s hull had grown foul with so much cruising in tropical waters and her engines were in need of small repairs. So Captain von Müller played another trick. The small British island of Diego Garcia, south-east of Colombo, was only visited by a steamer once in three months. Captain von Müller knew the times of these visits, and he calculated that in all probability the inhabitants knew nothing of the war. Even if they did they were not likely to interfere with him, and there was no cable station on the island. So he went to it for refuge. The petty-officers' journal quoted above thus describes the visit :

“October 10. Visited the island of Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean, about half-way between Africa and Sumatra. The few families of Europeans knew nothing of the war, the steamer which serves the island only coming every three months. The *Emden* coaled all day. Some of our engineers repaired the local motor-boat and the inhabitants gave us baskets of cocoanuts and fish.”

But Captain von Müller did more than that. He told the friendly inhabitants that his ship's hull wanted cleaning, and he offered to pay them well if they would help him to careen her. So the *Emden* was run up on a sandy beach and everyone set to work with a will to scrape off the barnacles. When this was done von Müller put the ship afloat again on a high tide and remained two or three days at anchor to give his crew a rest, and when the ship left, the inhabitants, with German gold in their pockets, cheered her lustily. It was one of the merriest comedies of the war, and it also served to show von Müller once more in a favourable light. He offered to take the mail for the islanders, and he forwarded it to a British port a few



Central News.

THE GERMAN CRUISER "EMDEN."

Facing page 142.



days later in a steamer which he captured and released.

Despite his successes, the net was closing round him. The British battleship *Triumph*, and the Japanese cruisers *Nishin* and *Kasuga*, had been summoned from the China Seas to the Indian Ocean when first the *Emden* appeared there. The *Yarmouth* had preceded them from the same waters. The French cruiser, *Dupleix*, was stationed at Penang, and the Russians had the *Askold* and the *Jemtchug* under the orders of the British Admiral in Indian waters, Vice-Admiral Jerram. Moreover, the Royal Australian Navy, having completed its work in the German Pacific Islands, was preparing, with the *Minotaur* and the Japanese cruiser, *Ibuki*, to escort the Anzac battalions to Egypt, so that the *Sydney* and the *Melbourne* were also added to the ships hunting the corsair.

Von Müller had need of every stratagem he could devise to help him. The *Markomannia* was known to be his collier. He sent her away to the eastward as a decoy while he was at Diego Garcia, and on October 15 she was captured by the *Yarmouth* in the vicinity of Sumatra. The *Pontoporros*, which had

carried coals and was captured on September 15 by the *Emden*, was also taken by the *Yarmouth* with the *Markomannia*. The two colliers had served their purpose, and von Müller sacrificed them like pawns to the higher plan of his own safety, retaining the *Buresk* as his collier and hoping that luck would bring another coal ship into his net. It did. On October 20 he fell in with the British steamers, *Chilkana*, *Troilus*, *Benmohr* and *Clan Grant*, the Tasmanian dredger *Ponrabbel*, and the British coal steamer, *Exford*, 150 miles south-west of Cochin. So that while his pursuers were concentrating, as he hoped, on Sumatra he was on the other side of India. And the *Exford's* coal enabled him to carry on for the last twenty days of his wild career.

He fled rapidly from the scene of this last exploit and went due east. He steamed 1500 miles without attempting any attack on shipping, and in the early morning of October 28 attacked the allied warships in the roadstead of Penang. What motive inspired this daring, spectacular, and largely useless enterprise it is difficult to guess. It was probably the sheer joy of adventure.

The dummy funnel was rigged again, and the disguised ship steamed boldly into the anchorage in the pale dawn. She was challenged by the Russian cruiser, *Jemtchug*, and replied that she was the *Yarmouth*. As she passed within 600 yards of the Russian ship her dummy funnel wobbled. The alarm was instantly given, but it was too late. Two torpedoes were fired by the *Emden*, and at that range they could hardly miss a stationary target. The Russian ship was blown up with the loss of 85 lives. Then the *Emden* swung round and made for the open sea. On her way out she encountered the French destroyer, *Mousquet*, which was returning from patrol duty in the Straits of Malacca. The little French ship boldly tackled the raider, but two salvos from the heavier guns of the *Emden* were sufficient to wreck her. And Captain von Müller again showed his chivalry by launching boats to rescue the drowning and wounded survivors. A letter from one of them,* states that they were treated like friends on board the German cruiser, and two of the French seamen who died of their wounds on board the *Emden*

* Published in the *Temps*, March 26, 1915.

were buried at sea. Captain von Müller had their remains wrapped in French flags and himself read the Burial Service, ending with a short address, which he closed by saying in French :

“ Nous prions pour ces braves, qui sont morts des blessures reçues dans un combat glorieux.”

The other survivors, thirty-six in number, were transferred subsequently to a captured English steamer and landed at Sabang, Sumatra.*

The *Emden* rounded the northern end of Sumatra and then ran to the south for the Cocos-Keeling Islands. Here again one is puzzled by the action of Captain von Müller. The island, as he knew, was an important cable station and had a wireless telegraph apparatus. It was courting discovery to attack the place, a thing that no raider would be likely to do. It is possible that his success at Penang had momentarily blinded him to danger. It is more probable that his judgment was no longer as keen as it was at the beginning of his adventures. He had gone

* “ Nos Marins et La Guerre : Les Communiqués officiels de la Marine.” Berger-Levrault. Paris. p. 23.

through a most wearing time. A narrative by a sailor of the *Emden** gives us a pen-picture of the life lived by the officer in command of such a raider as the *Emden* :

" He hardly ever left the bridge. He was always studying books and charts throughout the three months of war. I was on signal duty and I could watch him at my leisure. During the night he remained sitting in a chair on the bridge. If I moved three steps he was on the alert. I do not think he slept throughout the cruise.

" I was also his steward. He fed alone, though sometimes he invited one of the officers. When I took away the plates I noticed that he had only eaten a little soup and a potato. He was back again at once in the chart room, calculating, plotting and thinking. Now and again, however, I saw him reading books other than volumes of sailing directions. They were works on Gneisenau and Nelson. He went very thin, and in two months he aged ten years."

There is nothing exaggerated in that picture. The captain of a corsair is at war with

* Recounted by the Constantinople correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, June 11, 1915.

all the world when he has the ships of four navies looking for him, when he has no fortified base to which to retire, when he is dependent on chance wireless messages for information, and on captures for replenishing his bunkers that are all too soon exhausted when high speed is so often necessary. Only a man of iron nerve could endure the strain. That von Müller blundered into such an obvious danger as the attempt to silence the cable station at Direction Island in the Cocos-Keeling group is only human. He paid the penalty, and that penalty was defeat.

CHAPTER XIII

THE "SYDNEY" AND THE "EMDEN" (continued)

THE first Australian Contingent left the rendezvous in Australian waters on November 1,* escorted by the *Melbourne* and *Sydney* of the Royal Australian Navy and the Japanese cruiser *Ibuki*. Captain Kato, of the *Ibuki*, in an interview,† stated that in view of the presence of the *Emden* right in the track of the convoy, and the fact that of the thirty-eight ships composing the convoy all but three were unarmed, the ordinary route was avoided as much as possible. The result was that the squadron was fifty miles east of the Cocos-Keeling group on the morning of November 9, when a broken wireless message from the station at Direction Island was picked up, of which the decipherable part was, "Strange

* *Commonwealth Year Book*, No. 9.

† Published in the *Jiji* and quoted in the *Temps* of February 3, 1915.

warship . . . off entrance." The captain of the *Melbourne* was the senior officer of the squadron, and although Captain Kato begged that he might be allowed to go and investigate, it was the *Sydney* which was detached for the task.

What had happened was this. A four-funnelled cruiser had appeared off the island the previous evening, but did not call. The next morning just before sunrise the same cruiser approached the island again, obviously intending to send a boat ashore. For some unexplained reason the dummy funnel fell overboard and the *Emden* was betrayed. The wireless station rushed out a message, but by the time it had been composed and sent, a strong landing party was in possession of the station, and the message was also interrupted by loud calls from the *Emden's* wireless apparatus. Even then Captain Müller seems to have ignored the danger to himself; he did not recall the landing party, and when the *Sydney* tore up over the horizon at twenty-five knots he was trapped. At 9.20 a.m. the look-out in the *Sydney* could see the masts and funnels of the strange cruiser twelve or fifteen miles away, and twenty minutes later



SEAMEN GUNNERS, PETTY OFFICERS, AND WARRANT OFFICERS, R.A.N.

the action began, the first shot being fired by the *Emden*. Captain Müller was doing the only possible thing : he was endeavouring to close the range, so that his small 4.1-inch guns should not be overpowered by the 6-inch pieces of the *Sydney*. Captain Glossop saw through that device, and throughout the action, as he had greater speed than the German ship, he was able to keep at whatever range suited him.

The *Emden* endeavoured to smother the *Sydney* with a hail of shell. In the first ten minutes she fired three salvoes to every one from the Australian ship. Owing to the length of the range she was using high angle fire, and consequently the shells when they hit fell on the deck and not against the sides. At the fourth salvo the *Emden* registered a serious hit, and the fifth hit the *Sydney* again, one shell wounding every man at one of the guns. An officer of the *Sydney*, describing the fight,* said :

“ I heard a crash, and looking aft saw that a shell had hit near gun No. 2 starboard. But owing to the screen being in the way I did not know it had knocked out practically

* *Times*, December 15, 1914.

the whole of that gun's crew. Not seeing any flame or smoke rising (we cope with the smallest fire immediately), I went on with my job. This required continual attention. The men are splendid at loading drill, but to practise supply of ammunition is almost impossible in peace time. To have a big supply stacked on the upper deck is far too dangerous a proceeding in action, and what with getting an even distribution of projectiles and cartridges between the two guns, getting the safety caps off, with fiddley pins and things to take out, attending to miss-fires, cheering up the one or two who seemed to be 'pulling dry,' you can imagine I had little time to think much about the *Emden*. I noticed once or twice when going forward the starboard side to the forecastle gun that we seemed to be in the thick of it. There was a lot of 'Whee-oo, whee-oo, whee-oo' and the 'but—but—but' of the shell striking the water beyond, and as the range was pretty big this is quite possible, since the angle of descent would be pretty steep."

The punishment of the *Emden* was very heavy. A quarter of an hour after the first shot was fired a salvo from the *Sydney*

entered the stern of the raider and burst on the after deck. The deck was torn and lifted from its beams till it resembled a rolling sea. The after gun was put right out of action, and seventeen men of the crew were blown overboard. Some of them who survived the experience swam about for eight hours before they were picked up. Her steering gear was smashed, and a serious fire was started which could not be put out.

The fore funnel was shot away, and the foremast toppled. The main fire control station was on this mast and its destruction considerably hampered the *Emden's* fire. Thereafter the punishment she inflicted on the *Sydney* was slight. Captain Müller again attempted to close the range and at one time he got it down to 5500 yards, but Captain Glossop swung round again and opened it rapidly to twice that distance. At this point the narrative of the young officer of the *Sydney* may be quoted again :

“ We next changed round to starboard guns. I then found the gunlayer of No. 1 starboard gun had been knocked out close to the conning tower, so I brought Atkins over to fire No. 1 starboard. I was quite

deaf by now, as in the hurry there had been no thought of getting cotton wool. This is a point I won't overlook next time.

"Coming aft from the port side from the forecastle gun I was met by a lot of men cheering and waving their caps. I said 'What's happened?' 'She's gone, sir, she's gone.' I ran to the ship's side and no sign of a ship could I see. If one could have seen a dark cloud of smoke it would have been different. So I called out, 'All hands turn out the lifeboats, there will be men in the water.' They were just starting to do this when someone called out, 'She's still firing, sir,' and everyone ran back to the guns. What had happened was that a cloud of yellow or very light-coloured smoke had obscured her from view so that looking in her direction one's impression was that she had totally disappeared."

The fight was entering on its last stage. Captain Glossop headed the *Emden* off from the open sea, and made her double back on her tracks towards the north. Thence she ran straight for North Keeling Island. Smoke was pouring from her everywhere except the forecastle. More than half her guns were

silent, and behind her trailed grim masses of wreckage. A salvo caught her just abaft the bridge and the second funnel fell, the third toppling a moment later and lying across the second. The smoke from the furnaces, which were stoked to their utmost capacity, belched up through the vents in the deck and swept along it, till the whole ship from the bridge aft seemed to be one smouldering heap.

The German colours were still flying and one gun barked spasmodically at the pursuers. With a last heave the stricken ship hurled herself at the coral edge of North Keeling Island, and shivered into stillness. The *Sydney* fired two more broadsides at her as she lay there, and then a sudden silence fell on the scene. It was just 11.20. The fight had lasted two hours, and the career of the *Emden* was at an end. But the Australian victory was not yet complete.

A collier had been hovering round the scene of the fight, apparently wondering whether to lend a hand or not. When the inevitable end was obvious this ship, the *Buresk*, in charge of a German prize crew, made off. And there were still the members

of the landing party at the cable station at Direction Island to attend to.

The *Sydney* swung away from her beaten foe to chase the *Buresk*. The steamer had only some ten knots to the *Sydney*'s twenty-five, and in fifty minutes the pursuit was over. The prize crew had, however, completely wrecked the collier by opening the Kingston valves and letting the water flow in. The valves had then been destroyed beyond the possibility of repair, and consequently the ship sank shortly after four o'clock in the afternoon, after having delayed the *Sydney* for some time. She was further delayed on the passage to Direction Island by having to stop and pick up a German sailor who was swimming about and night had fallen by the time she arrived off the cable station. The delay had enabled the landing party to get clear away. They had seized the schooner, *Ayesha*, which was lying off the island, provisioned it and seized whatever wearing apparel, books, tobacco, razors and other articles they could find handy, and in her they made the best of their way to Sumatra. Nothing was heard of them for many months after they left there, until

the German wireless stations in March, 1915, circulated the statement that they had arrived at Damascus, on their way to Constantinople. They ultimately reached the Turkish capital in May of that year. A volume describing their adventures was published in Germany, but I have never been able to obtain a copy of it.

Captain Glossop discovered that he had missed the quarry the next morning when he was able to send a boat ashore. Then with the local doctor on board to assist his own staff he hurried back to the wreck of the *Emden* to do what could be done for the wounded and the survivors in the raider. The officer who was sent on board wrote :


“ Luckily her stern was sticking out beyond where the surf broke so that with a rope from the stern of the ship one could ride close under one quarter with the boat’s bow to seaward. The rollers were very big, and the surging to and fro made getting aboard fairly difficult. . . . However, the Germans standing aft gave me a hand up and I was received by the captain of the *Emden*. . . .

“ When I got a chance, with all the boats away, I went to have a look round the ship.

I have no intention of describing what I saw. With the exception of the forecastle, which was hardly touched, from forebridge to stern-post, she is nothing but a shambles, and the whole thing is most shocking. The German doctor asked me to signal for some morphia, sent me aft, and I never came forward again."

The difficulties of transshipping wounded men from such a wreck under such sea conditions cannot be imagined by the landsman. But the men of the R.A.N. managed it, and Surgeon Leonard Dalby subsequently wrote a most vivid and valuable account of the way the crowd of wounded helpless men were managed in the *Sydney*. There were between seventy and eighty German wounded, a crowd of Chinamen from the sunken *Buresk*, and all the unwounded German prisoners to be accommodated in the Australian cruiser, and for ten days the medical staff and the crew had to put up with every inconvenience and discomfort attendant upon overcrowding. She fell in with the armed liner *Empress of Russia* on the way to Colombo, however, and sixty of the wounded and a hundred of the prisoners were transferred to her. There

THE
EMDEN



THE LAST OF THE "EMDEN."

Facing page 138.



were left on board twenty-five of the dangerous cases. “It would be difficult to imagine,” writes Surgeon Dalby, “a more severe test for the medical staff of a cruiser in action where so many wounded could be rescued. The sick berth staff of the *Sydney* came well out of the test, as did the other Australian ratings on board.” The officer previously quoted paid a fine tribute to the young Australian personnel :

“There were lots of redeeming points in the whole show. Best of all was to see the gun’s crew fighting their guns quite unconcerned. When we were last in Sydney we took on board three boys from the training ship, *Tingira*, who had volunteered. The captain said : ‘I don’t really want them, but as they are keen I’ll take them.’ Now the action was only a week or two afterwards, but the two out of the three who were directly under my notice were splendid. One little slip of a boy did not turn a hair and worked splendidly. The other boy, a very sturdy youngster, carried projectiles from the hoist to his gun without so much as thinking of cover. I do think for two boys absolutely new to their work they were splendid.”

160 THE IMPERIAL BRITISH NAVY

Out of the ship's company of 391 officers and men, 252 belonged to the Australian Navy, and 11 of the 16 casualties in the *Sydney* were Australians.*

The Admiralty announced on April 10, 1915, that the following were to receive the Distinguished Service Medal for services in the action :

Arthur W. Lambert, Chief Petty Officer,
R.A.N.

Bertie Green, Able Seaman, R.A.N.

Joseph Kinniburgh, Able Seaman, R.A.N.

Harold M. Collins, Able Seaman, R.A.N.

William Alfred Taylor, Able Seaman,
R.A.N.

Thomas Edward Mullins, Sick Berth
Steward, R.A.N.

These were the first men of the Royal Australian Navy to win medals for war services.

* Sir George Reid in the *Daily Telegraph*, November 20, 1914.

CHAPTER XIV

THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY

IT was not until January, 1915, that the "Royal Canadian Navy" figured in that form in the Navy List. The reason for the delay is hard to understand. Australia had already been granted the distinction in April, 1913. It is true that a great controversy had raged in Canada over the form that the naval assistance to the Mother Country should take, but the agreement with the Imperial Government constituting separate naval services for Australia and Canada was made public in the Dominion in 1911,* and the Canadian Naval Service was certainly in existence at the time the R.A.N. was officially recognized.

The beginnings of the Dominion Fleet were modest.

* See Appendix II. Sir Wilfrid Laurier presented the Memorandum to the Canadian House of Commons on July 28, 1911.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier presented a Bill to the Canadian Parliament on January 12, 1910, dealing with the Canadian Naval Service. It was passed as the Canadian Naval Service Act in May of the following year. The Premier explained that the Bill provided for the creation of a naval force to be composed of a permanent corps, a reserve force and a volunteer reserve. Every man in the force was to be enrolled by voluntary engagement only. The force was to be under the control of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, with a Director of Naval Service to supervise it and a Naval Board to advise the Department. Commissions in this naval militia were to issue in the name of the King. A Naval College was to be established on the model of the Military College at Kingston. Naval discipline was to be in the form of the King's Regulations as applying to the Royal Navy. The question of control of the force was referred to by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in these words :

“ While the Naval Force is to be under the control of the Canadian Government, and more directly under the control of the Department of Marine, yet in case of



Cribb.

BOYS OF THE R.C.N. ON BOARD THE "RAINBOW."



emergency the Governor-General in Council may place at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy the Naval Service or any part thereof, and any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and any officers or men serving in those vessels, or any officers or men of the Naval Service. There is a subsequent provision that if such action is taken by the Governor in Council at a time when Parliament is not sitting, Parliament shall immediately be called."

Dealing with the question of a Fleet Unit, he said his Government had not seen its way to accept for the present the Admiralty's suggestion for a naval unit in the Pacific, though it recognized the strategic reasons for such a policy. It had decided to have part of the Service on the Atlantic and part on the Pacific. The type of craft favoured by the Government included four *Bristols*, one *Boadicea** and six destroyers. The total cost of these ships would be, according to the British Admiralty figures, £2,338,000. Supposing the ships were to be built in Canada

* A light cruiser of 3300 tons, 26-knots speed, carrying six 4-inch guns.

it would be necessary to increase the estimated cost by one-third.

“It is our intention to start at the earliest possible moment with the construction of this fleet, and, if possible, to have the construction done in Canada,” he concluded.

On April 6 he moved certain financial resolutions. These provided for subsidies for dry dock construction and floating docks. On April 30 he asked for a vote of £600,000 for the Naval Service, including the upkeep of Halifax and Esquimalt Dockyards and maintenance of training schools. He also said :

“On a previous occasion I stated to the House that it was our intention as soon as the Navy Bill was passed to ask for tenders for the ten* ships with which we propose to commence our Navy. It is not probable that any of the £600,000 for which we now ask will be applied this year to that purpose. Tenders will be called for and the first thing the successful tenderer will have to do will be to put up plant, and therefore I do not think we shall be in a position this

* The number was actually eleven.

year to spend a single dollar of this amount."*

He also stated that the cost of the *Niobe* would be £215,000, with maintenance and repairs, £82,600 additional: the cost of the *Rainbow*, £50,000, with additional expenditure of £55,520. The officers and men were to be borrowed from the Imperial Navy and would remain in its service.

The acquirement of these two ships was the outcome of correspondence with the British Admiralty carried on between November, 1909, and February, 1910, in which Rear-Admiral C. E. Kingsmill acted for the Canadian Government. He had been appointed to the command of the Canadian Marine Service in 1909.

The *Niobe* arrived at Halifax on October 22,

* Actually the result of the tendering was not announced until November, 1911, when Mr. Hazen, Minister of Marine in the Borden Cabinet, stated that the lowest tender was that of Messrs. Cammell, Laird & Co., Birkenhead, whose total estimate was £2,256,000. In the same month, however, the Premier announced that the Laurier naval programme would not be proceeded with until the opinion of the Canadian people had been consulted. There followed the offer of the three Dreadnoughts, as described in a previous chapter, and in the result the Laurier programme of construction was never put in hand.

1910, and was welcomed by the Minister of Marine and Admiral Kingsmill. The *Rainbow* arrived at Esquimalt on November 9 just after the transfer of the dockyard from the Imperial Authorities to the Dominion Authorities had taken place. At the same time it was announced that these and subsequent ships of the Naval Service would be distinguished from ships of the Royal Navy by the use of the letters H.M.C.S. (His Majesty's Canadian Ship) before their names.

Canadian warships fly the white ensign at the stern and the Canadian flag at the jack-staff. The uniform is the same as that of the Royal Navy, except that the device on the buttons is a maple leaf instead of a laurel leaf, and the mark of the executive officer is a triangle on the uppermost row of gold braid on the cuff instead of the traditional curl of the Royal Navy.

The Naval Staff at Ottawa, as organized after the passing of the Act, was composed as follows :

Director of Naval Service—Rear-Admiral
C. E. Kingsmill.



UNIFORM OF OFFICERS, R.C.N.

Cribb.

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Chief of Staff—Commander C. D. Roper,
R.N.

Secretary to the Staff—Fleet-Paymaster
P. J. Ling, R.N.

Consulting Naval Engineer—Eng.-Com.
P. C. W. Howe, R.N.

Director of Naval Gunnery—Lt. R. M. T.
Stephens, R.N.

The command of the *Niobe* was given to Commander W. B. Macdonald, R.N., a son of Senator Macdonald, of British Columbia, and Commander J. D. D. Stewart was the first captain of the *Rainbow*. It is important to notice that these and other appointments were all announced by the Admiralty and not by the Canadian Government.

Recruiting for the Canadian Naval Service was promptly started, advertisements being inserted in the papers setting forth the terms of service. By January 31, 1910, the applications for enrollment totalled 234, of whom 115 were Canadians and the others retired men of the Royal Navy and the Royal Naval Reserve. In October it was stated that sixty candidates had offered themselves for the first thirty vacancies in the Royal Naval

College at Halifax. The final list of successful candidates included twenty-one names. Seven cadets who had been serving in the Canadian Government cruiser, *Canada*,* were promoted midshipmen and appointed to the *Niobe*.

The Naval College at Halifax was opened in 1911 with Mr. B. S. Hartley, R.N., as Director of Naval Instruction. The training at the college extends over two years. The parents are required to pay £20 a year college fees, with a maintenance allowance of £60 for the first year and £30 for the second year, which may be paid in instalments. Engineer cadets undergo a further year's training in a shipbuilding establishment, a year at sea and a fifth year at college for study in higher subjects. The first Canadian cadets to go to sea were nineteen young officers, who joined the cruiser *Berwick* in 1913 for their year's training afloat. She was a sister ship to the *Cumberland* and *Cornwall*, in which the Dartmouth cadets gained their first sea experience.

The scale of pay authorized for the Naval Service was as follows :

* On fishery protection duty.

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Seaman Class	.	.	.	2/- to 9/6 a day
Engine Room Department	.	.	.	3/- to 10/- „
Artisans	.	.	.	3/- to 10/- „
Sick Berth Staff	.	.	.	3/- to 10/- „
Waiters	.	.	.	3/- to 10/- „
Stewards	.	.	.	2/- to 10/6 „
Cooks	.	.	.	2/- to 9/- „
Ship's Police	.	.	.	4/- to 10/- „
Schoolmasters	.	.	.	6/- to 10/- „
Officers' Cooks and Stewards	.	.	.	3/- to 6/- „

The scale of pay for officers is :

Midshipmen	.	.	.	8/- a day
Sub-lieutenants	.	.	.	12/- „
Lieutenants	.	.	.	16/- to 22/- a day
Commanders	.	.	.	24/- to 32/- „
Captains	.	.	.	33/6 to 38/- „

Engineer commanders begin at 30s. and rise to 36s. a day ; the pay of engineer captains is 54s. a day.

The greatest difficulty of the Canadian Naval Service has always been recruiting. The first annual report of the Director of Naval Service, which was issued in December, 1911, showed that there were 21 cadets training at the College, and that 223 recruits had been entered, of whom 185 were drafted to the *Niobe* and 38 to the *Rainbow*. But desertion was a bad feature. In the following

year the Naval Department recorded that 86 recruits and 17 other men had deserted from the *Nlobe*, and 25 recruits and 21 other men from the *Rainbow*. By the end of 1912 the recruiting figures were still poor. Figures published by the Department in February, 1913, showed the total number recruited to be only 402, distributed over the following provinces :

Nova Scotia, 162 ; New Brunswick, 5 ; Prince Edward Island, 19 ; Quebec, 44 ; Ontario, 113 ; Manitoba, 1 ; Saskatchewan, 2 ; Alberta, 4 ; British Columbia, 52.

It was also recorded that 78 other men were qualifying for service. Possibly these were the result of the special recruiting campaign carried on in England during 1912, when an office was opened in Portsmouth.

CHAPTER XV

THE R.C.N. : ITS DOCKYARDS AND BASES

NO Admiral has done for Canada what Admiral Henderson did for Australia in the way of indicating the necessary naval bases and subsidiary stations. It would be presumptuous for a civilian student to attempt any such estimate, but there are certain clear and definite points in connection with the strategical disposition of the Royal Canadian Navy upon which it is legitimate and desirable to comment.

Canada's naval problem is far more complex than that of Australia. The Island Continent can maintain two squadrons in the sure and certain knowledge that, given good strategical foresight by her naval staff, the two units can quickly unite and merge into one Fleet if necessary. Canada, if she had to defend herself alone at sea, would be compelled to maintain two entirely independent fleets. In this respect she is even

more handicapped than the United States. The opening of the Panama Canal has made possible for the Republic a junction between the Fleets in the Pacific and the Atlantic with a minimum of delay. But unless Canada and the United States were in alliance the only route by which the two Dominion Fleets could unite is that to the extreme south of South America through the Magellan Straits. This is a formidable difficulty. It must either expose two weak Canadian squadrons, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific, to the danger of annihilation at the hands of a powerful antagonist before junction could be effected, or it must saddle the Canadian people with a tremendous burden of expenditure on naval defence—if Canada had to rely on herself. So long, however, as the Imperial Commonwealth holds together and the immense strength of the British Navy is at hand to lend support where needed, Canada is preserved from the more obvious perils of her strategic position. How that position can be utilized to the benefit of the whole Empire is a wider subject that is dealt with elsewhere.*

* See *post*, [p. 208–216.

In another respect Canada is very well provided strategically. She has good harbours on both seaboard, though at present only one on either side is developed as a naval base. In the autumn of 1910 the Canadian Government took over the naval yards at Halifax and Esquimalt. The Imperial Order in Council transferring the former was signed on October 13, and the transfer of the latter took place formally on November 9.

Other ports on the Atlantic that suggest themselves for various naval purposes are Montreal, St. John (New Brunswick), Shelburne (Nova Scotia) and Sydney (Cape Breton). At the latter place a combine of British shipbuilding interests started an important yard in 1911, under the name of the British Canadian Shipbuilding and Dock Co. A dry dock, 1000 feet in length, 110 feet wide, and with 40 feet depth on the sill, was part of the undertaking, in which it was ultimately expected to employ 8000 men. Eleven shipbuilding slips—eight of them adapted for large warship construction—were also included in the yard's possibilities.

The yard at Montreal was the venture of Canadian Vickers, Ltd. This firm arranged

to construct a dry dock at Lougue Point at a cost of £1,000,000, with a ship repairing plant equal to the largest repairing plants in Great Britain. In 1912 Messrs. Vickers sent a large floating dock to the St. Lawrence. At Levis and St. John the Dominion Dry Dock Co. planned an expenditure of £2,000,000 to equip each port with docks, 1000 feet long, 100 feet wide and 36 feet deep on the sill, taking vessels up to 80,000 tons. At the end of 1913 the Canadian Government placed a contract for improvements in the harbour at Halifax on which the expenditure was to be £1,040,000.

So far as docking and repairing accommodation is concerned, therefore, the Atlantic seaboard promises to be well supplied. That, however, is not all. Sydney, Cape Breton, is only a summer port as it is ice-bound for several months in the year, and in modern war, as we have learned, neither fleets nor armies go into winter quarters at the end of the autumn to resume operations when the weather is again bland. The bulk of the accommodation of the Canadian Atlantic Fleet will have to be concentrated further to the south.

Private enterprise on the Pacific Coast has already provided Canada with some naval yards. The Esquimalt Graving Dock and Shipbuilding Co. (in which Messrs. Denny Bros., of Dumbarton, are interested) was incorporated in 1911 to construct a dry dock 900 feet long, 122 feet wide and 40 feet deep. The firm's estimate was that when their yard was in full swing there would be employment for 4000 or 5000 men. A yard was started at Vancouver in 1912, and shortly before the war began Mr. A. F. Yarrow allowed it to be known that his firm was interested in the development of another yard at Esquimalt, at which torpedo craft construction would be a speciality. The Canadian Government plans for developing the naval yard at Esquimalt included a new dry dock 1150 feet long.

The growth of Prince Rupert to the North will, in time, provide a subsidiary base of considerable value.

These are the beginnings of a big industry. Shipbuilding on the North American Continent received a tremendous impetus during the war. Europe's need of new tonnage was America's opportunity and both the

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United States and Canada rose to it. The experience thus gained and the plant thus acquired will play their part in the future development of the Royal Canadian Navy.

CHAPTER XVI

THE R.C.N. : ITS SHARE IN THE WAR

THE annual reports of the Canadian Minister of Marine during the war have not the same interest as those issued in Australia. This is inevitable, but nevertheless a considerable amount of information is contained in them, and far more help was given to the naval operations of the war by Canada than was realized anywhere at the time. The full history of the submarines CC1 and CC2, for example, has a direct bearing on the fate of von Spee's squadron.

These two submarines were building at Seattle for the Chilian Government, and at the beginning of August, 1914, were practically complete, but not paid for. On the day before war was declared by Great Britain, Sir Richard McBride, the Premier of British Columbia, bought them on his own responsibility for £230,000. On August 5 Sir Robert

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Borden telegraphed to Sir Richard McBride, "We appreciate most warmly your action, which will greatly tend to increase security on the Pacific Coast." The boats were offered to the Admiralty, and on August 9 "gratefully accepted." The old sloop *Shearwater* was transferred to the Royal Canadian Navy for duty as a submarine mother-ship: experienced officers and men were lent from the British Navy and the two boats were speedily on active service.*

The two submarines worked with the *Rainbow* off the coasts of British Columbia,† and it subsequently became known that a plan by the German cruiser, *Leipzig*, to enter the Straits of Juan del Fuca was abandoned because of this defensive measure. Later the German cruiser, *Nürnberg*, made a dash

* The purchase was the subject of an investigation by a Commission presided over by Sir Charles Davidson in the course of 1915 owing to a doubt expressed by the Auditor-General at Ottawa as to the financial transactions in connection with payment for the boats, but no evidence of any irregularities was produced before the Commission.

† The Duke of Connaught telegraphed to the Colonial Office on August 4: "Government of Canada have, by Order of Council, August 4, placed His Majesty's C.S. *Niobe*, *Rainbow*, together with officers and men serving in them, at disposal of His Majesty for general service in Royal Navy."

to the north as far as Prince Rupert, but the British cruiser, *Newcastle*, had by that time reinforced the Canadian ships and the German vessel slipped away again without attempting any offensive action.

Mr. Hazen, the Minister of Marine, in introducing his first war estimates for the Naval Service,* stated that the cost of Naval operations since the war broke out was £540,000. He mentioned the following items :

<i>Niobe</i>	£145,225
<i>Rainbow</i>	73,290
Submarine maintenance	34,015
Submarine depot	7,760
Halifax Dockyard	55,500
Esquimalt Dockyard	34,670
" Certain Naval requirements "	
at Esquimalt	41,485
Naval Defence in the Pacific	45,900
Naval Defence in the Atlantic	59,200

This was additional to the ordinary peace estimates.

The crew of the *Niobe* numbered 700, and was obtained in part from two small British ships which were lent to the Government on the Pacific coast, and in part from naval reservists enlisted in Canada. That of the

* Canadian House of Commons, March 27, 1915.

Rainbow numbered 300, and was also from the naval reserves of Canada and Newfoundland. A total of 387 men and 35 officers of the reserve were being utilized in various forms of coast defence, with 95 in the *Rainbow* and some auxiliary vessels. As to general naval protection of the Canadian shores, Mr. Hazen added :

“ We have had a number of British vessels on the British Columbia coast, such as the *Newcastle*, and two Japanese cruisers, which have been acting in concert with the naval authorities at Esquimalt. On the Atlantic coast a number of vessels of the British Navy are based on Halifax and are in and out of that harbour—the *Lancaster*, the *Essex* and the *Suffolk*. ”*

In an additional statement two days later, Mr. Hazen said :

“ At certain places guns have been mounted

* Sir Robert Borden, in a speech in London on September 28, 1915, said that while Admiral von Spee was at large in the Pacific and British Columbia was threatened with a bombardment by his squadron, “ all that we had to defend our Pacific Coast was one Japanese ship, one British cruiser, one Canadian training-ship, manned, I am proud to say, by young Canadians . . . and two Canadian submarines.” For details of the Australian patrol of the Canadian coasts, see *ante* p. 132.

and manned by naval volunteers : whilst in other places protection has been prepared by the provision of motor torpedo-boats and mines prepared for laying in case of emergency."

He stated that Rear-Admiral W. O. Storey, a retired British naval officer, had, at his request, been appointed to command at Esquimalt when war broke out,* and finally he announced that thirty-three vessels for special purposes had been chartered from private owners, or in many cases lent for service to the Government.

Many of the vessels were private yachts similar to the *Grilse*, a "torpedo-boat," which was officially announced to have been lost at sea in a storm in December, 1916. Fortunately the Minister of Naval Service was premature in the statement. She staggered into Shelburne Harbour several hours after the receipt of a wireless message saying that she was sinking. Six of the crew were washed overboard, including the wireless operator, who was trying to repair an aerial. She fought her way through the gale for forty-eight hours, and her escape was a fine testi-

* The date of his appointment is given in the Navy List as October 12, 1914.

mony to the seamanship of the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve officers in command of her.

This corps was started in the autumn of 1914, the Royal Approval of its formation being gazetted on October 23, 1914. Men enlisting in the corps were paid at the same rate as the troops in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 4s. 6d. a day, with £4 a month separation allowance to wife or dependents. Full kit was supplied free, including oilskins, sea boots and warm winter clothing. The recruits were sent first to Halifax and then across to one of the naval depots in England, where they underwent two months' course of "intensive culture" in drill, signalling and gunnery. At the end of that time they were sent afloat in men-of-war on active service. Young officers of the corps entered with the rank of sub-lieutenant, and were specially trained at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich. They arrived there in parties of fifty at a time, and after completing a rapid course of training were sent afloat. As in the case of the New Zealand volunteers, large numbers of them joined the Motor Boat Patrol.

Captain the Hon. Rupert Guinness, one of the leading spirits in the R.N.V.R. in England, visited Canada in the autumn of 1916 on a special recruiting mission, which it was subsequently stated had been very successful in increasing the number of officers and men in the corps.

One Canadian Volunteer seaman at least took part in a famous fight. An Ontario boy named Lawrence Kirkham, who left a farm some months after war began, to go to sea, served in the destroyer-leader, *Broke*, when she and the *Swift* fought five German destroyers in the Straits of Dover on April 20, 1917.

The Royal Canadian Navy has also had its casualties in action. Four midshipmen from the College at Halifax were serving in the *Good Hope* when Sir Christopher Cradock's squadron met von Spee off Coronel. They went down with their ship.

The establishment of naval shipbuilding yards in Canada, which had begun before the war, enabled Canada to lend some assistance in providing new material for the Navy. The following official announcement was made on January 6, 1915 :

“ To meet the exaggerated stories published in the United States the Canadian Militia Department has authorized the statement that there is no reason why the facts regarding the construction of submarines in Canada should not be published. They are as follows :

“ The keels of eight first-class craft have already been laid down by the Canadian Vickers Co. here, and it is expected that several will be ready in August next. The plant is running at full capacity.”

In the following September the *New York Herald* announced that “ operating under their own power, without re-fuelling or re-victualling and without the slightest mishap,” ten submarines, built at the Vickers Yard in Montreal, had crossed the Atlantic. This was officially admitted in October to be correct, and attention was again called to the feat in October, 1916, at the time the German submarine U53 appeared off New York.

The Secretary of the Admiralty announced on August 8, 1914, that the Duchess of Connaught had telegraphed to ask if the offer of a hospital ship for the Navy by the women of Canada would be acceptable. Mr.

Churchill, the First Lord, replied that the Board begged that "their deep appreciation of the offer made by the women of Canada, which they gratefully accept," might be made known.

CHAPTER XVII

NEW ZEALAND'S SHARE IN THE WAR

IF New Zealand owed the protection of her own shores and shipping directly to the Australian Navy it must not be assumed that New Zealand did nothing at sea during the war. She was, in fact, the first of the Dominions to offer help. Lord Liverpool, the Governor-General, telegraphed to the Colonial Secretary on July 31, 1914: "Please inform me at the earliest possible moment when we should bring into operation Section 19, New Zealand Naval Defence Act." The Colonial Secretary replied on August 2 that "the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will be glad if you will arrange with Ministers for issue at once of Proclamation under Section 19 (2). Please say in issuing Proclamation that you do so because 'in your opinion it is in the interests of Great Britain.'" Lord Liverpool wired on the next day that the Proclamation had been issued.



Cribb.

THE "NEW ZEALAND'S" COAT OF ARMS.

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The cruiser *Pyramus* was one of the ships attached to the New Zealand station for training New Zealand seamen, and many of them served in her during the war. Parties of them went home to New Zealand on leave during the autumn of 1916, and the following account of their doings was published :*

The ship was commissioned at Wellington, New Zealand, on July 15, 1914, and carried out her ordinary duties as a training ship until July 29, when we were ordered to proceed to Akaroa to calibrate and prepare for war. Preparations completed, we sailed for Auckland, arriving there a few hours before the message came through that war was declared. At 2 a.m. the next day we left Auckland, and, after a few days at sea, received orders to return. On August 16 the ship left Auckland in company with the New Zealand squadron and two transports carrying New Zealand troops, and on arrival at Noumea, New Caledonia, we were joined by the *Australia*, *Melbourne* and *Montcalm*. From there the whole squadron left for Samoa, calling at Suva on the way, arriving off Apia, Samoa, on August 30. At 1 p.m. the island

* *Lyttelton Times* (Christchurch, N.Z.), October 4, 1916.

surrendered and at 9 a.m. next day was formally declared a British possession by the French Admiral.*

In the meantime troops and stores were landed, after which we returned to New Zealand *en route* for Melbourne and Hobart, where we joined the New Zealand convoy on September 22, and escorted them to Albany to join up with the first contingent of Australian troops. From there we proceeded to Marmagoa, Portuguese India, touching at Fremantle, Singapore, Penang, Colombo and Bombay, and stayed there for some time guarding six German and Austrian ships.

From there we returned to Bombay, and on December 31, 1914, left for East Africa, arriving at Mombassa on January 10, 1915, from which time until the middle of April we patrolled the deltas of the Rufigi River and the German East African Coast, searching and capturing three islands and entering harbours, destroying German shipping.

We then left for Simonstown to refit and recuperate, and early in June arrived back off the German East African Coast and started

* Rear Admiral Huhuet.

preparations for the attack on the *Königsberg*, one of the German raiding cruisers which had been bottled up some time before. The first attack was made on July 6, but as she was not completely destroyed a second attack was made on July 11, when our object was achieved and the *Königsberg* totally destroyed. The bombardment was carried out by two monitors, and we had the honour of being the only big ship to enter the river, our duty being to cover the monitors and bombard concealed batteries on both banks.

After this we proceeded to the Persian Gulf, calling at Aden on the way. As soon as we arrived we were at it again, and on August 13 took part in a naval and military expedition against a Persian tribe called the Tangistani, who had been attacking the telegraph station and British Consuls at Ispahan and Kerman.

The landing was carried out with few casualties, although the odds against us were very heavy. The expedition was very successful, the Tangistani village and fort being destroyed and the tribe well punished.

The captain of our ship* was invested


* Commander Viscount Kelburne, R.N.

with the D.S.O. and two men were awarded the D.S.M. for work done in this expedition.

Shortly after this we proceeded up the Gulf and captured a Turkish fort, four field guns, and a great quantity of arms, ammunition and military stores at a place called Al Bida on the Arabian coast.

Then we returned to Bushire, and on September 9 a landing party was sent ashore to assist in repelling an attack on the town. The party consisted of three machine guns and crews and a section of marines, and although we suffered heavy casualties, the enemy were beaten off and badly defeated. The General Officer Commanding congratulated the men and thanked them for their invaluable assistance. From this time onward the ship was employed patrolling and guarding telegraphs on the coast, which were of vital importance, as they were the only communications with Mesopotamia. From time to time there were alarms and attacks, but they were not of sufficient importance to mention.

The ship paid off at — on August 25, 1916, after a very successful and interesting



Crit's

MAORI WAR-CRY AS MOTTO OF THE "NEW ZEALAND."

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experience, having steamed 73,560 miles since the outbreak of war.

Another fact recounted by the men was that some of them arrived at Cocos-Keeling Island in time to bury the German dead after the action between the *Sydney* and the *Emden*.

The *Psyche* and the *Philomel*, which also belonged to the New Zealand squadron, were attached to the Australian Navy, took part in the New Britain and Samoa expeditions, and subsequently assisted in the trade route patrol.

Apart from this, large numbers of young New Zealanders joined the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve for service in British waters. They received commissions as sub-lieutenants, underwent a special course of training at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, and then were drafted to ships of all sorts. Many of them served in the Motor Boat Patrol.

The battle-cruiser *New Zealand* was in the North Sea throughout the first three years of war, and took part in the battles in the Heligoland Bight, at the Dogger Bank and Jutland.

One name in New Zealand's naval annals

will always be remembered—Lt.-Com. W. E. Sanders, R.N.R. He was a native of Auckland, and was serving in the Union Steamship Line when war broke out. He received a commission in the Royal Naval Reserve in 1916, and within a year had won the V.C. The award was officially stated to be "in recognition of his conspicuous gallantry, consummate coolness and skill in command of one of H.M. ships in action." No details were given. And in August, 1917, his name figured in the casualty list under the single word "killed." Again no details were given. One day New Zealand will thrill to read the full story of the exploits of Sanders, V.C.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Cribs,

PORTRAIT OF MR. SEDDON PRESENTED TO THE "NEW ZEALAND."

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE NAVY OF INDIA

SINCE a work of two volumes has been written on the Indian Navy,* it is scarcely necessary to do more here than recapitulate very briefly the outstanding features of India's naval history. The East India Company's local fleets, first at Surat in 1615 and later at Bombay, were the foundations of the Indian Navy. The Bombay Marine throughout the seventeenth centuries was employed in the suppression of piracy, in convoying ships trading with the Persian Gulf and Red Sea and the ports on the Malabar Coast. Whenever the tide of naval warfare swept from European waters into the Indian Ocean the Marine had to assist the Royal Navy. Ships of the Bombay Marine like the *Protector*,† *Advice* and *Revenge*,

* *History of the Indian Navy*, by C. R. Low, Lieutenant (late) Indian Navy. London, Bentley. 1877.

† Driven ashore and lost in the great storm of January 15, 1761, at the siege of Pondicherry. The *Revenge* was also lost in a storm in April, 1782.

served under Boscawen, Pocock, Stevens and Hughes in the long drawn-out struggle for sea supremacy between England and France. In a more peaceful way the surveying expeditions by officers of the Marine did invaluable service. In the Persian Gulf, the New Guinea Coast, the Archipelago and as far as the China Seas these explorers roamed, and in recognition of the services rendered to the world the Directors of the East India Company, in 1809, established a Marine Survey Department in Bengal, with Captain Wales, of the Marine, as first Surveyor-General.

The Bombay Marine played a great part in the First Burmese War (1824-6). The ships of the Company that were attached to the squadron under Commodore Grant were the *Hastings*, *Teignmouth*, *Mercury*, *Thetis*, *Prince of Wales* and *Jessy*, with a whole flotilla of gun brigs and schooners and row-boats.* The officers and men of the Marine were voted the thanks of Parliament for their services in the war in May, 1827.

The Marine was governed by a Board,

* The Company's paddle-steamer *Diana*, which Low says was undoubtedly the first vessel propelled by paddles that floated east of the Cape of Good Hope, also formed part of the flotilla.

which issued Marine General Orders, and consisted of a Superintendent, the Master Attendant, the Commodore of the harbour and the senior captain. There was a deputy judge-advocate-general attached to the service, in which courts-martial had been established certainly since 1624 and probably earlier. It was reorganized and remodelled in 1837, and by an Order in Council of June 30 of that year all officers of the Bombay Marine were granted the privilege of ranking with but after officers of the same rank in the Royal Navy. On May 1, 1830, the following order was officially issued from Bombay Castle: "In accordance with a communication from the Hon. the Court of Directors the Governor in Council is pleased to announce that the Bombay Marine will henceforward be denominated the 'Indian Navy.'" The new Navy consisted of one 32-gun frigate, four 18-gun ships, three 14-gun ships, four 10-gun brigs and two schooners.

As the Indian Navy it continued to exist until 1863. It took part in the second Burmese War, the Persian War and the Mutiny with distinction; but in November, 1862, the Secretary of State for India decreed

its abolition, and stated that "the defence of India against a serious attack by sea, as well as the naval services required in the Red Sea and upon the eastern coast of Africa, will be undertaken by vessels of the Royal Navy."

It was proposed to form a sort of local service to be called the Bombay Marine for the transport of troops and stores and other civil duties. This proposal ultimately took the shape of the Royal Indian Marine, under the Indian Marine Service Act of 1884. This force has done sterling service for India for many years. Neglected, overshadowed, unknown to nine-tenths of the citizens of the Empire, it has carried on, and when the full history of the war in the East can be told it will be found that it was the Royal Indian Marine in conjunction with the Royal Navy that made possible the Mesopotamia campaign. A corner of the veil was lifted when a number of officers of the Service were gazetted to the D.S.C. and other decorations for their work in the Persian Gulf and on the Tigris and Euphrates.

India, both native and Anglo-India, has long desired a revival of the Indian Navy,

but the desire has been somewhat lukewarm. The example of Australia, however, has not been without its effect in fanning the embers. In November, 1913, it was announced from Bombay that several Indian princes desired to present two or perhaps three Dreadnoughts to the Royal Navy. The offer was never made officially, and it may be that the announcement was a kite to try public opinion.

Nearly a century earlier an Indian Prince did present a warship to the British Navy. This was the *Imaum*, built at Bombay in 1826 for the service of Seyyid Said, the Imaum of Muscat. He presented the ship to King George IV. The East India Company presented three ships to the Royal Navy during the war of American Independence, the *Ganges*, *Carnatic* and *Bombay Castle*, all 74-gun ships.

The next few years may see great changes in the Government of India. As to the character of these changes, the speed with which they can be brought about, and the limits to which they may extend it is no part of my purpose here to discuss. But it is, I imagine, beyond all dispute that a self-

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governing India will be a factor in the Imperial British Navy of the future. Her geographical position alone makes it imperative that sea-power should play a great part in her future. The late Mr. Gokhale, in his testament,* advocated an Indian Navy among the reforms that he hoped would be granted to his country by the Empire. There are Anglo-Indians who will vehemently oppose any such idea as impracticable. There are others, less conservative, to whom the suggestion offers no insuperable difficulties. The greatest obstacle of all to the institution of a truly Indian Navy was the bar which hitherto existed against any Indian holding the King's Commission. India herself has broken down that barrier. The conduct of her soldiers in the field has made it impossible for England any longer to say that on principle the Indian could not be a commissioned officer. Nine Indian private soldiers have been promoted from the ranks to hold the King's commission for services in the field.†

* *Times*, August 15, 1917.

† Mr. Montague in the House of Commons, August 20, 1917.

From that to the commissioned Indian naval officer is but a step. How many years it will take us to make that step no one can forecast.

India has a fairly big maritime population, much of which has done good service in the R.I.M., where all the ranks from Chief Sarang (or Chief Petty Officer) and Tindals to Bhandarry (or cook's mate), and Topass (Boy First Class) have been filled by natives for many years. There are dockyards at Bombay and Kidderpore. The Ceylon yard at Trincomalee could be extended, and other ports offer themselves as suitable subsidiary bases.

These things, however, are dependent on wider though not more vital questions. Indeed, I venture to affirm that in the whole of the discussions that must be aroused by any scheme for the future governance of India the naval aspect of the problem ought to be kept prominent. India's strategic importance not only to herself but to the whole Imperial Commonwealth, is so great that naval and military opinion ought to weigh heavily in the counsels of the statesmen to whom will be committed the task of re-forming the con-

stitution of the Indian Government. It is a thousand pities that so few of the statesmen of Britain are students of Britain's naval history. For lack of knowledge of the foundations they are often in danger of building elegant but crazy superstructures.

CHAPTER XIX

FROM SHORE TO SHIP

TERRITORIAL association is of considerable sentimental importance in the fighting forces. With regiments it is maintained without much difficulty: the headquarters of the county regiment are generally in the county town and the troops are continually seen. With ships the case is entirely different. It is only rarely that the native of a county or a town can see the ship that is the namesake of his district. The example set in 1903, by the Association of the Men of Kent and Kentish Men in presenting trophies and a silk flag to the cruiser *Kent* has, however, been followed with excellent results by many other territorial societies, and it has also spread overseas. The linking up of the people and the fleet is so essential a part of National and Imperial defence that I make no apology for compiling here a record of presentations from the various

Dominions and Colonies to their namesakes afloat.

The first *New Zealand*, a pre-Dreadnought battleship completed in 1905, received a gunnery shield and a silver ship's bell as a present from the school children of the Colony, while the adults collected a fund to provide annual prizes for the best gunnery performances in the ship. The shield bore views of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, and pictures of the ship herself and an early Maori war canoe. The design round the shield was composed of Maori war implements, New Zealand birds and flowers and the Colonial arms. When the Dominion's own battle-cruiser was put into commission in 1913 and visited New Zealand, she was overwhelmed with presents. An ivory hammer for the president of the Ward Room Mess, a silk ensign and jack from the women of New Zealand, a silver shield for swimming, a shield for gunnery efficiency, silver tea services, loving-cups, salvers, bowls and plaques were all included in the list.

Australia's first namesake in the Navy was the battleship *Commonwealth*. The people of Australia were not able to have their



Cribb.
CUPS AND TROPHIES PRESENTED TO THE "GOOD HOPE" IN SOUTH AFRICAN PORTS.



presentation made to the ship in their own waters, but it was made on their behalf at Portsmouth by Lady Northcote, the wife of a former Governor-General, in June, 1911. The gift was entirely of Australian design, material and workmanship. It consisted of a silver challenge shield, a silver model of Captain Cook's ship, the *Endeavour*, and a fund for prizes for the men. The shield was surmounted by the Imperial Arms with the motto, "Our heritage the Sea." Below the motto was a small map of Australia in silver relief. In the corners were inscribed the names of Dampier, Cook, Bass and Flinders. The silver model of the *Endeavour*, a nef of the old sort, intended for decoration of the ward-room table, was supported by fruit dishes made of pearl shells from Thursday Island.

Canada was visited by the battleship *Domnion* in 1906, when she was commanded by Captain C. E. Kingsmill, who was three years later appointed to command the Canadian Marine Service. A gunnery shield for the ship's company, a loving-cup for the officers and cigar and cigarette boxes in the shape of seamen's chests accompanied by lighters in the shape of 12-inch guns for each

mess, were presented to the ship at Quebec. The women of Canada had previously sent to the First Lord of the Admiralty a silk ensign to be flown in the ship on special occasions.

The Cape and Natal each presented trophies to their namesakes. The women of Cape Colony were responsible for the gift to the *Good Hope*, which included a gunnery shield, silver centre pieces for the ward-room table and a silk ensign. They were presented at Portsmouth in August, 1908, by Princess Christian. An interesting feature of the gunnery shield was the fact that the names of ninety-nine centres of population from which subscriptions had been received were engraved on the back. The silk ensign was broken on the jack-staff by Princess Christian on the day of presentation.

Natal's gift to the *Natal* was presented at Chatham in April, 1907, by Sir William Arbuckle, the Agent-General for the Colony. It comprised a service of silver plate and a large silver cup as a shooting trophy. The inscription on the cup was, "This trophy was presented by the people of Natal as a token of their interest in His Majesty's Navy



CENTRE-PIECE PRESENTED TO THE
"DOMINION."

Facing page 204.



Cribb
GUNNERY SHIELD PRESENTED TO THE
"GOOD HOPE."

and of their good will towards the ship bearing the name of the Colony." It took the form of the figure of Neptune supporting on a crowned head and both upraised arms the bowl, Britannia raising aloft the Royal Standard surmounting the whole.

CHAPTER XX

A WORLD-WIDE FLEET

PROPHECY, like the experts who indulged in it, was killed by the experiences of the first two years of war.

Augurium ratio est et conjectura futuri.

When one looks forward into the new world that is in the making one sees no sign that the struggle for the balance of power between nation and nation and race and race will be for ever abolished by the scarifying tumult that marked the opening of the twentieth century. One only sees that the men of the present and the next generation, sobered by their close contact with the reality of war as modern man can wage it, will avert a further calamity of the same nature in their time by all the arts of diplomacy. But humanity forgets. A few generations hence it will be only the heroism, the strategy, the political and economic outcome of the struggle that

will interest students. What mankind in millions suffered individually will be lost. If any doubt it let him ask himself how often, before August, 1914, he stopped to consider the sufferings of the soldiery who went with Napoleon to Austerlitz, or the miseries of the seamen who hovered outside Toulon with Nelson for twenty-two months and never set foot outside their wooden ships. Those things are forgotten. Even so acute a thinker as Mahan has but a few lines to give to the consideration of the health or ill-health of the men who made the career of Nelson possible. It will be the same with the historians and the students who come ninety years after us.

Therefore I take reason for my augury and essay to conjecture what should be the lines of development along which the Imperial British Navy shall be builded by us and our sons that our grandsons and their sons may live in security through any upheaval as we have lived.

No such survey can omit from consideration the new factor of aviation. It has been claimed that the aerial war machine has robbed the islands of the world of their great

natural defence and that henceforward air-power is greater than sea-power. Until such time as the constructors can produce aerial machines that will each transport 1000 men with their equipment, heavy guns, munitions, provisions and other impedimenta a distance of 10,000 miles my reason declines to accept the dictum. The aerial arm, as I see it, is an auxiliary, an important and vital auxiliary, but none the less an auxiliary to the navies and armies. We have encountered so many of these new weapons that were to abolish all the old methods of warfare in the march of science since sails gave place to steam. The torpedo is but one example. And the torpedo has proved to be still an auxiliary to the gun, else why were submarines, that at first carried only torpedoes, armed with guns, and ever with larger guns as their design grew? The naval air service and the military air service will develop and expand. Seaplanes will replace certain types of ship at present employed on auxiliary service with the battle squadrons. They will, manifestly, become vastly more important as scouts than at present. But reason cannot yet see in the air the carriers

of a striking force such as would be needed to overcome the resistance of an armed and trained population. Transport of an invading army will be in the future as in the past by the sea, and so long as the offence comes from the sea so long must the defence be based on the sea.

There is a further consideration that Europeans, absorbed with their own parochial concerns, are prone to overlook. The centre of naval gravity need not always be in European waters. The vast stretches of the Pacific have hitherto been outside the main theatres of sea warfare, but there is no guarantee that they will always be pacific. The Russo-Japanese war was but a ripple on the surface. The growth of Australia and New Zealand, combined with the latent wealth of India, may tilt the balance of power from the west eastward. The rulers of the Federated Malay States were far-sighted when they gave the *Malaya* to the British Navy. Federation is preferable to subjugation.

One direction, then, in which we may foresee a development of the Imperial British Navy is the Pacific Fleet. The whole of the

waters from the Red Sea to the shores of British Columbia will come under its protection. It will be the joint concern of India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Each will maintain its own portion, and the whole will coalesce into a strategic unit in time of need for use wherever the storm threatens. This is the ideal that has been before the oversea statesmen for some years. To quote only one reference to the matter, Mr. Massey, the Premier of New Zealand, said on October 28, 1913 :

“The British Dominions in the Pacific aim at nothing less than the same naval supremacy in these seas as is held by their kinsmen on the other side of the world.”

It would be futile to attempt to lay down the strength of each country's squadron. That must depend not only on the considered strategical needs of the time, but also on the financial ability of each to bear its share of the burden. But we cannot go far wrong if we accept the Henderson proposals to Australia as a basis for the immediate future. Four squadrons of eight battleships or battle-cruisers each is certainly beyond the means of the populations concerned in the next

twenty years, but if Australia could provide eight and Canada eight, with four each from New Zealand and India and suitable provision of smaller craft by each country in proportion, a fleet of formidable defensive possibilities would be built up. To this we can add a largely increased British squadron in China waters. Trenching for a moment on a future chapter, I may suggest that the British Admiral in command on the China Station will possibly be the senior admiral in the Pacific and one of the Navy's most prominent leaders, for upon him would probably devolve, in the event of a coalition of the Dominion Squadrons, the command of the entire Pacific forces of the Empire.


It will be noticed that South Africa has been omitted from this suggestion. The Union occupies a particular and peculiar strategic position in the world-disposition of the Empire. South Africa is to the new world into which we are coming what Gibraltar was to the old world that we have left behind. It is a dominating bulwark between the West and the East. Any South African Navy or naval unit must therefore have as its charge the defence of the passage from

the Pacific to the Atlantic. This is a heavy responsibility. It is one entailing financial burdens that may be beyond the powers of the young and growing community to shoulder. The Home Country will in all probability be obliged to bear the greatest part of the burden for many years to come, for the principle of the *Kleine Vlootje*, admirable though it is as a beginning, is not big enough to compass the requirements of Imperial defence.*

What of the British Fleet? It will remain the backbone of the defence. It will be the well from which strength will be drawn for the weak points. And its main strategical station will be the Atlantic.

Here the naval student touches upon the fringe of one of the gravest problems of the Empire—Ireland. Beyond all question of politics, beyond all dissensions between Ulsterman and Nationalist and Sinn Féiner, there looms up to the clear-sighted the future of the west coast of Ireland.

* Part of the expense of developing South Africa for naval purposes has already fallen on the British Exchequer. In the Navy Estimates for 1913-14 it was announced that a new dock at Durban 110 feet wide and 35 feet deep was to be built at a cost of £450,000.



Cribb.

TROPHY PRESENTED BY WOMEN OF CAPE COLONY TO THE "GOOD HOPE."

Facing page 212.



It is there that will be found the bases of the British Fleet in the coming strategical dispositions of the Imperial naval forces.

The untutored in naval affairs may open wide their eyes at the statement, but no man conversant with the tactical developments of naval warfare since 1914 can fail to have seen for himself that all the existing naval bases and dockyards are doomed to gradual extinction. The civil authorities at Portsmouth and Plymouth are not blind to the signs of the times. Both Town Councils have initiated plans to develop their harbours into commercial ports, that the prosperity of the towns may not be unduly affected by the changed strategical needs of the age. The far northern bases that served us in the war with the Central Empires were strategically suitable for that war. They are too far north to be suitable for any other conceivable campaign.

The reason for the passing of Portsmouth and Plymouth as our main naval bases is to be found in the development of the submarine. Before the war, even naval students who failed to follow Sir Percy Scott in his wholesale adulation of the underwater de-

stroyer, had seen that a change was at hand. A German writer in *Nauticus*, an important and well-informed naval annual, said in the spring of 1914 :

“It may perhaps be said that from the growth of the submarine a diminution in the value of the big ship will follow. That would be a false deduction. The submarine will force the decisive battle further out on the high seas, where only large, seaworthy and battleworthy ships are of any value.”

There is a corollary to that perfectly sound idea. It is that the large ships can only harbour in safety in places that give on to the wide open seas where there is plenty of room to manœuvre. None of the ports in the English Channel have that advantage. The Irish harbours all possess it.

Bantry Bay is four miles across and offers a safe anchorage for the largest vessels. Bere Island, which lies across the entrance to the Bay, is an admirable site for anti-torpedo craft batteries. There was much talk a few years ago of developing Galway, both as a naval port and as a harbour for Transatlantic steamers. It would need a great breakwater as protection from westerly gales, but for

war defences it is admirably supplied by nature, with the Aran Islands off the mouth of the bay and several islets nearer to the harbour, forming a complete chain. Blacksod Bay is another base of which the Navy made frequent use in manœuvres at the latter end of the last century. Lough Swilly is a magnificent natural harbour for ships of all sizes, and Queenstown is already a naval base of proved value in war. These bases are indispensable to the future of the Empire. Upon that point you will find complete agreement among all naval men. It is therefore curious to note that when the Imperial Government appointed members of a Convention to discuss the future governance of Ireland in the summer of 1917 it overlooked entirely the naval aspect of the matter. Not one naval officer, not one student of naval affairs, was asked to sit on the Convention to state the naval case. This is not the place to labour the point or to enlarge upon the habitual ignoring of the naval aspect of the whole Imperial question which is characteristic, not of one Government but of all, not of one party but of all. The point, however, must be made, because on the future control of

those harbours and the coast around them depends the safety of every Dominion, dependency, colony and protectorate of the British Empire.

The question has, too, a great bearing on the future prosperity of Ireland. The growth of two or three great naval bases with the concomitant influx of population, the building of new railways, the demands upon agriculture and manufactures, the increase in all the facilities (and disadvantages) of modern civilized or townified life, cannot fail to have widespread influence. These are factors that appear to have been overlooked by those who are considering the settlement of the Irish problem.

Canada, I have suggested, will be interested in the maintenance of the Pacific Fleet. She has also, however, an extensive Atlantic seaboard, and it is from that littoral that the bulk of the seamen she has so far succeeded in enlisting are drawn.* The difficulties she already encounters in recruiting men for her naval service will be increased if enlistment means exile to the other side of the continent. This is one of the many awkward questions

* See *ante*, p. 170.

that call for consideration. The evolution of an Empire-wide Navy is not a matter of mechanics. Strategically there can be no doubt that the sound course is for Canada to concentrate on the Pacific and leave the Atlantic to the British Navy. Whether it is humanly practicable is doubtful.

It will be seen that throughout this survey of some possibilities of the future, based solely on broad lines and in no way attempting to enter into detail, it has been taken for granted that all the self-governing States of the Empire will proceed with the development of individual Fleets—a phrase that is preferable to the older “local navies” since that conveys a wrong impression. There appears to be no room for doubt that this is the course that will be followed. No one can have traced the development of the naval idea overseas in the preceding pages without being drawn more and more to the conviction that the day of the “naval contribution” is dead so far as the larger States are concerned. It may well be that the smaller colonies, unable to meet the expense of a fleet unit, will desire to contribute, so far as the finances of each allow, towards the maintenance of the

Imperial Navy—by which term we must henceforward mean all the squadrons and not merely the Royal Navy—and it will be a matter for adjustment into which exchequer these contributions are paid.

Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and also India, however, will never return to that policy of doles which was so vehemently advocated twenty years ago and for which there are apologists at this day. The great Victorian rallying cry, "One Flag, One Fleet, One Empire," is Victoriously out of date so far as the fleet is concerned. It is as obsolete, we may hope, as that other poetic misconception of the nineteenth-century "Britain Beyond the Seas." There is no part of Britain that is beyond the seas. All Britain is on the sea.

CHAPTER XXI

AN IMPERIAL ADMIRALTY

WITH his infinite capacity for belittling himself, the Englishman has always led the world to believe that he is incompetent to organize. He has spread the legend that the Empire happened, that no one had anything to do with its growth. Actually the development of the British Empire is a triumph of organization—slow, tentative, elastic, patient building up through many decades. Anyone who wants a striking example on the other hand of the capacity of the Englishman for rapid business organization should study the report on the administration of the Order in Council of March, 1915,* where he will find set out the remarkably efficient system of the War Trade Intelligence Department, the Contraband Committee, the Enemy Exports Committee, the Admiralty Committee for the

* Cd. 8469, Miscellaneous, No. 6. 1917.

Diversion of Ships in War Time and the Port and Transit Committee. That was built up in a few days by the officials of three much-maligned public departments—the Board of Trade, the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, to deal with the whole business of blockade. They had nothing to do with policy; they administered. And the proof of the efficiency of the system is the small number of cases in the Prize Court in which a decision was given against the captors.

When it is urged, therefore, as it sometimes is, that the creation of separate Fleets by the Dominions and the attempt to mould the different squadrons into a strategic whole for Imperial purposes will result in confusion, the objection can be brushed aside, for it is based on a fallacy. The organization to deal with that problem will be forthcoming.

It will take the form of an Imperial Admiralty, whatever may be the official designation for it. It will be separate from the Board of Admiralty which administers the Royal Navy. It will be a consultative body that will co-ordinate the work of all the Boards and Departments that control

each individual fleet. Each Dominion will be represented by a senior officer, and each could hold the presidency in rotation for twelve months. Ministers of Marine visiting the Imperial capital would naturally attend sittings of the Board, and it might be found advantageous for the Board to pay periodical visits to the Dominion capitals at intervals of three or five years. It would be necessary to prevent the influence of the British Admiralty predominating unduly at the Board. The years of tradition and experience at Whitehall, the marked seniority of the parent service and the preponderating strength of the Royal Navy would inevitably tend to that, apart altogether from the propinquity inevitable if the offices of the Board are in London. Frequent consultations with the authorities in the Dominions on their terrain would serve to counteract that tendency, not necessarily vicious in itself, but undesirable on obvious grounds.

In broad outline the duties of the Imperial Admiralty would fall under three heads :

Strategy.

Material.

Personnel.

The first it would deal with only on general principles. The detail work would be the task of the Imperial Naval General Staff. It would be the concern of the Board to co-ordinate—but not to control—the disposition of the individual fleets, to see that weak points in the defence were never left uncovered by the removal to distant points of all the squadrons concerned. Thus, if the “X” Straits were considered a vital artery at a junction of the “spheres of influence” of Australia and India, it would be the concern of the Board to advise the Australian Naval Board and the Indian Department of Marine that the forecast of the movements of their squadrons in the ensuing three months would involve the removal of both naval forces to a distance of at least 1200 miles from the Straits at the same time, and the Board would request that the forecast be amended to avoid this simultaneous desertion of the Straits.

Similarly, if it was brought to the notice of the Board that potentially hostile forces near a certain Dominion zone were being increased beyond the capacity of the Dominion to counter, the Board would repre-

sent to the British Admiralty that it might be desirable to detail certain British ships for temporary duty in that zone, and to arrange if necessary for the transfer of those ships and men for the time being to the control of the Dominion Government concerned.

On all matters of strategic or international importance Commanders-in-Chief of squadrons and senior officers on detached service would communicate both with their own naval department and with the Imperial Board simultaneously.

In regard to material, the duties of the Board would be more detailed. Without possessing the power to veto any ship-building proposals by any of the individual navies, it would be able to direct the energies of each into the best lines by impartial and unanimous advice. It is in this connection that the periodical visits to the Dominions would be most valuable. It is essential in the building up of a fleet to preserve strict balance between all the requirements. The ideal fleet, from the point of view of the strategist, has never yet existed. Nelson and his brothers clamoured for "more

frigates." The admirals of to-day clamour for more destroyers or more mine-sweepers, or more seaplanes. The Imperial Admiralty, with the resources of a quarter of the world under its guidance, should be able to produce something very near to the ideal. In the same way it would dispose of the best obtainable advice on design from all the naval constructors of the Empire: it would be a clearing house for ideas in improvement, adaptation or obsolescence.

In regard to personnel, the functions of the Imperial Naval Board are likely to be of the highest importance. A factor of great value in the training of the officers and men of all the squadrons will be periodical interchange. This is foreseen and allowed for in the agreement already existing between the Imperial Government and the Dominions.* In times to come it will be most desirable to make full use of this. It will broaden the outlook of the men in the smaller Dominion squadrons and give them a chance of professional intercourse with men of more varied experience. It will keep officers of the British Navy in touch with oversea opinion. It will provide

* Appendix II, Clause XIII.

a personal sentimental link between all the separate and individual fleets, the value of which cannot be overestimated. We are far too prone, in discussing naval matters, to talk in terms of material and to overlook entirely the human element. This is a grave error. It is the human element that makes the machine function. It is the human element that is fallible and incalculable. It is the human element upon which the efficiency of the whole organization depends. Let the ship answer her helm never so truly and easily, she will not turn aright unless the man on the bridge judges aright the moment to put the wheel over. The simile can be applied to the direction of a squadron, and of the whole agglomeration of squadrons that henceforward will be the Imperial British Navy.

The whole supervision of this interchange will be in the hands of the Board. A register of officers "lent" to the various navies will be kept: a register of officers recommended to be "lent" will also be compiled, and as each man's two years of "foreign service" are completed another will be detailed to take his place, unless the vacancy is to be

filled by an officer of the home fleet. Obviously this system of interchange can only apply on a large scale to the junior ranks. It will probably not go beyond the commanders. An exception might occur in the case of the captain's list of a Dominion Navy becoming overloaded with officers for whom employment afloat cannot be found while there are vacancies elsewhere that the surplus could suitably fill. Nevertheless, even if it were restricted to the junior ranks it would be immensely valuable.*

Another direction in which the Imperial Board would be called on to adjust matters of personnel would be in supplying extra ratings to any navy in which recruiting had failed to keep pace with shipbuilding. This is a problem that is very likely to arise in the early years, and it will be for the Board to arrange for drafts of volunteers to be lent from the well-provided navies for a period

* An interesting example of this interchangeability in actual practice can be found in the Navy List for April, 1917, under the Gradation List of Officers R.A.N. (pp. 588c, *et. seq.*). There it will be noticed that the number of officers "lent from the R.N." is interspersed with others against whose names appear the words "lent to the R.N." The same thing occurs in even more marked degree in the list of the R.C.N. officers (pp. 591b, *et. seq.*).

of years to those that need men. In this connection also the Board might do useful service in raising bodies of naval volunteers for short service in the various colonies and dependencies that do not maintain individual fleets. These men could be drafted to Dominion squadrons requiring men, and in this way a valuable naval reserve of trained men would be built up throughout the Empire.

There will be objections to all these suggestions, and difficulties in carrying them out. That is the fate of suggestions. But I take leave to believe that fundamentally they are all reasonable and that in practice they would be found to be workable with little modification.

CHAPTER XXII

THE IMPERIAL STAFF

THROUGHOUT the war the work of the Imperial Naval General Staff fell on the War Staff at the Admiralty. That was inevitable under the organization that existed before the war. The future, however, will produce an Imperial Staff, working with the Imperial Board, since the essence of war is to be prepared. Plans hurriedly drawn up on the outbreak of hostilities must result in confusion and may result in failure.

The Admiralty War Staff may be taken as a model for the future. As the Churchill Memorandum* on the reconstituted War Staff said :—

“ It is to be a brain far more comprehensive than that of any single man, however gifted and tireless and unceasing in its action, applied continuously to the scientific and

* Issued by the Admiralty, January 1, 1912.

speculative study of naval strategy and preparation.

“ A proper staff, whether naval or military, should comprise three main branches—namely, a branch to acquire information on which action may be taken : a branch to deliberate on the facts so obtained in relation to the policy of the State and to report thereupon ; and, thirdly, a branch to enable the final decision of superior authority to be put into actual effect.”

Here we come upon one of the problems of the future that will require delicate adjustment. What is to be the “superior authority” in the event of war? Is it to be the Imperial Naval Board or the Board of Admiralty? There can be little doubt that ultimately it will be the Imperial Board, but there may have to be an interregnum during which a combination of the two will act in the event of crisis. It is quite certain that the system which was good enough in 1914 by which all such Dominion ships as existed came under the sole control of the authorities of the Royal Navy will not do in future when the Dominion Fleets are larger, when waters nearer to their own shores may

be the centre of gravity, and when operations in which they have a direct personal interest are toward. The control must be centralized. On that all will be agreed. But the persons exercising the control must be representative of Imperial opinion.

The Imperial Naval General Staff need not necessarily contain a preponderance of officers of the Royal Navy. The Admiralty will still need its separate staff for its own purposes. The task of the Imperial Staff will be to map out plans in which the whole of the naval forces of the Empire will be engaged, and for that purpose officers from the Dominions with special knowledge of local conditions will be wanted. Moreover, a War Staff is a means of "preparing officers who arrive or likely to arrive by the excellence of their sea service, at stations of high responsibility for dealing with the more extended problems which await them there."* This aspect of the Imperial Staff is particularly important, taken in conjunction with the work of the War College, which will continue its special courses of instruction for staff officers, but extend them to embrace

* Churchill Memorandum.

the young officers of the Dominion Fleets. It will, I think, be necessary to have only one College for this purpose, and oversea officers desiring to qualify for staff appointments with flag officers of their own Fleet, on the War Staff of their own Naval Board or on the Imperial Staff will all receive instruction there. This unity of teaching, this "common entry" to staff work, if I may call it so, will tend to modify the diversity of view that must otherwise exist among members of the Imperial Naval General Staff gathered from all the corners of the world, a diversity that might disrupt the work on some crucial question.

Into the details of how many years should be spent on Staff work, and whether preliminary experience should be gained on a local staff before the officer is appointed to the Imperial Staff this is not the place to enter, nor can the student without professional experience fittingly discuss such matters. He must deal in broad outlines.

The task of the Imperial Naval General Staff will be no less complex than that of the individual Navy's War Staff, but it will also be more extensive. Liaison officers between

the General Staff and the local staff will be necessary in time of war, and probably in time of peace. There must be constant interchange of ideas as well as of information. It would seem that the Intelligence Division of the Imperial Staff could be less actively acquisitive and more passively receptive of information than is the case with the present Admiralty Intelligence Division, since the greater part of the work of acquiring knowledge would be done by the local staffs, and the results could be transmitted to the Imperial Staff for information. In the same way the work of the Mobilization Division would be practically all carried out by the similar divisions locally. The work of the Imperial Staff would be mainly concentrated on operations, and the Operations Divisions of the local staffs would consequently sink into lesser importance.

There will be those who will contend that far too much importance is being attached to staff work: that the business of the Commander-in-Chief afloat is being filched from him: that it is no longer necessary for him to be a strategist, all that is required of him is that he shall be a tactician. This is

only correct in a limited sense. The control of modern fleets is so widely different from the control of the old-time small squadrons that utterly new methods of operation are required. With a world-wide Navy such as that which will henceforth defend the Empire, policy and strategy will often go side by side, and the Commander-in-Chief afloat cannot, in the nature of things, be as fully informed of political cross-currents as the Staff at headquarters. This question of the extent of power to be enjoyed by the Commander-in-Chief has been gradually growing more and more awkward, but the common-sense view of it is that so bluntly expressed by Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby in the nineties of the last century when he said :—

“ It is for the politicians to tell me if they want the Channel defended or not. That is their business. They tell me I am to defend the Channel, and I then say : ‘ Very well ; to do that I shall require so many ships, so many guns and so many men.’ That is my business. Then they have a right to say : ‘ That is too much : we cannot afford it and so we will give up the idea of defending the Channel.’ That again, is their business.

But they have no right whatever to say, 'You do not require that number of ships, or guns, or men.' For that is not their business at all and they know nothing whatever about it."

He admitted that it was the business of the politicians to control policy, and every naval officer of distinction afloat agrees with him.

Furthermore, as was emphasized in the Churchill Memorandum, staff work is a training for high command. No fighting leader is born: he is made. Nelson was made by incessant study, by constant remoulding of his own deductions, and in great measure by the frequency of opportunity for practical testing of his theories throughout his lifetime. That last advantage had not been enjoyed by the senior officers of the British Navy when it entered upon hostilities in 1914. Much had to be unlearned. We may hope, without affectation, that the officers of the future will have as little chance of gaining practical knowledge. But in the lack of war experience we must provide every expedient that can be devised, because when crisis comes it is trained skill directing every

movement of the defensive and offensive forces of the Empire that will avert disaster, and may frequently avert war itself. The man on guard is less often attacked than the unprepared men.

CHAPTER XXIII

DOMINION FUELLING STATIONS

THE future importance of the Pacific as a strategical area is not a new discovery. The United States Government with notable prevision has provided itself with two important outposts, the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines. Hawaii, it has been said, is to be the Gibraltar of the Pacific. The claim is something exaggerated, since Hawaii is in the open ocean and commands no narrow entrance into a strategical area as Gibraltar does. It is nevertheless the fact that the American naval authorities are making every effort to utilize the natural advantages of Pearl Harbour to produce a first-class *point d'appui*. The harbour before Honolulu is small, and would hardly shelter a cruiser squadron. Pearl Harbour, however, is a magnificent land-locked anchorage, which in its natural state was an inland sea inaccessible to any but small boats. A

deep water channel has, however, been projected from Honolulu Harbour to Pearl Harbour, and the completion of the channel will be of the greatest moment to the American Fleet. Shore defences on the heights of Malakiki Hill will certainly bear some resemblance to the terraces of Gibraltar, and will command the sea both east and west.

The importance of Hawaii as a base lies in its position almost exactly in the centre of the North Pacific. Any fleet based on it is well placed for striking either north-west or south-west. The confined waters in which naval strategy had mainly to work in the European war must not blind students to the fact that sea-power is not always limited in its operations to a few hundred square miles of ocean, and that the time may come when opposed fleets will be based on home ports 3000 miles and more apart. That state of affairs must arise in the event of any conflict between nations bordering on the Pacific.

One need only take a few typical steamship routes to show this graphically :

Sydney, N.S.W.,	to Victoria, B.C.	6756 miles
Hong Kong	„ Victoria	5720 „
Yokohama	„ Victoria	4200 „

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Yokohama	to San Francisco	4521 miles
Sydney	„ Panama	7692 „
Vancouver	„ Hong Kong	6000 „
„	„ Auckland	6000 „
Yokohama	„ Sydney	4500 „

In the old days of sailing ships the effective radius of a vessel was determined only by the quantity of provisions she could carry. To-day the determining factor is fuel. "Dependence on coal in the absence of strong stations where coal can be stored limits the range to which even a victorious Power can exercise that supremacy at sea which by naval writers is called the command of the sea."* At cruising speed a battleship will burn anything from 930 lbs. to 1050 lbs. per mile, and at normal high speed the consumption may be anywhere between 2450 lbs. and 2654 lbs. per mile. That is to say, at cruising speed a modern battleship could steam about 5500 miles without re-coaling. That is only enough to take her half across the Pacific and back. If she is to cruise about, if she is to go further and still be able to get back to her starting point there must be fuelling depots on or within reach of the route she is to follow.

* Professor Spenser Wilkinson at the Royal Colonial Institute, January 23, 1912.

This is a question of the future that Australia, New Zealand and Canada will have to thrash out with the Imperial Government. The Australian Government's only "possessions" in the Pacific are Lord Howe Island and Norfolk Island, which are too close to Sydney to be of any practical use. Canada has no islands except those just off her mainland. The future disposition of the ex-German colonial possessions, like the Bismarck Archipelago and the Marschall Islands, is too nebulous for consideration at the moment. It must also be borne in mind that the Japanese have a very strong claim to the Marschall Islands since it was their naval forces which occupied Jaluit, the capital, in October, 1914, and although the Japanese Government then expressly stated that "the landing was a purely military undertaking, no permanent occupation being contemplated," the ultimate ownership of the islands may safely be said to be uncertain. Somewhat similar considerations apply to the Caroline Islands, the military occupation of which was also announced by the Japanese Navy Department on October 20, 1914.

In any considerations of future fuelling

bases for Dominion naval forces in the Pacific we must at present confine ourselves to such possessions as are unquestionably British. And a cursory glance at the map will indicate at once the possibilities of Midway Island, Johnston Island, Fanning Island and Ducie Island. The four lie approximately in a line stretching from the north-west to the south-east, across the middle of the Pacific Ocean. They are at reasonably equal distances from each other, the extent of the whole line covered being some 3000 miles. There is nothing further north than Midway Island, which is a grave disadvantage to Canada. There is nothing further south than Ducie, which is of little moment to Australia and New Zealand since the only conceivable point southwards from which a blow could be directed at them would be Chili, and that is a prospect that does not offer any appalling possibilities for any foreseeable period of time.

It is not suggested that these islands are to be turned into first-class naval bases. They are not physically suited for that purpose in the first place, and secondly, such bases are not needed. They would be solely

employed as fuel storage depots. Two of them are in the Tropics and the other two only just without the boundaries of Cancer and Capricorn, and any question of using them for storing provisions is therefore barred except at a prohibitive capital expenditure on buildings, cooling plant and other precautions. Storage of coal and oil fuel should, however, be quite possible. The experience of the great war showed that the difficulty of obtaining fuel was not sufficient to deter any adventurous commander from keeping the seas even without a base. Von Müller did it in the *Emden* for some weeks, with the help of considerable luck. The squadron of von Spee had no fixed base and was hunted from pillar to post in the Pacific, but he maintained his cruising capacity to the last. The inner history of his shifts and devices to obtain coal will probably never be told, for knowledge of it as a whole perished with him and his staff. The important thing to note, however, with all the raiding squadrons in the war was a brief period during which they were able to maintain themselves at sea, and the immense efforts that their opponents had to put forth to catch them. The eight

or nine German cruisers at large in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans were searched for by upwards of seventy British, Australian, Japanese, French and Russian cruisers apart from auxiliary cruisers (armed merchantmen). All those vessels were constantly in need of refuelling since they were frequently called on to steam at high speed. As an instance of the amount of coal required by these vessels an extract from the published log of the *Bristol** is instructive. Mr. Buchan gives the following table of the ship's coalings during a few weeks :—

	Tons.		Tons.
St. Lucia . . .	532	Ceara . . .	184
Trinidad . . .	99	„ . . .	1061
Para . . .	690	Port Stanley . .	369
„ . . .	1005	„ . . .	387
Montevideo . .	1207	„ . . .	627
„ . . .	530	Vallenar Roads .	1098
„ . . .	1050	Possession Bay .	922
„ . . .	336	Port Tamar . .	327
Aqua Mari . . .	251	Port Stanley . .	1078
„ . . .	728		

That was during the chase after the *Karlsruhe* and the *Dresden*. In the course of twenty months the *Bristol* covered 58,361 miles and

* *The Log of the "Bristol,"* by W. Buchan. The Westminster Press, London. 1915.

burned 27,839 tons of coal. That is the effect of commerce protection on coal consumption.

It will be noticed that much of the *Bristol's* coaling was done in harbour, but a certain amount had to be done at sea from colliers. Those colliers had only short distances to go from port to the rendezvous, and little time was wasted in getting to and fro. If we take a purely hypothetical case in the Pacific, however, we shall find a different state of affairs. An Australian squadron searching for an elusive enemy between the Equator and longitude 20 South and between the Tonga Islands and latitude 120 West would be 2000 miles from its nearest base, most of the time. A fleet of colliers of enormous proportion would be needed to keep that squadron supplied from Australia and New Zealand. If Fanning Island and Ducie Island had stores and facilities for loading the colliers, however, the length of the journeys would be greatly reduced and the danger of supplies being lost or delayed would be lessened.

Another factor to be borne in mind in considering this question is the proportion of oil fuel to coal which is to be stored in the fuelling stations. Oil fuel burning warships

are becoming more numerous. All the big ships designed for the British Navy just prior to 1914 were solely adapted to burn oil fuel. Destroyers and other small craft have abandoned the use of coal some time since. The ease with which oil can be transhipped from the supply vessels and the ease with which it can be manipulated in the boiler rooms is so great an advantage over coal that even the fact that the British Empire produces barely 2 per cent of the world's output of oil, whereas in coal production it is ahead of the rest of the world, could not hold back the advance of adapted science in its naval service. The Dominions which will be most interested in the oil fuel problem in the Pacific are Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and none of them is a great oil producer. In New South Wales the shale oil production in 1914 was 50,049 tons, and the most active fields were those of the British Australian Oil Co., in the northern districts. Queensland has possibilities that have not been fully prospected, searches are proceeding in South Australia, and geologists have estimated the probable capacity of the Tasmanian beds at 12,000,000 tons. New Zealand has produced

about 6720 gallons a week, and in Papua prospecting is proceeding.

Canada's known deposits are mainly in Alberta and New Brunswick, and are of little moment, even if considerably developed, to the Pacific problem.

The production of oil in Burma, Eastern Bengal and Assam amounts to about 250,000,000 gallons a year. It is evident, therefore, that the oil burning fleets in the Pacific will be mainly dependent on the Californian and Mexican oil fields for their supplies at any rate in the near future. It will be from them that the storage tanks in the mid-Pacific bases will have to be replenished. It is a question for the statesmen of Australia and New Zealand to ponder seriously. The parent Navy had to secure its supplies of oil by acquiring an interest in the Anglo-Persian oil fields. The future development of the Australasian fields may be a matter which it will not be possible or desirable to leave to private enterprise.

Coal for storage will offer less difficulty. The following table shows the production of coal in the Pacific Dominions compared with Great Britain in the year 1914 :—

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United Kingdom	270,070,000 tons
Canada	12,133,000 „
Australia	12,445,000 „
New Zealand	2,276,000 „

Australian coal is very largely used for bunkering purposes. In 1914 more than 1,500,000 tons were taken away from the port of the Commonwealth in the bunkers of steamships, and of that amount N.S.W. provided 1,100,000 tons. Experts have estimated the contents of the N.S.W. coalfields to be considerably more than 1,000,000,000 tons down to a depth of 4000 feet, and the Southern and Western districts have immense deposits of excellent steam coal. Here again national interests may require some sort of State control of the output either by State ownership of the mines or by long dated contracts or prior rights to the output.

APPENDIX I

ADMIRALTY MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE
CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
SELF-GOVERNING DOMINIONS ON THE NAVAL
AND MILITARY DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE,
1909.

ON the 16th March of this year statements were made by the First Lord of the Admiralty on the introduction of the Navy Estimates for 1909-1910.

On the 22nd March the Government of New Zealand telegraphed an offer to bear the cost of the immediate construction of a battleship of the latest type and of a second of the same type if necessary. This offer was gratefully accepted by His Majesty's Government. On the 29th March the Canadian House of Commons passed a resolution recognizing the duty of Canada, as the country increased in numbers and wealth, to assume in a larger measure the responsibilities of national defence, and approving of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval Service in co-operation with, and in close relation to, the Imperial Navy. On the 15th April Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the

Australian Government, telegraphed that, whereas all the British Dominions ought to share the burden of maintaining the permanent naval supremacy of the Empire, so far as Australia was concerned this object would be best attained by the encouragement of naval development in that country. (On Mr. Deakin succeeding Mr. Fisher as Prime Minister a further telegram was sent on the 4th June, offering the Empire an Australian " Dreadnought " or such addition to its naval strength as may be determined after consultation in London.)

In view of these circumstances, His Majesty's Government considered the time was appropriate for the holding of a Conference to discuss afresh the relations of the Dominions to the United Kingdom in regard to the question of Imperial defence, and on the 30th April sent an invitation to the Defence Ministers of the four Dominions and the Cape Colonies to attend a Conference under the terms of Resolution I of the Conference of 1907, to discuss the general question of the naval and military defence of the Empire, with special reference to the Canadian resolution and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia.

(2). If the problem of Imperial naval defence were considered merely as a problem of naval strategy it would be found that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity of command. In furtherance, then, of the simple strategical ideal

the maximum of power would be gained if all parts of the Empire contributed, according to their needs and resources, to the maintenance of the British Navy.

(3). It has, however, long been recognized that in defining the condition under which the naval forces of the Empire should be developed other considerations than those of strategy alone must be taken into account. The various circumstances of the oversea Dominions have to be borne in mind. Though all have in them the seeds of a great advance in population, wealth and power, they have at the present time attained to different stages in their growth. Their geographical position has subjected them to internal and external strains, varying in kind and intensity. Their history and physical environment has given rise to individual national sentiment, for the expression of which room must be found. A simple contribution of money and material may be to one Dominion the most acceptable form in which to assist in Imperial defence. Another, while ready to provide local naval forces and to place them at the disposal of the Crown in the event of war, may wish to lay the foundation upon which a future navy of its own could be raised. A third may think that the best manner in which it can assist in promoting the interests of the Empire is in undertaking certain local services not directly of a naval character, but which may relieve the Imperial Government from expenses which would otherwise fall on the British Exchequer.

(4). The main duty of the forthcoming Conference as regards naval defence will be, therefore, to determine the form in which the various Dominion Governments can best participate in the burden of Imperial defence with due regard to varying political and geographical conditions. Looking to the difficulties involved it is not to be expected that the discussions with the several Defence Ministers will result in a complete and final scheme of naval defence, but it is to be hoped that it will be found possible to formulate the broad principles upon which the growth of Colonial naval forces should be fostered. While laying the foundations of future Dominion Navies to be maintained in different parts of the Empire, these forces should contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence.

(5). In the opinion of the Admiralty a Dominion Government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct Fleet unit; and the smallest unit is one which, while manageable in time of peace, is capable of being used in its component parts in time of war.

(6). Under certain conditions the establishment of local defence flotillas, consisting of torpedo craft and submarines, might be of assistance in time of war to the operations of the Fleet, but such flotillas cannot co-operate on the high seas in the wider duties of protection of trade and preventing attacks from hostile cruisers and squadrons. The operations of destroyers and torpedo boats are

necessarily limited to the waters near the coast or to a radius of action not far distant from a base, while there are great difficulties in manning such a force and keeping it always thoroughly efficient.

A scheme limited to torpedo craft would not, in itself, moreover, be a good means of gradually developing a self-contained fleet, capable of both offence and defence. Unless a naval force—whatever its size—complies with this condition it can never take its proper place in the organization of an Imperial Navy distributed strategically over the whole area of British interests.

(7). The Fleet unit to be aimed at should, therefore, in the opinion of the Admiralty, consist at least of the following :—

- 1 armoured-cruiser (new *Indomitable* class,
which is of the Dreadnought type),
- 3 unarmoured-cruisers (*Bristol* class),
- 6 destroyers,
- 3 submarines,

with the necessary auxiliaries such as depot and store ships, etc., which are not here specified.

Such a Fleet would be capable of action not only in the defence of coasts, but also of the trade routes, and would be sufficiently powerful to deal with small hostile squadrons should such ever attempt to act in its waters.

(8). Simply to man such a squadron, omitting auxiliary requirements and any margin for reliefs, sickness, etc., the minimum numbers required

would be about 2300 officers and men according to the Admiralty scheme of complements.

(9). The estimated first cost of building and arming such a complete Fleet unit would be approximately £3,700,000, and the cost of maintenance, including upkeep of vessels, pay, and interest and sinking fund, at British rates, approximately £600,000 per annum.

(10). The estimated cost of the officers and men required to man the ships does not comprise the whole cost. There would be other charges to be provided for, such as the pay of persons employed in subsidiary services, those undergoing training, sick, in reserve, etc.

(11). As the armoured-cruiser* is the essential part of the Fleet unit, it is important that an *Indomitable* of the Dreadnought type should be the first vessel to be built in commencing the formation of a fleet unit. She should be officered and manned as far as possible by Colonial officers and men, supplemented by the loan of Imperial officers and men who might volunteer for the service. While on the station the ship would be under the exclusive control of the Dominion Government as regards her movements and general administration, but officers and men would be governed by regulations similar to the King's regulations and be under naval discipline. The question of pay and allowances would have to be settled on lines the most suitable to each Dominion Government concerned. The other

* Now called battle-cruiser.

vessels when built would be treated in the same manner.

(12). It is recognized that to carry out completely such a scheme as that indicated would ultimately mean a greater charge for naval defence than that which the Dominions have hitherto borne ; but, on the other hand, the building of a Dreadnought (or its equivalent), which certain Governments have offered to undertake, would form part of the scheme, and therefore, as regards the most expensive item of the shipbuilding programme suggested, no additional cost to those Governments would be involved.

(13). *Pari passu* with the creation of the Fleet unit it would be necessary to consider the development of local resources in everything that relates to the maintenance of a Fleet. A careful enquiry should be made into the shipbuilding and repairing establishments, with a view to their general adaptation to the needs of the local squadron. Training schools for officers and men would have to be established ; arrangements would have to be made for the manufacture, supply and replenishment of the various naval ordnance and victualling stores required by the squadron.

(14). All these requirements might be met according to the view of the Dominion Governments, in so far as the form and manner of the provisions made are concerned. But as regards shipbuilding, armaments and warlike stores, etc., on the one hand, and training and discipline in peace and war on the other,

there should be one common standard. If the Fleet unit maintained by a Dominion is to be treated as an integral part of the Imperial Forces, with a wide range of interchangeability among its component parts with those forces, its general efficiency should be the same, and the facilities for refitting and replenishing His Majesty's ships, whether belonging to a Dominion Fleet or to the Fleet of the United Kingdom should be the same. Further, as it is a *ine quâ non* that successful action in time of wars depends upon unity of command and direction, the general discipline must be the same throughout the whole service, and without this it would not be possible to arrange for that mutual co-operation and assistance which would be indispensable in the building up and establishing of a local naval force in close connection with the Royal Navy. It has been recognized by the Colonial Governments that in time of war the local naval forces should come under the general directions of the Admiralty.

Admiralty, July 20, 1909.

R.McK.

Imperial Conference. Correspondence and papers relating to a Conference with representatives of the self-governing Dominions on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire. 1909. (Cd.4948.)

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF OVERSEA
DOMINIONS AND THE HOME GOVERNMENT
ON THE INSTITUTION OF THE DOMINION AND
COMMONWEALTH NAVAL FORCES.

THE naval services and forces of the Dominions of Canada and Australia will be exclusively under the control of their respective Governments.

II. The training and discipline of the naval forces of the Dominions will be generally uniform with the training and discipline of the Fleet of the United Kingdom, and by arrangement the officers and men of the said forces will be interchangeable with those under the control of the British Admiralty.

III. The ships of each Dominion naval force will hoist at the stern the White Ensign as the symbol of the authority of the Crown and at the Jackstaff the distinctive flag of the Dominion.

IV. The Canadian and Australian Governments will have their own naval stations as agreed upon from time to time. The limits of the stations are as described in Schedule A (Canada) and Schedule B (Australia).

V. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to send ships to a part of the British Empire outside their own respective stations they will notify the British Admiralty.

VI. In the event of the Canadian or Australian Government desiring to send ships to a foreign port they will obtain the concurrence of the Imperial Government in order that the necessary arrangements with the Foreign Office may be made, as in the case of ships of the British Fleet, in such time and manner as are usual between the British Admiralty and the Foreign Office.

VII. While the ships of the Dominions are at a foreign port a report of their proceedings will be forwarded by the officer in command to the Commander-in-Chief on the station or to the British Admiralty.

VIII. An officer in command of a Dominion ship, so long as he remains in a foreign port, will obey any instructions he may receive from the Government of the United Kingdom as to the conduct of any International matters that may arise, the Dominion Government being informed. A commanding officer of a Dominion ship having to put into a foreign port without previous arrangement on account of stress of weather, damages or any unforeseen emergency will report his arrival and reason for calling to the Commander-in-Chief of the station or to the Admiralty and will obey, so long as he remains in a foreign port, any instructions he may receive from the Government of the United Kingdom as to his

relations with the authorities, the Dominion Government being informed.

IX. When a ship of the British Admiralty meets a ship of the Dominion the senior officer will have the right of command in matters of ceremony, or international intercourse, or where united action is agreed upon, but will have no power to direct the movement of ships of the other service unless the ships are ordered to co-operate by mutual agreement.

X. In foreign ports the senior officer will take command, but not so as to interfere with orders that the junior officer may have received from his own Government.

XI. When a Court-martial has to be ordered by a Dominion and a sufficient number of officers are not available in the Dominion service at the time, the British Admiralty, if requested, will make the necessary arrangements to enable a Court to be formed. Provision will be made by order of His Majesty in Council and the Dominion Government to define the conditions under which the officers of the different services are to sit on joint Courts-martial.

XII. The British Admiralty undertakes to lend to the Dominions during the period of development of their services under conditions to be agreed upon, such flag-officers and other officers and men as may be needed. In their selection preference shall be given to officers and men coming from or connected with the Dominion, but they should all be volunteers to the service.

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XIII. The service of officers of the British Fleet in the Dominion naval forces or of officers of these forces in the British Fleet, will count in all respects for the promotion, pay, retirement, etc., as service in their respective forces.

XIV. In order to determine all questions of seniority that may arise the names of all officers will be shown in the Navy List and their seniority determined by the date of the commission, whichever is the earlier, in the British, Canadian, or Australian services.

XV. It is desirable in the interest of efficiency and co-operation that arrangements should be made from time to time between the British Admiralty and the Dominions for ships of the Dominions to take part in Fleet exercises or for any other joint training considered necessary, under the senior naval officer. While so employed the ships will be under the command of that officer, who would not, however, interfere in the internal economy of the ships of another Service further than may be absolutely necessary.

XVI. In time of war, when the naval Service of a Dominion or any part thereof has been put at the disposal of the Imperial Government by the Dominion authorities, the ships will form an integral part of the British Fleet and will remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of war.

XVII. The Dominions having applied to their naval forces the King's Regulations, Admiralty

Instructions and Naval Discipline Act, the British Admiralty and the Dominion Governments will communicate to each other any changes which they propose to make in these Regulations or that Act.

SCHEDULE A (Canada).

The Canadian Atlantic Station will include the waters north of 30 deg. north latitude, and west of meridian 40 deg. west longitude.

The Canadian Pacific Station will include the waters north of 30 deg. north latitude, and east of meridian 180 deg. longitude.

SCHEDULE B (Australia).

The Australian Naval Station will include on the north from 95 deg. east longitude by the parallel of 13 deg. south latitude to 120 deg. east longitude, thence north to 11 deg. south latitude, thence to the boundary with Dutch New Guinea on the south coast in about longitude 141 deg. east, thence along the coast of British New Guinea to the boundary with German New Guinea in latitude 8 deg. south, thence east to 155 deg. east longitude.

On the east by the meridian of 155 deg. east longitude to 15 deg. south latitude, thence to 28 deg. south latitude on the meridian of 170 deg. east longitude, thence south to 30 deg. south latitude,

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thence west of the meridian of 160 deg. east longitude, thence south.

On the south by the Antarctic Circle.

On the west by the meridian of 95 deg. east longitude.

APPENDIX III

THE CAPTURE OF THE EMDEN

ADMIRALTY, *January 1st, 1915.*

THE following despatch has been received from Captain John C. T. Glossop reporting the capture of the German cruiser *Emden* by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*.

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* at Colombo,
November 15th, 1914.

SIR,

I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*, at 6.30 a.m. on Monday 9th November, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. *Emden* coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid

to begin with but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action I had not fired, and as she was making off fast I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows and hoisting International Code signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat and found her to be the s.s. *Buresk*, a captured British collier with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English steward, 1 Norwegian cook and a German prize crew of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, the Kingston knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired four shells into her, and returned to *Emden*, passing men swimming in the water for whom I left two boats I was towing from *Buresk*.

3. On arriving again off *Emden* she still had her colours up at mainmast head. I enquired by signal, International Code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse, "What signal? No signal books." I then made in Morse "Do you surrender?" and subsequently "Have you received

my signal ? " to neither of which did I get an answer. The German officers on board gave me to understand that the Captain would never surrender and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35, as she showed white flags and hauled down the ensign by sending a man aloft.

4. I then left *Emden* and returned and picked up the *Buresk's* two boats, rescuing two sailors (5 p.m.) who had been in the water all day.

I returned and sent in one boat to the *Emden*, manned by her own prize crew from the *Buresk*, and one officer, and stating I would return to their assistance next morning.

This I had to do, as I was desirous to find out the condition of cables and wireless station at Direction Island. On the passage over I was again delayed by rescuing another sailor (6.30 p.m.), and by the time I was again ready and approaching Direction Island it was too late for the night.

I lay on and off all night, and communicated with Direction Island at 8 a.m., November 10th, to find that the *Emden's* party, consisting of three officers and forty men, one launch and two cutters, had seized and provisioned a 70-ton schooner (the *Ayasha*), having four maxims with two belts to each. They left the previous night at 6 o'clock.

The wireless station was entirely destroyed, one cable cut, one damaged, and one intact. I borrowed a doctor and two assistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to the *Emden's* assistance.

I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded, and lack of accommodation, etc., in this ship, and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded "then for such time as they remained in the *Sydney* they would cause no interference with ship or fittings and would be amenable to the ship's discipline."

I therefore set to work at once to tranship them, —a most difficult operation, the ship being on weather side of island, and the seas alongside very heavy. The conditions on board the *Emden* were indescribable. I received the last from her at 5 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up twenty more men who had managed to get ashore from the ship.

Darkness came on before this could be accomplished and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5 a.m. on November 11th, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring the wounded round to embarking point. A German officer, a doctor, died ashore the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction Island, to return their doctor and assistants, send cables, and was back again at 10 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded, and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m., Wednesday, November 11th.

Total casualties in the *Sydney*: killed 3; severely wounded (since dead) 1; severely wounded 4;

wounded 4 ; slightly wounded 4. In the *Emden* I can only approximately state the killed at 7 officers and 108 men, from captain's statement. I had on board 11 officers and 9 warrant officers and 191 men ; of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.

The damage to the *Sydney*'s hull and fittings was surprisingly small ; in all about ten hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler-rooms and funnels escaped entirely.

I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of young hands and people under training, it is all the more gratifying. The engines worked magnificently, and higher results than trials were obtained, and I cannot speak too highly of the medical staff and arrangements on subsequent trip, the ship being nothing but a hospital of a most painful description.

JOHN C. T. GLOSSOP,
Captain.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.



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
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